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A  HISTORY  OF 


Two  Reciprocity  Treaties 


THE   TREATY    WITH    CANADA    IN    18^4 

THE    TREATY    WITH    THE    HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS    IN    1876 

WITH  A  CHAPTER  ON 

THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER  OF  THE 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 


BY 

CHALFANT   ROBINSON,   Ph.D. 


THE    TUTTLE,     MOREHOUSE    &    TAVLOB    PRESS 

NEW    HAVEN,     CONN, 


2(a 
GEORGE  W.  HAMILTON 


PREFACE 


There  is  a  wide-spread  and  increasing  interest  in  reci- 
procity as  one  solution  of  the  problem  presented  by  the  tariff 
in  its  relation  to  trade.  This  general  interest  is  offered  as  a 
reason  for  the  publication  of  another  book  so  soon  after  the 
appearance  of  Reciprocity,  in  which  Professors  Laughlin  and 
Willis  have  given  such  a  comprehensive  treatment  of  the 
whole  subject. 

Eleven  years  ago,  Dr.  F.  E.  Haynes  published  an  excellent 
article  on  "The  Reciprocity  Treaty  of  1854  with  Canada" 
in  volume  VII  of  the  Publications  of  the  American  Eco- 
nomic Association,  November,  1892.  But  in  relation  to 
Canada  and  to  Hawaii,  both  of  these  publications  are  more 
or  less  limited  in  scope,  and  inasmuch  as  public  questions 
of  great  importance  are  involved,  and  as  these  treaties 
present  so  many  points  of  interest  to  the  student  of  political 
and  commercial  history,  no  excuse  seems  necessary  for 
considering  them  both  in  greater  detail  than  has  yet  been 
done. 

The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854,  as  it  appears  in  this 
volume,  was  submitted  to  the  Faculty  of  Yale  University 
for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy,  in  June,  1902.  The 
Hawaiian  Treaty  of  1876  was  practically  finished  when 
Reciprocity  appeared,  and  a  projected  chapter  on  Cuba  was 
laid  aside  because  that  work  had  already  covered  the  Cuban 
Treaty. 


6  Preface. 

The  writer  wishes  to  express  his  gratitude  for  many  valu- 
able suggestions  to  Professor  Edward  G.  Bourne  of  Yale 
University,  and  for  courtesies  in  the  use  of  the  library  to 
Professor  Addison  Van  Name,  Yale  University,  to  the 
Officers  of  the  Library  of  Harvard  University,  and  to  Dr. 
Roland  P.  Falkner,  Chief  of  the  Documents  Department  in 
the  Congressional  Library. 

Yale  University, 
New  Haven,  November  i6,   1903. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Introduction 9 


PART  I 

The  Reciprocity  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854     ...        19 

CHAPTER    I 
The  diplomatic  history  of  the  treaty 21 

CHAPTER    H 
The  treaty  in  operation         ........         40 

CHAPTER    HI 
The  circumstances  which  led  to  its  abrogation  ...         65 

PART  II 

The  Reciprocity  Treaty  with  the  Hawaiian  Islands  in  1876  89 

CHAPTER   I 

Annexation  or  reciprocity  with  the  United  States  ;  the  history  of 

Hawaii's  early  international  relations  ....         91 


8  Contents. 

CHAPTER    II 

PAGE 

The  political   and  the  commercial  elements  in  the  treaty;   the 

history  of   its  ratification,  and  its  adoption  by  Congress       109 

CHAPTER   III 

The  operation  of  the  treaty ;  the  extension  of  its  provisions,  and 

its  renewal  .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .       141 


PART  III 

The  Treaty-making   Power  of  the  House  of  Representa- 


161 


PART  IV 

APPENDIX 

A  Consideration  of  some  of  the  Economic  Conditions  Found 
IN  the  Sandwich  Islands  at  the  Time  of  their  Discov- 
ery BY  Captain  Cook 179 


INTRODUCTlOiN 


At  the  close  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  although  their 
political  connection  with  Great  Britain  had  ceased,  the  thir- 
teen revolted  colonies  had  every  reason  to  expect  that  such 
trade  as  then  existed  would  necessarily  continue  with  the 
British  West  Indies,  as  well  as  with  Canada,  and  the  other 
northern  colonies.  This  expectation  was  due  to  a  just 
recognition  of  the  great  advantages  connected  with  their  eco- 
nomic position  in  the  colonial  system  which  they  had  just  left. 
The  resources  of  Canada  were  as  yet  undeveloped,  to  be 
sure,  and  the  other  northern  colonies,  Nova  Scotia,  Prince 
Edward  Island,  and  Newfoundland,  had  little  but  gypsum, 
fish,  and  lumber  to  return  to  the  United  States  in  exchange 
for  the  provisions  which  the  Americans  later  found  it  profit- 
able to  sell  to  them ;  but  they,  unlike  Canada,  were  com- 
petitors with  the  United  States  for  the  trade  of  supplying  fish 
and  lumber  to  the  British  West  Indies.  In  their  relations  to 
this  West  Indian  trade  Newfoundland,  Nova  Scotia,  and  the 
other  northern  colonies  were  now,  since  the  Revolution,  the 
more  favorably  situated  because  they  still  enjoyed  within  the 
English  navigation  system  a  freedom  of  trade  which  was 
denied  to  the  United  States  by  law,  and  this  freedom  of  trade 
to  a  great  extent  balanced  whatever  advantage  it  may  have 
been  to  the  United  States  to  be  a  little  nearer  to  the  West 
Indian  market.  English  colonial  vessels  might  freely  carry 
back  the  tropical  products  of  the  West  Indies  in  return  for 
fish  and  lumber  from  the  northern  English  colonies,  while 
United  States  vessels  were  uniformly  excluded  from  these 
northern  ports,  and  might  supply  to  Jamaica,  and  to  the 
British  West  India  Islands,  in  English  vessels,  such  indis- 


lo  Introduction. 

pensable  commodities  only  as  the  northern  British  colonies 
could  not  furnish.^ 

The  laws  of  the  English  colonial  system  endeavored  in  a 
like  manner  to  confine  to  England  and  to  her  colonies  such 
trade  as  Canada  and  the  northern  colonies  carried  on.  It 
must  be  remembered,  too,  that  the  English  colonial  system 
had  tended  to  develop  and  to  foster  an  inter-colonial  trade 
while  the  thirteen  revolted  States  were  still  colonies.  The 
result  of  this  system  had  been  to  knit  certain  colonies 
together  by  trade  so  closely  that  the  political  changes  which 
followed  the  Revolution,  and  the  War  of  1812,  served  only 
for  a  time  to  check  the  tendency  to  continue  these  trade 
conditions  which  had  been  so  diligently  promoted  by  the 
English  Navigation  Laws. 

The  commercial  inter-dependence  of  these  colonies  did 
not  cease  when  some  of  them  changed  their  political  status. 
It  had  been  too  firmly  established  by  tradition  and  by  custom, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  West  Indies,  to  be  easily  set  aside,  and 
whatever  was  the  natural  feeling  of  rancor  and  hatred  which 
the  exiled  Tories  carried  with  them  to  Canada,  and  to  the 
other  northern  colonies,  it  was  not  of  such  character  as  to 
prevent  them  from  exchanging  their  furs  and  certain  farm 
products,  wherever  such  trade  could  be  profitably  made,  for 
supplies  of  various  kinds  which  came  to  them  from  the 
United  States.^ 

'  Exactly  what  these  commodities  were  we  know  from  an  enumera- 
tion in  28  Geo.  Ill,  Cap.  6,  Par.  i  of  articles  which  might  be  lawfully 
exported  from  the  United  States  to  the  British  West  Indies.  These 
articles  were  :  tobacco,  pitch,  tar,  turpentine,  hemp,  flax,  masts,  yards, 
bow-sprits,  staves,  headings,  timber,  shingles,  lumber,  cattle  and  live- 
stock, bread,  biscuit  flour,  peas,  beans,  potatoes,  wheat,  rice,  oats, 
barley  and  grain.  A  list  which  indicates  how  inadequate  the  resources 
of  the  northern  colonies  were  to  supply  the  demands  made  by  the  West 
Indies. 

*  The  value  of  exports  from  the  United  States  to  the  British  North 
American  Colonies  in  1798  was  over  $600,000.  Chas.  H.  Evans, 
Domestic  Exports,  Table  No.  5,  pp.  79-80,  Washington,  1884,  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office.  Too  much  weight,  of  course,  must  not  be  laid 
upon  the  trade  with  Canada,  which  had  been  English  only  since  1763, 


Introduction.  ii 

The  growth  of  these  commercial  interests,  after  the  war, 
for  a  long  time  held  New  England  and  the  colonies  more 
or  less  unwillingly  bound  together ;  and  the  persistent  idea  of 
this  relationship  to  each  other  as  parts  of  a  commercial  unit, 
such  as  existed  when  they  were  all  colonies  of  Great  Britain, 
has  consciously  or  unconsciously  influenced  every  attempt  to 
negotiate  reciprocity  treaties  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  for  greater  freedom  of  trade  with  the  northern 
colonies,  and  also  with  the  British  West  Indies,  that  is  to  say, 
it  has  to  a  certain  extent  influenced  every  attempt  to  re-estab- 
lish the  old  freedom  of  trade  which  once  existed  between  all 
the  colonies. 

To  imderstand  what  this  means,  it  is  necessary  to  recall 
what  the  Navigation  System  had  aimed  to  bring  about.  In 
the  first  place,  it  had  intended  to  secure  to  British  vessels  a 
monopoly  of  the  carrying  trade  of  Great  Britain.  By  law 
colonial  ships  were  considered  to  be  British  vessels,  and  they 
might  freely  trade  to  and  fro  between  any  parts  of  the  British 
dominions.  Vessels  of  any  other  nationality  whatsoever 
were  rigorously  shut  out  from  this  trade,  in  order  that 
British  ships  might  have  no  foreign  competition.  In  the 
second  place,  it  had  intended  to  secure  to  English  merchants 
the  entire  English  colonial  trade.  This  was  accomplished 
by  allowing  the  colonist  to  import  what  he  needed  only 
through  the  English  merchant.  And  to  protect  the  English 
home  interests,  the  colonists  were  further  forbidden,  to  a 
limited  extent,  to  manufacture ;  the  idea  being  that  Great 
Britain  would  obtain  her  needed  raw  materials  from  her 
colonies,  and  would  sell  to  them  in  return  her  own  manufac- 
tured goods. 

but  in  1712  complaint  was  being  made  in  Canada  that  it  was  impossible 
to  prevent  furs  from  being  disposed  of  to  the  English  colonies,  because 
the  English  gave  a  better  trade  in  return  for  them  than  the  French. 

Charlevoix,  History  of  New  France  (Shea),  V,  p.  265. 

In  1650  a  proposition  to  establish  commercial  intercourse  between  the 
French  and  English  colonies  had  come  to  the  New  England  commission- 
ers, from  Quebec,  but  was  refused. 

Collections  of  the  New  York  Historical  Society,  vol.  H,  new  series, 
pp.  322-325. 


12  Introduction. 

This,  if  it  could  have  been  maintained,  was  an  ideal  condi- 
tion of  reciprocity,  presumably  good  for  the  colonists,  who 
would  thus  find  a  fairly  sure  market  for  their  natural  com- 
modities, and  assuredly  good  for  the  English  manufacturer, 
who  would  not  need  to  go  into  foreign  markets  for  his 
supplies,  and  who  could  practically  force  the  colonists  to 
buy  what  he  had  to  sell.  The  colonists,  being  thus  restrained 
from  manufacturing,  had  turned  their  attention  to  ship- 
building, and  to  producing,  not  only  those  commodities  and 
raw  materials  which  would  find  a  sale  in  England,  but  also 
to  producing  those  which  the  neighboring  colonies  required, 
but  which  owing  to  their  soil  and  geographical  position 
they  could  not  produce. 

When  the  thirteen  colonies  cast  ofif  their  political  allegiance 
to  Great  Britain,  however,  although  their  economic  relation 
to  the  colonial  system  remained  unaltered,  they  were  at  once 
shut  out  from  the  protection  and  the  privileges  which  they 
had  enjoyed  as  English  colonies.  The  door  being  closed 
upon  them,  they  were  as  strangers  outside,  while  those 
within,  their  former  fellow  colonists,  by  reason  of  belong- 
ing to  the  same  economic  and  geographical  unit  as  the 
United  States,  were  compelled  to  suffer  because  of  the 
attempted  exclusion  of  the  United  States  from  their  com- 
mercial life.  The  political  division,  instead  of  coinciding 
with  the  economic  boundaries,  now  ran  athwart  them,  and 
attempted  by  artificial  trade  regulations  to  separate  that 
which  by  nature  was  bound  together.  Thus  it  came  about 
that  there  was  pressure  brought  to  bear  both  from  within 
and  from  without  the  system  to  restore  as  far  as  possible 
the  old  relations. 

This  was  true  of  our  intercourse  with  both  Canada  and 
the  West  Indies.  In  each  case  the  need  for  American 
productions  and  the  need  for  American  markets  compelled 
some  kind  of  commercial  adjustment,  and  materially  aided 
the  United  States  in  its  endeavor  to  make  an  opening  in  the 
smooth  front  of  the  British  colonial  system.  How  these 
forces  operated  in  the  case  of  Canada  is  told  in  the  treaty 


Introduction.  13 

which  follows.  The  thing  desired  by  the  United  States,  it 
will  be  remembered,  was  that  American  fishermen  be  allowed 
to  fish  in  disputed  waters  as  they  had  done  when  they  were 
colonists  of  Great  Britain.  It  was  Canada's  desire  that  the 
United  States  should  so  far  return  to  the  old  colon,ial 
arrangement  as  to  allow  a  free  trade  to  take  place  in  the 
raw^  materials  of  both  countries.  Of  course  when  this  desire 
found  expression  in  the  treaty  of  1854,  it  was  not  put  into 
that  form,  but  it  meant  practically  nothing  more. 

Until  the  United  States  became  a  manufacturing  nation, 
the  limitations  placed  upon  her  trade  with  Canada  were 
of  little  consequence.  It  was  the  need  for  a  settlement  of 
the  fishery  question  which  pressed  upon  the  Republic,  and 
this  brought  about  an  adjustment  of  the  trade  relations  in  a 
treaty  with  Canada,  by  which  the  United  States  not  only 
regained  all  that  had  been  desirable  in  the  old  colonial  system 
with  respect  to  Canada,  but  by  which  the  United  States  was 
placed  in  a  position  where  it  hoped  to  be  able  even  tO'  sup- 
plant the  mother  country,  and,  by  supplying  American 
manufactured  goods  to  Canada  in  return  for  Canadian  raw 
materials,  to  assume  the  reciprocal  relation  toward  Canada 
which  England  had  held  in  colonial  times. 

In  the  case  of  the  West  Indies,  the  United  States  wanted 
to  share  with  British  ships,  on  her  former  colonial  footing, 
the  right  to  carry  cargoes  to  and  from  British  West  Indian 
ports,  not  only  to  the  United  States,  but  to  British  colonial 
ports  as  well.  In  other  words,  Great  Britain  was  urged  to 
concede  to  the  United  States  precisely  the  most  vital  point 
in  the  English  navigation  system,  the  right  tO'  trade  between 
British  colonies  in  vessels  other  than  those  of  British 
register. 

At  no  time  while  the  controversy  lasted,  from  Jay's  treaty 
in  1794  until  1831,  was  England  inclined  to  yield  anything 
of  the  kind.  The  United  States  really  did  not  expect  that 
England  would,  and  the  question  became  simply  this  test 
of  endurance :  Could  the  economic  dependence  of  the  British 
West  Indies  upon  the  United  States  be  relied  on  to  force 


14  Introduction. 

Great  Britain  to  yield,  or  would  the  merchants  and  farmers 
of  the  United  States  compel  the  American  ship  owners  to 
give  up  the  fight  in  order  that  their  trade  might  not  be 
interfered  with. 

The  twelfth  article  of  Jay's  treaty  had  contained  a  virtual 
reciprocity  treaty  with  the  West  Indies.  It  had  provided 
for  reciprocal  port  and  tonnage  dues,  and  had  admitted  the 
United  States  to  a  share  in  the  carrying  trade  between  the 
West  Indies  and  the  United  States,  stipulating  that  the 
United  States  should  not  re-export  the  sugar,  molasses, 
coffee,  cocoa,  and  cotton  after  it  had  been  brought  there 
from  the  West  Indies,  and  further,  that  American  vessels 
plying  this  trade  must  be  seventy  tons  burden  or  less.  Both 
of  these  provisions  were,  of  course,  with  the  end  in  view  to 
keep  American  vessels  from  trading  between  West  Indian 
ports  and  foreign  countries  or  with  other  British  colonies. 
This  clause  was  struck  out  by  the  United  States  Senate  as 
unsatisfactory,  however,  and  the  West  Indian  trade  question 
had  been  thus  left  without  treaty  adjustment. 

In  the  thirty-five  years  from  Jay's  treaty  until  the  United 
States  yielded  the  claim  that  its  vessels  should  properly  be 
allowed  to  share  with  England  in  the  carrying  trade  between 
the  British  colonies,  there  was  never  any  obscurity  as  to  the 
point  at  issue. 

The  course  of  action  pursued  by  the  United  States  to  force 
Great  Britain  to  yield  this  point  and  the  resistance  made  by 
Great  Britain  is,  however,  much  more  involved.  The  his- 
tory of  the  retaliatory  measures  adopted  by  each  nation  is 
not  necessary  here,  but  a  consideration  of  the  conditions 
which  made  them  possible  is  pertinent  to  the  subject  of 
reciprocity  treaties,  and  particularly  to  the  relation  which 
the  commercial  unity  under  the  old  English  colonial  system 
bears  to  recent  and  to  remote  attempts  to  restore  those  free 
conditions  of  trade  through  reciprocity  treaties. 

The  British  West  Indies  and  the  middle  and  eastern 
sections  of  the  United  States  stand  in  intimate  economic 
relations  to  each  other.     The  strip  of  ocean  that  separates 


Introduction.  15 

them,  at  the  same  time  binds  them  together.  This  fact  and 
the  varied  character  of  their  productions  has  always  made 
it  natural  that  an  exchange  of  commodities  should  take  place. 
In  colonial  times  it  was  even  more  easy  than  it  has  since 
been,  and  this  was  because  of  the  artificial  stimulus  given 
by  the  Navigation  Laws  to  inter-colonial  trade  in  raw 
materials.  For,  being  forbidden  to  manufacture  for  export 
or  for  each  other,  the  colonies  were  induced  to  trade  with 
each  other  in  their  natural  productions. 

In  itself  this  was  fortunate,  because,  due  to  their  respec- 
tive geographical  positions,  one  colony  usually  produced  in 
abundance  what  another  colony  most  needed.  This  recipro- 
cal inter-dependence  was  particularly  true  of  the  productions 
of  New  England  and  of  the  West  Indies.  New  England's 
forests  furnished  timber  of  the  most  useful  kind,  her  waters 
abounded  in  fish,  and  her  farms  yielded  flour  and  provisions 
of  all  sorts,  as  well  as  cattle.  The  West  India  Islands 
needed  all  these  staples  of  New  England  and  of  the  middle 
states,  for  they  produced  none  of  them.  Timber  and  lumber 
were  needed  not  only  for  building  houses,  and  for  supplying 
ships  with  spars,  but  immense  quantities  of  staves  and  head- 
ings were  used  in  the  manufacture  of  casks  and  barrels  for 
holding  molasses,  rum,  and  sugar.  The  soil  of  the  West 
India  Islands  is  so  productive  and  so  well  adapted  to  the 
growth  of  sugar-cane  that  the  available  land  was  all  used  to 
produce  the  sugar  crop,  and  in  this  way  little  or  no  attempt 
was  made  to  raise  anything  else.  The  attention  thus  given 
to  sugar-cane  made  the  Islands  especially  dependent  on 
supplies  like  wheat,  bread,  flour,  potatoes,  all  kinds  of  grain, 
cattle  and  timber,  which  could  only  be  furnished  them  from 
without,  a  position  of  dependence  very  much  like  that  of 
Hawaii  at  a  somewhat  later  period.  These  were  all  profit- 
ably furnished  by  New  England  because  the  supplies  of 
New  England  were  close  at  hand. 

On  their  part,  the  West  Indies  furnished  mainly  sugar  and 
molasses,  which  the  New  England  merchants  were  glad  to 
exchange  for  their  timber,  fish  and  farm  products.     It  is 


1 6  Introduction. 

familiar  history  how  they  took  the  molasses  tO'  New  England 
to  distill  it  into  rum,  how  with  the  rum  they  bought  negroes 
on  the  West  Coast  of  Africa,  which  in  turn  they  sold  as 
slaves  to  the  planters  of  the  West  Indies,  who  paid  for  them 
in  sugar  and  molasses.  This  trade  became  very  extensive, 
and  was  carried  on  with  profit  to  both  parties  as  long  as 
New  England  remained  in  the  English  colonial  system. 

As  it  has  been  said,  the  needs  of  the  inhabitants  of  those 
Islands,  and  their  dependence  upon  the  United  States  for 
supplies,  were  used  by  the  United  States  in  attempting  to 
break  down  the  opposition  of  Great  Britain  to  foreign  com- 
petition in  her  carrying  trade.  The  attempt  did  not  succeed, 
but  the  intimate  trade  relations  with  the  West  Indies  did 
not  cease  as  a  result. 

For,  as  the  United  States  became  a  great  manufacturing 
nation,  it  not  only  did  not  cease  to  produce  natural  com- 
modities, but  it  was  able  to  add  to  the  list  of  goods  supplied 
to  the  West  Indian  trade. 

When  the  Canadian  treaty  was  under  discussion,  consistent 
with  the  tendency  to  re-establish  a  freedom  of  trade  which 
had  once  been  enjoyed  by  the  colonies,  it  was  urged  that  the 
British  West  India  Islands  should  be  included  in  that  reci- 
procity agreement,  although  this  arrangement  did  not  take 
place.  It  was  not  until  the  McKinley  Act  of  1890  provided 
for  it,  that  the  idea  of  restoring  colonial  free  trade  found 
expression  in  the  reciprocity  treaties  negotiated  with  Great 
Britain  for  the  West  Indies  in  1892,  by  the  provisions  of  which 
the  raw  materials  of  these  Islands  were  to  be  exchanged  for 
the  natural  productions  of  the  United  States,  and  for  Ameri- 
can manufactured  goods  under  very  favorable  conditions. 
They  are  examples  of  the  same  influence  which  was  apparent 
in  connection  with  the  reciprocity  treaty  with  Canada  in 
1854 :  the  idea  of  a  greater  freedom  of  trade  because  of  the 
direction  originally  given  to  it  by  the  regulations  of  the  old 
English  colonial  system,  to  which,  as  the  thirteen  colonies, 
we  once  belonged. 


Introduction.  17 

The  return  to  these  early  trade  conditions  would  seem 
to  indicate  that  after  all,  the  Navigation  System  did  not 
press  so  heavily  upon  the  colonists,  and  did  not  so  directly 
contravene  the  natural  laws  of  trade,  as  we  have  been 
accustomed  to  believe. 

The  present  relation  of  Canada  to  reciprocity  is  most 
interesting.  What  will  be  the  outcome  of  the  agitation  in 
England  for  a  return  to  a  protective  tariff  is  entirely  a  matter 
of  conjecture;  Canada  may  not  become  a  part  of  the  pro- 
posed Imperial  Customs-union,  and  the  movement  may  fail 
altogether,  but  it  is  quite  possible  that,  influenced  by  the 
agitation  in  England  for  commercial  re-adjustment,  Canada 
may  gravitate  to  the  commercial  system  of  the  American 
Republic. 

In  this  connection,  the  influence  of  the  northern  migra- 
tion of  American  farmers  to  the  wheat  fields  of  British 
Columbia  must  not  be  lost  sight  of,  nor  the  significant, 
though  more  limited,  settlement  of  French  Canadians  in  the 
mill  towns  of  New  England.  For  in  any  arrangement,  or 
lack  of  it,  between  the  United  States  and  Canada,  the 
economic  and  commercial  factor  will  be  vital. 

It  will  be  evident,  therefore,  that  the  history  of  the  attempt 
to  adjust  our  commercial  relations  with  Canada  by  a  reci- 
procity treaty  is  very  closely  connected  with  present  day 
issues. 

Further,  in  the  administration  of  our  island  dependencies, 
Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippine  Islands,  questions  have  arisen 
as  to  the  basis  upon  which  the  productions  of  those  islands 
should  be  admitted  to  the  United  States.  The  economic  and 
political  conditions  which  gave  rise  to  the  question  of  these 
commercial  regulations  have  so  many  points  in  common 
with  the  conditions  under  which  our  trade  with  Hawaii  has 
been  carried  on,  that  a  consideration  of  the  reciprocity  treaty 
with  Hawaii  caimot  fail  to  throw  light  on  these  more  recent 
and  related  questions. 


1 8  Introduction. 

As  a  means  of  freeing  trade,  otherwise  hampered  by  the 
operation  of  the  tariff,  the  employment  of  reciprocity  treaties 
is  not  less  important  on  its  political  side.  A  very  important 
question  here  suggests  itself :  Is  the  tendency  of  a  prolonged 
reciprocity  between  neighboring  countries  a  tendency  toward 
a  more  intimate  political  relation?  Where  the  countries 
have  their  boundaries  contiguous  with  our  own,  as  in  the 
case  of  Canada  and  of  Mexico,  or  where,  though  not  con- 
tiguous, they  are  adjacent,  as  Cuba,  will  reciprocity  treaties 
help  to  bring  about  annexation  to  the  United  States ;  or 
will  the  very  fact  that  their  commercial  intercourse  has  been 
placed  on  a  satisfactory  footing  thereby  remove  the  most 
obvious  reason  for  political  unity?  In  order  to  draw  any 
conclusions  upon  these  matters,  it  is  obviously  necessary  to 
consult  the  history  of  cases  where  reciprocity  has  already 
been  tried. 


PART   I 

THE  RECIPROCITY  TREATY  WITH  CANADA 

IN  18^4 


Chapter  I. 

The  Diplomatic  History  of  the   Treaty. 

The  treaty^  entered  into  by  the  United  States  and  by  Great 
Britain  in  behalf  of  her  North  American  colonies  in  the 
year  1854,  offered  an  apparently  happy  solution  for  several 
vexed  questions.  These  involved  in  their  nature  the  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  financial  policy  of  Great  Britain,  and  of 
the  United  States,  as  well  as  the  local  needs  and  prejudices 
of  the  individual  states  and  colonies. 

The  treaty  with  England,  in  1782,  had  specifically  pro- 
vided for  the  continuance  of  our  rights  in  the  fisheries  as 
before  the  war.  But  at  that  time  it  was  not  known  that  the 
source  of  the  Mississippi  River  did  not  lie  within  British 
territory.  This  fact  was  not  ascertained  until  the  Commis- 
sion, provided  for  in  Jay's  Treaty  of  1794,  had  determined 
the  northern  boundary  of  the  United  States,  and  Great 
Britain  was  thus  deprived  of  any  right  to  navigate  the  Mis- 
sissippi River,  a  matter  of  great  consequence  to  her.  When 
the  treaty  of  Ghent  was  drawn  up  in  1814,  at  the  close 
of  the  War  of  181 2,  the  fisheries  were  not  provided  for, 
because,  it  was  claimed,  the  war  had  annulled  any  previous 
treaty  stipulations,  and  a  new  agreement  was  necessary. 
This  idea  was  repelled  by  our  Commissioners,  but  a  subse- 
quent treaty  was  drawn  up  in  1818  to  provide  for  the  fish- 
eries. The  right  to  the  fisheries  may  have  been  withheld 
by  Great  Britain,  as  it  has  been  suggested,-  in  order  to 
exchange  it  for  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi.  At 
any  rate,  the  Convention  of  1818^  had  meant  to  compromise 
the  opposing  claims  of  the  two  governments  ;  that  the  United 

^  Haswell's  Treaties  and  Conventions,  p.  448.  10  U.  S.  Stat,  at 
Large,  1099.     Stat.  United  Kingdom,  18  and  19  Vict.  Cap.  3. 

'  J.  G.  Blaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  II,  pp.  615-618. 

'  59  Geo.  Ill,  Cap.  38.  J.  G.  Blaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol. 
II,  pp.  615-619. 


2  2  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4. 

States  had,  and  that  the  United  States  had  not  forfeited  by 
the  War  of  181 2  its  treaty  rights  to  take  fish  in  the  waters 
adjacent  to  the  British  colonies ;  but  an  ambiguous  clause 
as  to  the  extent  of  the  rights  defined  by  this  convention 
raised  an  issue  that  for  a  series  of  years  disturbed  the  peace 
of  the  two  nations,  an  issue  embodied  in  the  quarrel  of  the 
British  colonies  with  the  American  fishermen.  This  trouble 
caused  the  disputed  waters  to  be  patrolled  by  English  and 
American  war  vessels,  and  so  high  did  feeling  run  that 
frequently  only  the  prudence  of  the  naval  commanders 
prevented  an  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

The  issue^  raised  was  whether  the  line,  within  which  the 
Americans  might  not  fish,  should  be  drawn  three  miles  from 
shore  following  the  indentations  of  the  coast,  or  three  miles 
from  shore  drawn  from  headland  to  headland.  The  dif- 
ference was  vital.  Indented  as  the  New  England  and 
British  American  shores  are  by  innumerable  bays,  great 
and  small,  it  was  a  question  of  serious  importance  to  the 
American  fisherman  where  the  line  was  to  be  drawn ;  for 
the  decision  would  determine  whether  he  would  enjoy  or 
be  deprived  of  these  profitable  inlets  as  his  lawful  fishing 
grounds. 

Codfishing  is  deep-sea  fishing.  It  is  perilous,  therefore, 
and  if  pursued  alone  does  not  yield  profit  or  even  livelihood 
to  fishermen  coming  from  a  distance.  Furthermore,  the  fish- 
ing season  is  limited.  But  at  the  time  when  this  industry  is 
slack,  the  bays  and  inlets  swarm  with  herring  and  mackerel 
that  may  be  taken  without  danger  from  open  boats  and  cured 
on  shore,-  so  that  a  combination  of  the  three  kinds  of  fishing 
was  possible,  which  returned  good  profits  for  the  voyage ; 
but  without  the  privilege  of  entering  the  hays,  the  American 

^  Foreign  Relations,  Pt.  Ill,  1S73-4,  pp.  277-286.  Ex.  Docs.  No. 
23,  pp.  389-493  ;  32  Cong.  2  Sess.  ;  Article  in  North  American 
Review,  Vol.  62,  for  full  discussion  of  subject. 

"  A  full  treatment  of  this  phase  of  the  subject  is  given  in  the  report 
of  I.  D.  Andrews,  Sen.  Docs.  No.  112,  1851-52.  i  Sess.  32  Cong., 
Vol.  II,  pp.  39-41. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854.  23 

fishermen  were  driven  to  violate  the  law/  or  to  take  up  other 
occupations  on  shore. ^ 

The  colonial  interpretation''  of  the  treaty  was  that  the 
line  should  be  drawn  from  headland  to  headland,  a  thing 
preposterous  to  the  Americans  who  had  before  this  always 
fished  in  these  waters  unchallenged.  But  the  provincial 
governments  refused  to  make  concessions,  and  remained 
obdurate*  even  when  Great  Britain  was  willing  to  yield. 

Because  of  this  attitude  of  the  Provinces,  the  United 
States  appeared  unable  in  any  way  to  obtain  a  privilege 
that  it  very  much  desired,  and,  when  year  after  year  Ameri- 
can fishing  boats  were  seized  by  the  colonial  authorities, 
could  only  make  protests^  to  Great  Britain. 

A  change,  far  reaching  in  its  results,  took  place  in  the 
economic  policy  of  Great  Britain  in  1846.  This  was  the  ■ 
free  trade  movement,  which,  by  the  repeal  of  the  British 
Corn  Laws,  reacted  upon  the  trade  of  the  North  American 
colonies,  and  forced  them  in  turn  to  seek  such  commercial 
adjustments  with  the  United  States  as  the  serious  position 
of  the  colonies  made  urgent.  In  earlier  years  a  differen- 
tial duty  by  certain  laws  had  protected  grain  and  lumber, 

'  "One  of  the  most  serious  consequences  of  this  habitual  evasion  of 
the  terms  of  the  convention  of  iSiS,  was  that  the  American  fishing 
vessels  were  obliged  to  place  themselves  in  difficult  and  dangerous 
positions  to  avoid  detection.  In  1851,  over  100  vessels  were  driven 
ashore  on  Prince  Edward  Island  in  a  gale  and  over  300  lives  lost.  The 
fleet  braved  the  storm  rather  than  run  for  port,  and  thus  confess  their 
infraction  of  British  rights." — The  Reciprocity  Treaty.  (Prize  essay) 
Arthur  Harvey,  p.  7,  note  (c). 

The  Americans  never  acknowledged  these  rights  ;  and  their  treat- 
ment in  British  colonial  ports  was  such  that  they  usually  preferred  the 
high  seas. 

^  Reports  of  Committees,  2  Sess.  32  Cong.  1852-53  ;  Report  No.  4, 
p.  24. 

2  Ex.  Docs.  2  Sess.  32  Cong.,  Vol.  3,  1S52-53  ;  H.  Doc.  No.  23,  p. 
406,  Sec.  2. 

*  North  Am.  Review,  Vol.  62,  pp.  369-70,  et  seq. 

'"  A  list  of  official  papers  relating  to  the  fishery  dispute  with  Great 
Britain  from  June  25,  1S23,  to  July  14,  1852,  is  found  in  Sen.  Docs. 
32  Cong.  I  Sess.  Vol.  10,  No.  100,  pp.  3-155- 


24  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4. 

the  great  colonial  staples,  in  the  markets  of  Great  Britain. 
When,  however,  the  duty  on  lumber  was  reduced  one-half," 
and  that  upon  corn^  was  virtually  abolished,  the  lumber 
trade  was  at  once  depressed,  and  the  trade  in  colonial 
grain  was  in  danger  of  being  driven  from  the  English 
markets  by  that  from  countries  less  remote.  Thus  it  was 
feared  that  wheat  from  the  Canadas  could  no  longer  com- 
pete with  grain  from  the  Danube  and  the  Black  Sea,  and 
that  provincial  lumber  could  not  undersell  that  from  the 
Baltic.  That  these  fears  were  very  well  grounded  is 
shown  by  the  tables  of  English  imports  of  grain  from 
1844  to  1852.^  With  this  discouraging  outlook  abroad,  the 
colonies,  especially  Canada,  cast  about  to  dispose  of  their 
agricultural  and  forest  products  in  markets  nearer  home. 

The  natural  market  for  the  colonies  was  the  United 
States,*  but  the  American  tariff  of  1846^  presented  a  wall 
over  which  the  products  of  the  colonies  could  hardly  be 
forced.     Thus,  shut  out  of  English  markets  because  of  the 

'  Stat.  U.  K.  Vol.  XVIII,  pt.  I,  9  and  10  Vict.  Cap.  23,  par.  II,  June 
26,  1846. 

All  restrictions  on  breadstuffs  were  not  removed  until  1849.  A 
differential  duty  continued  on  lumber  until  i860. 

-  English  rorn  =  wheat. 

^  See  Appendix,  Table  A. 

'^  ' '  The  near  market  must  as  a  rule  be  the  best,  not  only  on  account  of 
the  difference  in  freights  but  in  many  cases  on  account  of  the  perish- 
ableness  of  goods.  It  must  be  best  for  fruits,  fish,  vegetables,  and 
even  for  poultry  and  eggs.  It  is  best  for  horses,  the  breeding  of  which 
is  a  great  Canadian  industr3^" — Canada  and  the  Canadian  Question  ; 
Goldwin  Smith,  p.  291. 

*  Coal,  firewood,  fur,  hemp  unmanufactured,  potatoes,  poultry,  wood 
unmanufactured,  and  wool  =  3o  per  cent. 

Bacon,  bark,  barley,  beef,  corn,  fish,  fiax,  wheat  flour,  fruit,  furs  on 
skin,  hempseed,  lard,  marble,  rough  or  in  blocks,  oats  and  pitch=20 
per  cent.  Gypsum  (ground),  planks,  pork,  scantling,  skins  of  all  kinds 
unmanufactured  (tanned  or  dressed,)  timber  (hewn  or  sawed),  vege- 
tables, whale  bone  and  oil  =  20  per  cent. 

Flax  (unmanufactured),  tow  (flax  or  hemp),  flaxseeds  15  per  cent. 

Grindstones,  hides,  and  rags=5  per  cent. 

U.  S.  Statutes  at  large  ;  Tariff  of  1846  ;  Vol.  9,  p.  42. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4.  25 

distance,  and  from  the  American  market  because  of  the 
tariff,  the  condition  of  the  colonies  was  critical  in  the 
extreme.^  It  was  indeed  plain  that  if  the  colonies  were 
to  enter  the  markets  of  the  United  States  with  their  pro- 
ducts,- they  must  ask  for  some  relaxation  of  the  tariff  on 
the  part  of  the  American  government. 

The  Canadian  Parliament  had  passed,  May  12,  1846, 
resolutions^  asking  Her  Majesty's  government  to  open 
negotiations  with  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  obtain- 
ing admission  there  for  the  products  of  Canada  on  the  same 
terms  on  which  American  products  should  be  admitted  to 
the  markets  of  Great  Britain  and  Canada.  Mr.  Gladstone 
replied,*  June  3,  1846,  that  Her  Majesty's  government  would 

^  Letter  of  Lord  Elgin  : — The  downward  progress  of  events  !  These 
are  ominous  words.  But  look  at  the  facts.  Property  in  most  of  the 
Canadian  towns,  and  more  especially  in  the  capitol,  has  fallen  fifty  per 
cent,  in  value  within  the  past  three  years.  Three-fourths  of  the  com- 
mercial men  are  bankrupt,  owing  to  free  trade  ;  a  large  proportion  of 
the  exportable  produce  of  Canada  is  obliged  to  seek  a  market  in  the 
States.  It  pays  a  duty  of  20  per  cent,  on  the  frontier.  How  long  can 
such  a  state  of  things  be  expected  to  endure?  ...  I  am  confident  I  could 
carry  Canada  unscathed  through  all  these  evils  of  transition  ...  if  I 
could  only  tell  the  people  of  the  Provinces  that  as  regards  the  condi- 
tions of  material  prosperity  they  would  be  raised  to  a  level  with  their 
neighbors.  But  if  this  be  not  achieved,  if  free  navigation  and  recipro- 
cal trade  with  the  Union  be  not  secured  for  us,  the  worst,  I  fear,  will 
come,  and  that  at  no  distant  day. 

Walrond's  Letters  and  Journals  of  Lord  Elgin,  p.  70.  (Date  not 
given,  probably  early  in  1849.) 

*  The  duty  on  our  side  on  colonial  and  other  foreign  goods,  aver- 
ages twent)r-three  and  one-half  per  cent,  on  the  principal  articles  of 
exportation. 

The  duty  imposed  upon  our  exports  to  Canada  averages  twelve  and 
one-half  per  cent.  It  does  not  difTer  materially  although  it  is  some- 
what lower  in  the  other  colonies. — Reports  of  Committees  2  Sess.  32 
Cong.  H.  Rep.  No.  4,  p.  6. 

■'  Mr.  Crampton  to  Mr.  Clayton,  March  22,  1849,  Reports  of  Com- 
mittees 32  Cong.  2  Sess.  Rept.  No.  4,  p.  53  ;  and  Hopkins'  Canada,  p. 

345. 

*  Mr.  Crampton  to  Mr.  Clayton,  March  22,  1849  ;  Repts.  of  Comm. 
32  Cong.  2  Sess.  Rept.  No.  4,  p.  53  ;  and  Hopkins'  Canada,  p.  345. 


2  6  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4. 

readily  cause  directions  to  be  given  to  the  Minister  in  Wash- 
ington to  avail  himself  of  the  earliest  opportunity  to  press 
this  important  subject  upon  the  notice  of  the  American 
government.     So  the  matter  rested  for  a  time. 

Yet  to  afford  some  relief  to  the  distressed  colonies,  Parlia- 
ment passed  an  Act/  August  28,  1846,  giving  them  power 
to  regulate  their  own  tariff.  This  liberty  was  made  use 
of  in  1847/  when  the  Canadian  Parliament  lowered  the 
duty  on  American  manufactures  from  123^4  per  cent,  to 
7^2  per  cent,  and  raised  the  duty  on  British  manufactures 
from  5^  per  cent,  to  7^  per  cent.  In  this  way  it  equalized 
as  far  as  possible  the  conditions  upon  which  British  and 
American  manufactured  goods  entered  the  Canadian  mar- 
kets. The  measure  was  the  more  important  when  we  con- 
sider that  previous  to  this  time,  agreeable  to  the  traditional 
colonial  policy  of  Great  Britain,  there  had  been  heavy 
discriminating  duties  favoring  the  mother  country.  These 
duties  were  now  lowered  as  a  natural  consequence  of  the 
removal  by  Great  Britain  of  differential  duties  in  favor  of  the 
colonies. 

But  this  equalization  afforded  a  relief  so  inadequate,  that 
in  1848,  in  behalf  of  the  colonies,  Mr.  Crampton,  charge 
d'affaires  of  the  British  government,  called  the  attention 
of  Mr.  A.  J.  Walker,  then  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to 
the  subject  of  reciprocal  trade  with  the  Provinces.^ 

As  a  result  of  Mr.  Walker's  favorable  consideration  of 
the  matter,  a  bill*  was  drawn  up  by  Mr.  Grinnell  of  the 
Committee  of  Commerce.  This  bill  contained  a  schedule  of 
free  goods,  but  made  no  provision  for  the  fisheries.  It 
passed  the   House  of   Representatives,*  but   failed   in   the 

■  Stat.  U.  K.  Vol.  XVIII,  pt.  I  ;  9  and  10  Vict.  Cap.  94. 

-  10  and  II  Vict.  Cap.  31.  July  28,  1847.  Provincial  Statutes  of 
Canada. 

Referred  to  also  in  Reports  of  Comm.  2  Sess.  32  Cong.  1852-53  ; 
Rept.  No.  4,  p.  54. 

*  Foreign  Relations,  1873-4;  pt.  Ill,  p.  292. 

*  Cong.  Globe,  i  Sess.  30  Cong.,  Vol.  18,  p.  923  (1848). 
Ex.  Docs.  No.  64  ;  H.  Reports  ist  Sess.  31st  Cong. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854.  27 

Senate,  probably  because  of  the  strong  opposition  of  Presi- 
dent Taylor's  Cabinet  to  the  measure/  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  take  out  of  the  hands  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
a  certain  amount  of  power  to  originate  bills  of  revenue  in 
time  of  national  need, — an  objection  the  force  of  which  a 
later  Congress  was  to  experience.  The  Canadian  Provincial 
Parliament,  desirous  to  keep  the  subject  still  open,  passed 
an  act  April  25,  1849,  providing  for  the  free  admission  into 
Canada  of  certain  articles-  produced  in  the  United  States, 
whenever  the  same  articles,  the  produce  of  Canada,  should 
be  admitted  free  into  the  United  States. 

This  offer  met  with  no  response  from  the  United  States. 
Nothing  at  least  was  done  toward  accepting  it,  and  Canada, 
on  whom  the  repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws  had  fallen  most 
heavily,  now  a  disappointed"  suppliant,  was  threatening,  by 
a  return  to  high  tariff,  retaliation  upon  our  trade.* 

Up  to  this  time  the  Maritime  Provinces,  Nova  Scotia, 
New  Brunswick,  and  Prince  Edward  Island,  had  been  less 
affected  than  Canada  had  been  by  the  free  trade  movement, 
but  in  1849,  the  repeal  of  the  Navigation  Laws^  by  Great 
Britain  seemed  to  threaten  their  chief  industry,  the  ship- 
building and  carrying  trade  for  the  colonies.  They  viewed 
with  alarm  the  competition  of  foreign  ships,  for  until  now 
the  commerce  of  the  colonies  had  been  carried  on  entirely 

'  Senator  Collamer,  Cong.  Globe,  3  Sess.  sSth  Cong.  1864-5  ;  pt.  I, 
p.  210. 

^  Schedule  :  Grain  and  bread  stuffs  of  all  kinds,  vegetables,  fruits, 
seeds,  animals,  hides,  wool,  butter,  cheese,  tallow,  horn,  salted  and 
fresh  meats,  ores  of  all  kinds,  metals,  ashes,  timber,  staves,  wood 
and  lumber  of  all  kinds.  — 12  Vict.  Cap.  3,  Provin.  Stat.  Canada. 
April  23,  1849. 

^  A  proposition  for  a  reciprocal  relaxation  of  commercial  restrictions 
had  also  been  made  by  Mr.  Crampton,  March  22,  1849.  For  the  cor- 
respondence on  this  subject  March  22,  1849  ^o  April  i,  1850,  including 
a  memorandum  of  Hon.  W.  H.  Merritt,  special  agent  for  Canada,  see 
Reports  of  Committees,  32d  Congress,  2d  Session,  H.  Rep.  No.  4,  pp. 
53-72. 

•*  Hon.  W.  H.  Merritt's  Memorandum,  House  Rep.  No.  4,  p.  63. 

5  Stat.  U.  K.  Vol.  XIX,  pt.  H  ;    t2  and  13  Vict.  Cap.  29. 


2  8  The  Treaty  tvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

in  British  vessels.  Canada,  however,  looked  upon  the  repeal 
of  these  laws  with  satisfaction,  for  foreign  competition  in 
the  carrying  trade  meant  cheaper  freight  from  her  farms 
and  forests  to  the  sea  coast.  The  Maritime  Provinces,  thus 
deprived  of  the  advantage  which  the  Navigation  Laws  had 
given,  felt  now  all  the  more  that  they  were  in  a  position 
where  unrestricted  trade  with  the  United  States  in  coal,  fish, 
gypsum,  and  ores  of  metals,  the  chief  products  of  these 
Provinces,  was  not  only  desirable,  but  almost  essential  to 
them. 

In  April  of  this  same  year,  1849,  discontented  with  the 
depression  of  her  trade,  for  which  she  held  the  actions  of 
the  home  government  in  part  responsible,  Canada's  feel- 
ing burst  forth.  A  riot  followed  the  signing  of  the  bill 
to  provide  for  the  losses  sustained  by  Lower  Canada  in  the 
rebellion  of  1837.  During  this  outbreak  the  Parliament 
House  was  burned  at  Montreal,  the  Governor  General,  Lord 
Elgin,  was  pelted  in  the  streets,  and  the  British  League 
issued  its  manifesto  in  favor  of  annexation  to  the  United 
States.^ 

Politically,  the  presentation  at  this  time  of  the  question 
of  annexation,  was  exceedingly  unfortunate.  If  Canada  had 
come  into  the  Union  with  the  consent  of  England,  a  thing 
hardly  probable,  she  would  have  come  in  as  a  free  state. 
This  would  have  served  to  intensify  the  animosities  of  the 
fight  on  the  slavery  question,  at  a  time  when  it  was  hoped 
by  every  one  that  the  matter  would  be  settled  by  the  Clay 
Compromise  of  1850.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Canada  broke 
away  forcibly  from  the  mother  country,  hostilities  with 
England  could  scarcely  have  been  avoided.  But  the  question 
did  not  come  to  an  issue.  Annexation  found  only  scant 
encouragement  from  the  northern  states,  enough,  however, 
for  the  slave  party  to  see  in  the  unadjusted  trade  relations 
with   Canada  a  constant  menace  to  the  southern  majority 

1  N.  Y.  Tribune,  April  30,  1849. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4.  29 

in  the  government.^  According  to  the  recollection,  in  1865, 
of  Senator  Collamer-  of  Vermont,  and  of  Senator  Chandler 
of  Michigan,^  who  were  members  of  the  Thirty-second  Con- 
gress, this  apprehension  on  the  part  of  the  South,  in  1854, 
was  what  brought  about  the  treaty.  It  is  the  more  probable 
when  we  remember  that  the  South  favored  a  free  trade 
policy,  and  that  if  the  alternative  were  offered  of  free  trade 
by  treaty  or  the  annexation  of  Canada,  the  South  must 
naturally  have  favored  the  treaty. 

In  a  message*  to  Congress  May  7,  1850,  President  Taylor 
transmitted  all  the  official  correspondence^  with  Great 
Britain  on  the  subject  of  reciprocal  trade  with  the  Provinces, 
and  called  the  attention  of  Congress  to  an  arrangement  for 
free  trade  between  the  United  States  and  the  Provinces  in 
their  natural  products,  which  would  provide  also  for  the 
free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  of  the  Canadian 
canals.  On  December  2,  185 1,  President  Fillmore®  directed 
the  attention  of  Congress  to  the  fact  that  overtures  had 
been  made  by  the  British  government  relative  to  reciprocal 
trade  with  the  United  States,  and  suggested  that  the  matter 
shovild  be  regulated  by  reciprocal  legislation.  Yet  matters 
drifted  on,  and  Congress  took  no  action." 

'  The  annexation  of  Canada  could  not  then  have  seemed  so  remote 
as  we  might  consider  it  now.  There  was  a  verj'  widespread  belief  that 
President  Pierce's  administration  had  some  designs  upon  Cuba,  as 
future  territory  for  the  extension  of  southern  slavery.  This  opinion  was 
strengthened  by  the  later  appearance  of  the  Ostend  Manifesto,  Oct. 
18,  1854.  The  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill  had  repealed  the  Missouri  Com- 
promise May  30,  1854,  so  that  the  fear  of  the  slaverj^  party  that  the 
northern  States  might  look  upon  Canada  as  a  legitimate  means  to 
restore  the  balance  of  power  between  the  southern  slave  States  and  the 
northern  free  States,  was  very  natural. 

^  Senator  Collamer,  Cong.  Globe,  2d  Sess.  3Sth  Cong.  1864-65  ;  p. 
210  ;  pt.  I. 

•'  Senator  Chandler,  same  ;  p.  230. 

■*  Repts.  of  Comm.  32  Cong.  2  Sess.  H.  Rep.  No.  4,  pp.  51-52. 

'"  Same,  pp.  53-72. 

*"  Annual  message  ;  and  Foreign  Relations,  1873  ;  pt.  Ill,  p.  293. 

'  "  Congress  did  nothing,  said  nothing,  thought  nothing  on  the  sub- 
ject."—Hon.  W.  H.  Seward,  U.  S.  Senate,  Aug.  14,  1852. 


3©  TJie  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

Diplomatic  negotiations  having  produced  no  apparent 
results,  other  methods  were  resorted  to.  At  Toronto/  July 
21,  1 85 1,  Canada  with  its  little  strip  of  sea  coast,  agreed  to 
cooperate  with  the  delegates  from  Nova  Scotia  and  New 
Brunswick  in  the  efficient  protection  of  the  fisheries,  by 
providing  either  a  steamer,  or  two  or  more  sailing  vessels,  to 
cruise  on  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  and  on  the  coast  of 
Labrador,  to  seize  American  fishing  vessels  found  within  the 
three-mile  limit.  This  was  after  a  renewed  appeal  had  been 
made  to  England  for  aid. 

On  July  5,  1852,  the  British  government  sent  a  com- 
munication to  the  United  States,  announcing  that  she  was 
about  to  send  to  British  North  American  waters  "such  force 
of  small  sailing  vessels  and  steamers  as  shall  be  deemed 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  infraction  of  the  treaty."-  The 
United  States  at  once  sent  Commodore  Perry  to  the  fishing 
grounds,  in  command  of  the  steam  frigate  Mississippi,  "to 
protect  the  rights  of  American  fishermen  under  the  con- 
vention of  i8i8."-' 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  held  opposite  views  as  to  what  these  "rights"  were. 

The  colonial  governments  themselves  fitted  out  six 
cruisers  fully  manned  and  armed,*  and  the  danger  of  a  clash 
with  our  vessels  of  war  in  colonial  waters  was  imminent. 
Prudence,  however,  prevailed.  There  was  no  collision,  but 
American  fishermen  suffered  severely. 

The  events  of  this  summer  produced  great  excitement  in 
the  United  States,  as  it  was  thought  that  England  was 
attempting  to  force  the  negotiations  on  the  subject  of  recipro- 
cal trade. ^     Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  action  of  the 

'  Ex.  Docs.  No.  23,  pt.  IV,  2  Sess.  32  Cong.  pp.  436-7. 

*  Mr.  Crampton  to  Mr.  Webster  July  5,  1852,  Sen.  Docs.  32  Cong,  i 
Sess.  No.  100;  Vol.  10;  p.  154. 

^  Ex.  Docs.  No.  100  ;  Vol.  10  ;  32  Cong,  i  Sess.  p.  i. 

■'I.  D.  Andrews'  Report;  Ex.  Docs.  No.  112;  Vol.  11,  p.  36;  32 
Cong.  I  Sess. 

^  Speeches  of  Senators  Davis,  Seward  and  Mason  in  U.  S.  Senate 
Aug.,  1852. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854.  31 

colonies  in  the  matter,  the  British  government  seems  to  have 
had  no  such  intention/  although  it  was  known  that  Great 
Britain  would  not  consider  the  settlement  of  the  fishery  ques- 
tion aside  from  reciprocal  trade.- 

The  explanations  that  followed  England's  action  quieted 
the  agitation,  but  it  had  brought  the  fishery  question  before 
the  public,  and  had  shown  how  serious  the  matter  might 
become. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  our  relations  with  the  British 
North  American  Provinces  in  the  summer  of  1852.  They 
had  indicated  unmistakably  that  they  wanted  free  trade 
with  the  United  States.  The  United  States,  while  it  recog- 
nized the  need  of  the  Provinces  for  American  markets,  saw 
very  little  advantage  to  itself  in  such  arrangement,  and  had 
received  with  more  or  less  indifference  the  advances  which 
had  been  made.  It  is  not  probable  that  the  question  of 
reciprocal  trade  would  have  received  much  consideration  had 
not  the  fishery  question  been  forced  to  an  issue.  The 
fishing  rights  were  not  in  themselves  so  very  valuable  to 
the  United  States,  but  to  Maine  and  to  Massachusetts  they 
were  quite  necessary,  and  the  question  of  protecting  the 
industry  of  these  states  was  important  enough  to  be  con- 
sidered a  national  question  if,  while  it  was  unsettled,  there 
should  remain  this  source  of  continual  irritation  in  our 
diplomatic  relations  with  Great  Britain. 

Congress  could  decide  what  the  United  States  was  will- 
ing to  give  to  have  the  fishery  dispute  settled;  whether  it 
was  a  fair  exchange  to  throw  open  its  markets  to  the  Pro- 
vinces as  they  desired,  or  whether  in  return  for  this  conces- 
sion something  more  should  be  asked  by  the  United  States 
than  the  mere  privilege  of  fishing  in  colonial  waters  as 
before  the  war  of  1812. 

Plainly,  if  the  United  States  saw  fit  to  close  her  doors 
on  reciprocal  trade  with  the  British  Provinces,  the  latter, 

^  Speech   of   Queen   in   opening    Parliament  ;    President    Fillmore's 
Message  Dec.  6,  1852  ;  official  correspondence. 
^  Ex.  Docs.  No.  40  ;  p.  3  ;  32  Cong.  2  Sess. 


32  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4. 

in  turn,  would  insist  on  a  rigid  enforcement  of  the  colonial 
view  of  the  treaty  of  1818. 

Fully  aware  of  this,  and  knowing  the  losses  suffered  by 
the  American  fishermen  during  the  summer,  and  the  hard- 
ship which  such  conditions  would  bring  on  them  in  the 
future,  President  Fillmore,  December  6,  1852,  in  his  mes- 
sage^ to  Congress  said  that  he  considered  the  moment  favor- 
able for  the  consideration  of  the  entire  subject  of  the  fishery 
question.  "Great  Britain,"  he  says,  "will  meet  us  in  an 
arrangement  which  will  include  the  subject  of  commercial 
relations  with  the  British  Provinces."  Remembering, 
doubtless,  the  fate  of  the  bill  of  1848  for  the  purpose  of 
reciprocal  trade,  he  added  that  "all  the  provisions  of  such 
arrangements  affecting  the  revenue  would  be  reserved  to  the 
control  of  Congress." 

The  attitude  of  Congress  was  favorable  to  a  consideration 
of  the  matter,  and  February  11,  1853,  Mr.  L.  D.  Seymour, 
of  the  Committee  of  Commerce,  reported  a  bilP  embodying 
the  subject  of  the  fisheries,  and  reciprocal  trade  with  the 
British  North  American  colonies,  as  well  as  a  provision 
for  free  trade  with  the  British  West  Indian  ports.  This 
bill  was  fully  discussed  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
but  did  not  come  to  a  vote  before  Congress  adjourned.  The 
subject  then  passed  from  Congress  to  the  State  Department, 
and  here  it  took  final  form. 

After  a  correspondence  on  the  subject,  Mr.  Crampton, 
September  i,  1853,  submitted  to  Mr.  Marcy,  then  Secretary 
of  State,  a  projet}  Mr.  Marcy,  in  reply,  called  attention 
with  shrewd  foresight  to  the  weak  points  in  the  proposed 
treaty ;  but,  when  the  final  instrument  was  drawn  up,  the 
form  of  the  treaty  remained  practically  unchanged.  Among 
other  objections,  Mr.  Marcy  showed  that  manufactures  had 

'  Ex.  Docs.  No.  I,  32  Cong.  2  Sess.  Vol.  I,  pt.  I,  pp.  3-4. 

2  Cong.  Globe,  Vol.  26  ;  32  Cong.  2  Sess.  p.  568.  Text  of  Bill  is 
found  in  Cong.  Globe,  Vol.  27  ;  32  Cong.  2  Sess.  p.  198. 

'  A  full  copy  of  ih.e projet  and.  Mr.  Marcy's  notes  on  it  is  printed  in 
Foreign  Relations  1873-74,  pt.  Ill,  p.  296. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  1854.  33 

been  omitted  ;  that  the  clause  as  to  canals  would  be  nugatory 
as  the  United  States  had  none ;  that  the  interests  of  the 
southern  states  must  be  cared  for  ;  and  that  upon  this  ground 
he  had  added  rice,  tar,  pitch  and  turpentine  to  the  schedule 
offered  in  the  projct.  To  this  list,  when  the  treaty  was 
drawn  up,  were  added  products  of  fish  and  other  creatures 
living  in  water,  coal,  unmanufactured  tobacco,  and  rags. 

The  return  to  America  at  this  time  of  Lord  Elgin,  Gov- 
ernor General  of  Canada,  was  considered  so  fortunate  a 
circumstance  that  the  English  government  decided  to  send 
him  to  Washington  to  conclude  the  negotiations  of  the 
treaty.^  This  was  done,  and  he  arrived  with  his  suite  May 
26,  1854,  the  night  that  Congress  passed  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  Bill.  Ten  days  later,  June  5,  1854,  the  treaty 
was  drawn  up  and  signed  by  him,  and  by  Mr.  Marcy. 

"Being,"  as  it  was  stated  in  the  preamble,  "desirous  to 
avoid  further  misunderstandings  in  regard  to  the  extent  of 
fishing  on  the  coast  of  British  North  America"  and  "to 
regulate  the  Commerce  and  Navigation  between  Her 
Majesty's  possessions  in  North  America  and  the  United 
States  of  America  in  such  manner  as  to  render  the  same 
reciprocally  beneficial  and  satisfactory,"  the  treaty  dis- 
posed of  all  the  questions  at  issue  between  the  two  countries. 

It  provided : 

(a)  for  the  mutual  enjoyment  of  the  Atlantic  coast  fish- 
eries, at  any  distance  from  the  shore,  north  of  the  36th 
parallel ; 

(b)  for  free  markets  for  the  natural  products  of  the 
United  States  and  the  British  North  American  colonies,  as 
follows :  Agricultural  products:  grain,  flour,  and  bread- 
stuffs  of  all  kinds,  cotton-wool,  seeds  and  vegetables, 
undried  and  dried  fruits,  poultry,  eggs,  butter,  cheese,  tallow, 
plants,  shrubs  and  trees,  rice,  broom  corn,  and  bark,  dye 
stuffs,  flax,  hemp,  and  tow  manufactured,  tobacco  unmanu- 
factured.    Products  of  the   mine:  stone   or  marble  in   its 

'  Debates  in  Parliament,  Lord  Clarendon,  June  27,  1854;  Vol.  134, 
p.  729. 

3 


34  The  Treaty  ivith  Canada  in  1854. 

crude  or  unwrought  state,  slate,  ores  of  metals  of  all  kinds, 
coal,  gypsum,  ground  or  unground,  hewn,  or  wrought,  or 
unwrought,  burr  or  grind  stones.  Products  of  the  sea: 
fish  of  all  kinds,  products  of  fish  and  of  all  other  creatures 
living  in  the  water,  fish  oil.  Products  of  the  forest:  pitch, 
tar,  turpentine,  ashes,  timber  and  lumber  of  all  kinds,  round, 
hewed,  sawed,  unmanufactured  in  whole  or  in  part,  fire- 
woods. Animals  and  their  products:  animals  of  all  kinds, 
fresh,  smoked,  and  salted  meats,  hides,  furs,  skins  or  tails 
undressed,  lard,  horns,  manures,  pelts,  wool.  Miscel- 
lanea vis:    Rags. 

(c)  It  removed  any  cause  for  annexation  by  granting  to 
Canada  all  the  commercial  benefits  without  the  political  com- 
plications of  annexation. 

(d)  It  gave  the  United  States  free  navigation  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  River  and  of  the  Canadian  canals. 

(e)  It  disposed  of  the  accumulating  surplus  in  the 
Treasury  of  the  United  States  without  an  undesired  revision 
of  the  tariff.  1 

No  mention  was  made  in  the  treaty  of  manufactured 
goods.  This  was  a  matter  vital  to  its  operation,  for  it  later 
raised  the  question  as  to  the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  the 
treaty ;  that  is,  the  spirit  of  reciprocity  of  which  the  treaty 
was  only  the  symbol,  and  the  letter  of  the  treaty  which  gave 
ho  latitude  beyond  its  actual  provisions. 

There  were  two  important  reasons  offered  why  manu- 
factured goods  could  not  be  included  in  the  articles  of  the 
treaty.  The  first  was  that  the  Province  of  Canada  could 
not  give  up  the  tariff  as  a  means  of  revenue;  the  second 
reason  was  that  Canada  could  not  make  manufactured  goods 
free  to  Great  Britain  and  to  the  United  States  at  the  same 
time  without  making  a  dead  letter  of  the  American  tariff 

'  The  public  debt,  Dec.  3,  1853,  was  $56,336,157.32,  payable  only  at 
fixed  intervals.  The  balance  in  the  United  States  Treasury  September 
30,  1853,  was  $28,217,887.78. 

Rept.  of  Secretary  of  Treasury  1853-4;  Ex.  Docs.  No.  3,  p.  3,  33 
Cong.  I  Sess. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  1854.  35 

against  Great  Britain's  manufactured  goods.  Nor  could 
Canada  admit  the  manufactures  of  Great  Britain  at  her  then 
low  tariff  rates,  while  the  United  States  excluded  them  by 
high  tariff  rates,  without  producing  the  same  result.  For  if 
wares  could  come  to  the  colonies  from  England  free  of  duty, 
or  subject  to  only  a  nominal  tariff,  and  pass  from  the 
colonies  into  the  United  States  free,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
American  tariff  against  English  manufactures  could  not  be 
enforced.  But  these  objections  were  not  insuperable,  for 
Hon.  W.  H.  Merritt,  the  accredited  agent  of  Canada  in  the 
United  States,  stated  that  reciprocity  in  manufactured  goods 
might  be  obtained  with  Canada  at  any  future  time.^  The 
colonies  had  made  the  natural  products  stipulated  in  the 
treaty  free  to  Great  Britain.-  The  United  States  and  Eng- 
land were  thus  on  equal  footing  as  to  freedom  of  trade  in 
the  natural  products  of  the  colonies. 

The  colonial  agricultural  and  forest  products  were  bound 
to  compete  by  a  reciprocity  arrangement  with  like  products 
in  the  United  States,  but  this  objection  was  met  by  the 
advantage  of  the  lowered  price  of  grain  and  lumber  which 
it  was  urged  the  consumer  would  pay  as  a  result  of  a  greater 
supply  in  a  free  market.^  With  the  expectation  that  prices 
would  thereby  be  lowered,  the  farmers  and  lumbermen  were 
naturally  opposed  to  a  measure  that  would  swell  from  other 

'  "  It  has  been  suggested  that  the  same  principle  {of  reciprocity) 
should  be  extended  to  the  manufactures  of  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  To  this  Canada  could  have  no  objection;  on  the  contrary,  we 
feel  persuaded  it  would  be  to  our  advantage,  but  it  was  considered 
unwise  even  to  propose  it,  because  American  manufactures  would  feel 
apprehensive  that  British  fabrics  might  be  introduced  by  this  means 
through  Canada  into  the  United  States,  at  duties  considerably  lower 
than  those  imposed  by  the  present  American  tariff.  This  was  the  only 
reason  for  not  proposing  that  extension;  if  desirable,  it  can  be  obtained 
at  any  future  time. '  * 

Hon.  W.  H.  Merritt's  Memorandum,  Repts.  of  Comm.,  H.  Rept. 
No.  4;  pp.  58  and  59,  32  Cong.  2  Sess. 

See  also  Hopkins'  Canada,  p.  339. 

"^  12  Vict.  Cap.  i;  13  and  14  Vict.  Cap.  3;  Canadian  Consol.  Statutes. 

^  See  table  of  prices  during  the  Treaty,  Appendix  IV. 


36  The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

sources  the  supplies  of  commodities  which  they  had  been 
accustomed  to  furnish.  That  the  farmers  were  somewhat 
mistaken  in  their  opposition  will  be  shown  later. 

The  case  of  the  lumbering  interest  was  not  identical. 
Much  of  the  lumber  at  this  time  was  obtained  from  the  New 
England  States,  but  in  all  the  states  excepting  Maine,  the 
supply  was  far  below  the  demand.^  Prices  were  naturally 
high,  and,  as  a  consequence,  great  quantities  of  Canadian 
lumber  were  coming  to  the  United  States  in  increasing 
amounts  in  spite  of  the  tariff.  Maine  was  thus  the  only 
state  that  would  suffer  severely  by  competition,  for  Michi- 
gan lumber  was  not  yet  a  matter  to  be  considered.  Maine, 
however,  was  content  that  provincial  lumber  should  come 
into  the  markets  of  the  United  States  free  of  duty,  provided 
the  privilege  was  granted  of  floating  Maine  lumber  down 
the  St.  John  river  without  payment  of  duty.  A  glance  at 
the  map  of  Maine  and  New  Brunswick  will  show  that  the 
head  waters  of  the  St.  John  river  are  in  Maine,  in  her  great 
timber  region.  The  river  flows  across  that  state  to  New 
Brunswick,  after  crossing  which,  it  flows  into  the  Bay  of 
Fundy.  By  a  treaty-  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  dated  August  9,  1842,  all  lumber  floated  down  the 
St.  John  river  was  to  be  treated  as  New  Brunswick  lumber. 
At  the  time  of  the  treaty,  there  was  no  duty  on  New  Bruns- 
wick lumber  and  therefore  none  on  Maine  lumber,  as  it  came 
down  the  river.  After  a  short  time  New  Brunswick  found 
that  the  taxes  she  was  levying  did  not  bring  revenue  enough 
to  meet  expenses,  and  a  tax  was  accordingly  laid  on  all 
lumber  from  Maine  or  New  Brunswick  at  the  mouth  of  the 
St.  John.  This  tax  was  so  high  that  Maine  lumber  could 
not  be  brought  down  the  river  with  profit,  so  with  great 
labor  and  hardship  it  was  floated  up  the  river  by  means  of 
canals,  built  so  that  the  lumber  finally  reached  the  chain  of 

'  Repts.  of  Comm.  32  Cong.  2  Sess.  1852-53;  H.  Rept.  No.  4;  pp. 
20-2 1 . 

'  Stat.  U.  K.  Vol.  XIII.  6  and  7  Vict.  Cap.  84,  par.  23  ;  and  8  and  9 
<      Vict.  Cap.  93,   par.  27. 


The  Treaty  zvitJi  Canada  in  1854.  37 

Maine  lakes  that  led  to  the  ocean. ^  It  was  for  this  privilege 
of  again  taking  timber  down  the  St.  John  river  that  the 
Maine  lumber  men  were  willing  to  give  up  the  former 
advantage  of  not  being  forced  to  compete  with  colonial  lum- 
ber in  a  free  market,  and  a  clause  embodying  the  privilege 
was  inserted  in  the  treaty.- 

North  Carolina's  chief  interests  are  in  the  lumber  industry, 
and  her  markets  might  have  suffered  from  the  result  of  free 
lumber  from  the  Provinces.  To  satisfy  North  Carolina,  it 
was  stated''  that  the  treaty  would  provide  that  in  exchange 
the  British  West  Indian  ports  would  admit  her  forest  pro- 
ducts free  of  duty.  This  concession  was  not  made,  however, 
when  the  treaty  was  signed. 

An  examination  of  the  articles  of  the  treaty  will  show 
what  each  party  to  it  contributed. 

The  United  States  government  gave:  (a)  a  free  market 
for  provincial  products;  (b)  free  navigation  of  Lake 
Michigan;  (c)  a  promise,  which  remained  a  dead  letter, 
"to  urge  upon  the  various  state  governments  to  secure  to 
the  subjects  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  the  use  of  the  several 
state  canals  on  terms  of  equality  with  the  inhabitants  of  the 
United  States;*  (d)  free  Atlantic  sea-coast  fishery  north 
of  36°  North  Latitude. 

The  British  government  on  its  part  gave:  (a)  a  free 
market  to  articles  named  in  the  schedule;  (b)  permission 
to  fish  on  the  British  North  American  coast,  practically  as 
before  the  treaty  of  1818;  (c)  free  navigation  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  river  and  of  the  Canadian  canals;  (d)  free  lum- 
ber on  the  St.  John  river. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  only  valuable  concession  made  by 
the  United  States  was  a  free  market  for  the  provincial 
products,^  and  that  it  was  to  balance  this  that  the  British 

^  Repts.  of  Comm.  32d  Cong.  2  Sess.,  H.  Rep.  No.  4,  p.  21;  1852-3. 

*  Article  IV,  of  the  Treaty. 

*  Cong.  Globe,  Vol.  27;  p.  211,  2d  and  3d  Sess.  32  Cong.  See  Sey- 
mour's Bill. 

*  Article  IV,  sec.  3. 

*  See  J.  G.  Blaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  II,  p.  620. 


38  The  Treaty  ivith  Canada  in  1854. 

government  gave  the  fisheries,  the  St.  Lawrence  river,  the 
canals  and  free  himber  on  the  St.  John  river.  Indeed,  free 
trade  given  to  Canadian  products  alone  was  considered  an 
equivalent  for  free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the 
Canadian  canals.^ 

Bearing  this  fact  in  mind,  one  is  not  surprised  to  find  that 
the  schedule  is  arranged  from  the  standpoint  of  the  colonial 
needs,  that  nearly  all  the  articles  contained  in  the  free  list 
are  staple  products  of  the  Provinces.^ 

The  principal  exports  to  the  United  States  from  New 
Brunswick  were  lumber,  coal,  gypsum,  fish,  fish-oil,  and 
grindstones ;  from  Nova  Scotia,  sawed  lumber,  fish,  gyp- 
sum, grind-stones,  coal,  potatoes,  and  cord  wood ;  from 
Prince  Edward  Island,  small  fishing  vessels.  The  prin- 
cipal articles  of  export  from  Canada  to  the  United  States 
were  flour,  wheat,  lumber,  cattle  and  horses,  oats,  barley, 
rye,  wool,  butter,  and  eggs." 

The  principal  articles  of  export  from  the  United  States  to 
Canada  were  tea,  tobacco,  cotton  and  woolen  manufactures, 
hardware,  sugars,  leather  and  its  manufactures,  coffee,  salt, 
indigo,  rubber  goods,  hides,  machinery,  fruits  and  wooden 
ware.  This  does  not  include  certain  agricultural  products 
exported  to  the  Provinces. 

This  list  of  articles  exported  and  imported  by  the  Provin- 
ces'and  by  the  United  States  shows  that  Canada  would  have 
forest  and  agricultural  products  to  sell,  and  manufactured 
goods  to  buy.  The  United  States  would  have  manufactured 
goods  to  sell,   and   would   need  to  buy   lumber  and   some 

'  "  It  is  further  agreed  that  if  at  any  time  the  British  government 
should  exercise  the  said  reserved  right  (sec.  I),  the  government  of  the 
United  States  shall  have  the  right  of  suspending,  if  it  think  fit,  the 
operation  of  Article  III  of  the  present  treaty  in  so  far  as  the  Province 
of  Canada  is  affected  thereby,  for  so  long  as  the  suspension  of  the  free 
navigation  of  the  river  St.  Lawrence  or  the  canals  may  continue." 
Article  IV,  Sec.  2. 

'^  J.  G.  Blaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  II,  p.  620. 

^  Sen.  Ex.  Docs.,  No.  112  ;  Vol.  11  ;  1852-3  ;  32d  Cong.  I  Sess.,  p. 
429. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  1854.  39 

agricultural  products.  Here,  then,  the  two  countries  were 
in  a  position  to  supply  each  the  other's  needs  reciprocally. 

In  considering  this  reciprocal  relation  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  Canadian  tariff  at  this  time  was  moderate, 
that  the  Provinces  manufactured  almost  nothing,^  and  that 
the  United  States  government  had  reason  from  an  official 
source^  to  hope  that  the  spirit  of  reciprocity  would  extend 
to  this  exchange  of  colonial  natural  products  for  American 
manufactured  goods. 

A  reciprocity  actually  provided  for  in  the  treaty,  and 
which  operated  satisfactorily  to  its  close,  was  the  exchange 
of  products  due  to  the  geographical  position  of  New  Eng- 
land in  relation  to  the  Maritime  Provinces,  and  of  Canada 
to  the  States  bordering  upon  the  Great  Lakes. 

'  Repts.  of  Comm.  32d  Cong.   2  Sess.  Rept.    No.  4,   p.  16  ;   1852-53. 
-  Repts.  of  Comm.  37  Cong.  2  Sess.   Rept.  No.  22,  p.  11  ;  Vol.  3  ; 
I 861-2. 


Chapter  II. 

The   Treaty  in   Operation. 

Having  traced  the  history  of  the  drawing  up  of  the  treaty, 
let  us  go  on  to  examine  its  operation.  We  shall  consider 
the  subject  of  transportation,  and  of  trade  in  the  natural 
products  enumerated  in  the  schedule,  and  mark  the  tendency 
of  the  treaty  to  produce  during  the  years  that  it  covers  a 
reciprocal  interchange  in  all  branches  of  trade  rather  than 
simply  an  increase  in  the  volume. 

There  was  during  that  time  a  great  increase  in  popula- 
tion,^ an  opening  up  of  new  rich  farming  lands,^  and  a  con- 
sequent increase  of  production^  in  the  western  and  north- 
western part  of  the  United  States  and  in  Canada. 

^  Aggregate  population:                             ^^^  ^^  ^3^^ 

of  the  Maritime  Provinces* 664,051  788,049              

of  Canada*    1,842,265  2,507,657              

of  the  New  England  Statesf 2,728,116  2,135,283  3,487,924 

of  the  States  bordering  the  Great 

Lakes  and  lowaf 10,130,731  14,560,770  17,662,953 

*  Harvey,   Recip.  Treaty,  p.  4  and  p.  6;  and  3  Sess.  8  Pari.   Prov.  of 
Canada;  Debate  on  Confed.  p.  140. 

f  Compendium  of  9th  U.  S.  Census. 

'  Land  in  farms  in  acres:  o  o^  o 

■^  1850.  i860.  1870. 

In  Canada*  (improved  lands). . .  .       7,307,950      10,855.854  

In  the  New  England  Statesf  ,. .       18,367,458      20,110,922       19,569,863 

In  the  States  bordering  the  Great 

Lakes  and  lowaf 83,640,239    123,465,816    149,660,023 

*  Harvey,  Recip.  Treaty,  p.  5. 

f  Compendium  of  the  9th  U.  S.  Census. 

^  Bushels  of  corn:  „  01:-  o 

■'  1850.  i86o.  1870. 

raised  in  Canada* 2,090,094        2,591,151  

"        New  Englandf 10,175,856        9,164,505         7,347,666 

"         Iowa,     and    the    States 

bordering  on  the  Great 

Lakesf 223,587,543    373,879,370    402,480,326 

*  Harvey,  Recip.  Treaty,  p.  5. 

f  Compendium  of  9th  U.  S.  Census. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4.  41 

The  great  increase  in  the  means  of  transportation^  from 
1850  to  1865  brought  many  of  these  locahties  into  commu- 
nication with  the  great  markets,  and  made  a  commodity  of 
their  formerly  almost  worthless  farm  products.-  For  these 
reasons  it  is  difficult  to  say  how  much  of  the  increase  of  trade 
was  due  to  growth  in  population  and  improved  transporta- 
tion facilities,  and  how  much  to  the  operation  of  the 
reciprocity  treaty. 

More  than  this,  the  Crimean  War  coincided''  with  the  first 
years  of  the  treaty.  The  maintenance  of  this  war  caused 
an  unusual  demand  for  American  and  Canadian  breadstviffs 
in  Europe.  For  reasons  to  be  considered  later,  these  exports 
tended  to  be  included  in  the  reports  of  trade  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada.  A  like  unusual  demand  by  the 
United  States  for  Canadian  productions  during  the  last  three 
years  of  the  treaty  arose  because  of  our  Civil  War ;  yet 
after  these  demands  had  been  subtracted,  there  was  a  vigor- 
ous and  growing  trade  between  the  British  North  American 
colonies  and  the  United  States,  although,  as  will  be  shown, 
the  table  of  total  exports  and  imports  is  not  a  reliable  index 
of  the  actual  exchange  of  commodities.* 

To  get  a  clearer  idea  of  the  effect  of  the  treaty  independent 
of  other  factors  which  contributed  to  reciprocal  trade  with 
Canada,  we  must  review  certain  conditions  that  existed 
anterior  to  the  treaty  itself. 

As  one  of  the  results  of  the  Canadian  agitation  of  1849, 
there  was  established  in  the  year  1850  between  the  Provinces 

Bushels  of  wheat  grown:  ^g^^  ^^  ^870. 

In  Canada* 15,756,493  27,274,779              

"   New  Englandf 1,063,894  1,083,193  1,000,693 

"   Iowa  and  the  States  bordering 

the  Great  Lakesf 69.376,575  112,157,829  207,763,097 

*  Harvey,  Recip.  Treaty,   p.  5. 

f  Compendium  of  gth  U.  S.  Census. 
^  See  map. 

*  See  Table  I  in  Appendix. 

*  War  was  declared  Oct.  i,  1853.     Peace  concluded  March  30,  1856. 
*■  See  Appendix,  Table  II. 


42  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4. 

and  Great  Britain  and  between  the  several  Provinces  them- 
selves free  trade  in  natural  products.^  As  before  this  time 
each  Province  had  laid  its  own  duty  on  the  products  of  the 
other,  the  result  of  these  conditions  upon  the  trade  of  the 
United  States  had  been  very  marked.  The  exports  of  the 
United  States  to  the  Provinces,  which  for  the  four  years 
preceding  the  treaty  had  averaged  about  eleven  million 
dollars  per  annum,  for  the  period  before  that,  beginning  with 
1821,  did  not  average  four  million  dollars  per  annum.-  To 
encourage  further  this  trade  with  the  Colonies,  the  United 
States  passed  the  Bonding  Act  of  1850.^  By  its  provisions 
goods  destined  for  the  British  Colonies  could  be  shipped 
through  the  United  States  in  bond  without  payment  of  duty. 
It  will  be  seen  that  this  arrangement  was  particularly 
favorable  to  the  sea-coast  cities,  and  to  the  railroads  and 
canals  of  the  United  States,  while  to  the  Provinces  it  gave 
the  advantage  of  accessible  ports  on  the  Atlantic  coast. 
This  advantage*  to  the  Provinces  is  the  more  apparent  when 

'  The  following  articles  were  free  from  duty  when  imported  directly 
from  the  United  Kingdom  or  from  any  British  North  American 
Province  and  being  the  growth,  product  or  manufacture  of  said  United 
Kingdom  or  such  Provinces,  viz: — Animals;  beef;  pork;  biscuit; 
bread  ;  butter  ;  cocoa  paste  ;  corn  or  grain  of  all  kinds  ;  flour  ;  fish, 
fresh  or  salted,  dried  or  pickled  ;  fish-oil  ;  furs  or  skins  ;  the  produce 
of  fish  or  creatures  living  in  the  sea  ;  gypsum  ;  horns  ;  meat ;  poultrj'  ; 
plants  ;  shrubs  and  trees  ;  potatoes  and  vegetables  of  all  kinds  ;  seeds 
of  all  kinds  ;  skins  ;  pelts  ;  furs,  or  tails  undressed  ;  wood,  viz  : 
boards  and  planks,  staves,  timber  and  firewood.  Exempt  from  duty 
from  whatever  country  among  other  articles  :  ashes,  pot  and  pearl, 
cotton-wool,  trees,  shrubs,  bulbs,  and  roots,  wheat  and  Indian  corn, 
manures,  all  kinds,  seeds  of  all  kinds. 

12  Vict.  Cap.  I,  Canad.  Provincial  Statutes  1849. 

And  13  and  14  Vict.  Cap.  3;  July  24,  1850;  Canad.  Consol.  Statutes. 

'■'  Foreign  Relations,  1872-3  ;  pt.  3  ;  p.  292. 

*  U.  S.  Statutes  at -large,  Cap.  79,  Sec.  18  ;  Vol.  9,  p.  512. 

■*  "  Previous  to  1850  by  far  the  largest  part  of  western  Canadian  trade 
was  done  through  Montreal  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  trade  with  the 
United  States  was  very  insignificant,  but  it  has  been  greatly  extended 
by  the  operation  of  the  Bonding  Act  of  1850,  and  by  the  Reciprocity 
Treaty."  Rep't.  of  Canadian  Commissioners  of  Public  Works,  May, 
1857,  quoted  from  Hopkins'  Canada,  p.  340. 


77; r  Treaty  zvitJi  Cajioda  in  18^4. 


43 


we  remember  that  the  entire  extent  of  the  railroads  in  the 
Provinces,^  fifty-five  miles,  was  in  Canada.  Her  semi-en- 
clave geographical  position,  hemmed  in  as  she  is  for  one  half 
the  year  by  the  ice-bound  St.  Lawrence,  made  it  imperative 
that  Canada  should  cross  the  territory  of  the  United  States  to 
get  to  the  sea.  This  need  had  indeed  been  partially  provided 
for  by  the  Bonding  Act,  which  permitted  goods  to  cross  the 
United  States  into  Canada,  but  an  extension  of  the  privilege 
of  sending  goods  from  Canada  across  the  United  States  to 
the  coast  was  very  desirable.  In  1853,  this  was  brought 
about  by  a  special  act,  to  which  the  United  States  govern- 
ment acceded,  whereby  Canada  leased  the  railroad  that  ran 
from  Portland,  Maine,  to  Quebec.  In  this  way  Portland 
became  the  winter  port  for  Canada,  as  well  as  a  terminus 
on  United  States  soil  of  the  Grand  Trunk  railroad,  and 
the  Canadian  line  of  steamships  came  to  this  port  when 
the  St.  Lawrence  was  frozen  in  winter.^  These  arrange- 
ments imited  their  influence  with  that  of  the  treaty  in  pro- 
ducing after  1854  a  large  volume  of  trade  with  Canada  and 
the  other  Provinces. 

The  treaty  was  signed  by  all  the  Provinces  ;  Canada,  Nova 
Scotia,  New  Brunswick,  Prince  Edward  Island,  and  New- 
foundland, but  as  the  export  trade  of  the  United  States  to 

'  Miles  of  railroads  built  in  : — 


Ont. 

Quebec. 

N.  B 

N.  S. 

Total 

1847 

43 

43 

1850 

12 

12 

I85I 

22 

22 

1853 

181 

30 

211 

1854 

225 

109 

234 

1855 

"3 

83 

2 

198 

1856 

435 

6 

441 

1857 

65 

5: 

5        14 

132 

1858 

116 

4f 

)       70 

226 

1859 

237 

81 

3. 

)      .... 

353 

1,372  499  128  92 

Hopkins'  Canada,  p.  226. 
■^  Hon.  A.  T.  Gait,  Canada,  1849  to  1859,  p.  26. 


1,991 


44  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4. 

Canada  was  nearly  twice/  and  the  import  trade  from  Canada 
four  times^  as  great  as  that  of  all  the  other  Provinces  taken 
together,  it  will  give  us  a  just  estimate  of  the  value  of  the 
treaty  to  consider  mainly  Canada's  relation  to  the  United 
States. 

This  relation  will  be  best  understood  by  surveying  the 
whole  trade  of  Canada  with  other  countries  as  well  as  with 
the  United  States.  Having  already  shown  what  Canada  will 
need  to  buy,  and  what  she  will  have  to  sell,  it  will  be  further 
necessary  to  follow  her  imports  and  exports  during  the  years 
of  the  treaty  in  order  to  determine  to  what  extent  it  has 
tended  to  develop  reciprocal  intercourse  with  the  United 
States. 

In  1854,  as  the  map  will  show,  the  British  North  American 
Provinces  were  economically  divided  into  two  groups. 
There  were  (a)  the  mining  and  fishing  Provinces  of  Nova 
Scotia,  New  Brunswick,  and  Prince  Edward  Island,  and  (b) 
the  agricultural  Provinces  of  Upper  and  Lower  Canada 
(now  Ontario  and  Quebec). 

As  Goldwin  Smith  very  properly  says :  "Each  several 
province  of  the  Dominion  is  by  nature  wedded  to  a  com- 
mercial partner  on  the  south.  The  Maritime  Provinces 
want  to  send  their  lumber,  their  bituminous  coal  and  their 
fish  to  the  markets  of  New  England;  Ontario  and  Quebec 
want  to  send  their  barley,  eggs  and  other  farm  products, 
their  horses,  their  cattle  and  their  lumber  to  New  York  and 
other  neighboring  states."^ 

The  distances  that  separate  the  New  England  states  from 
the  northwestern  states,  the  colonial  maritime  states  from  the 
Canadas,  were,  as  Mr.  Smith  says  in  1891,  just  as  strong 
an  argument  in  1854  for  reciprocity.  The  causes  that  mig^ht 
weaken  it  would  be  a  later  arising  of  political  dissension 

'  U.  S.  Exports  to  Canada,  1850  to  1863  were  $198,401,546;  to  the 
other  Provinces  $101,405,218. 

*  U.  S.  imports  from  Canada,  1850  to  1863  were  $171,161,479  ;  from 
all  other  Provinces  were  $48,608,941.     See  Appendix,  Table  II. 

'  Goldwin  Smith  :  Canada  and  the  Canadian  Question,  p.  284. 


815 8* 80  16 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854.  45 

between  the  countries  north  and  south  of  the  boundary  line, 
and  the  increase  of  transportation  facihties  east  and  west. 
Both  of  these  causes  were  present  in  the  great  strides  that 
railroad  building  took  in  Canada  and  the  United  States  from 
1850  to  1865/  and  in  the  bitter  feelings  between  Canada 
and  the  northern  states  engendered  by  her  attitude  to  the 
North  during  the  Civil  War. 

Let  us  consider  the  exchange  that  took  place  north  and 
south  in  some  of  the  principal  articles  named  in  the  schedule 
of  free  goods  provided  for  by  the  treaty.  The  coal  trade 
offers  the  first  example.  In  arguing  for  the  treaty  Mr. 
Townsend  of  Ohio,  in  the  House  of  Representatives,-  thus 
cogently  stated  these  benefits  to  consumers  of  coal. 

"As  fuel  is  about  as  much  a  necessity  of  life  as  food, 
legislation  should  not  compel  millions  who  must  have  coal 
to  pay  exorbitant  prices  for  the  benefit  of  holders  of  coal 
stock." 

"The  great  iron  industries  of  Pennsylvania  suffer  by  com- 
petition with  England  not  only  because  labor  is  cheaper,  but 
because  coal  is  cheaper  in  England.  If  the  introduction  of 
free  coal  from  the  Provinces  would  make  cheaper  coal,  the 
iron  industries  would  profit.  The  eastern  manufacturers 
are  equally  eager  to  get  cheap  coal.  Factories  that  need 
anthracite  coal  are  lying  idle  because  they  cannot  import  at 
the  high  duty  the  Nova  Scotia  coal  which  they  find  beneficial 
to  use  in  connection  with  the  coal  of  Pennsylvania.  The 
anthracite  coal  of  Pennsylvania  will  not  make  gas.  That  of 
Nova  Scotia  will." 

"Liverpool  coal  which  is  very  like  Nova  Scotia  coal  would 
be  driven  from  the  market.  The  Nova  Scotia  and  New 
Brunswick  coal  is  very  bituminous,  often  sixty  per  cent, 
volatile.  The  coal  of  Pennsylvania  is  largely  anthracite ; 
there  will,  therefore,  be  little  competition.  The  British 
Cunarders  that  land  at  Halifax  cannot  use  Nova  Scotia  coal, 
but  must  use  Pennsylvania  coal  at  a  high  price.     Free  trade 

'  See  map. 

*  Cong.  Globe,  Vol.  27,   pp.  210-211  ;  32  Cong.  2  Sess. 


46  The  Treaty  zuitli  Canada  in  18^4. 

in  coal  then  would  mean  an  export  of  coal  from  Pennsylvania 
for  the  provincial  needs  and  imports  from  the  Provinces  for 
special  use  in  Nova  Scotia." 

This  exchange  of  coal  gives  a  good  idea  of  the  geographi- 
cal relations  of  the  two  countries.  The  coal  beds  of  Ohio 
and  Pennsylvania  were  too  far  away  (1854-1865)  to  be  use- 
ful to  the  manufacturing  New  England  states,  but  they  were 
adjacent  and  easily  accessible  to  Canada.  So  the  Nova 
Scotian  coal  was  too  far  off  to  be  of  much  use  to  Canada, 
but  was  within  easy  reach  of  the  New  England  states. 
Duty  being  removed  by  the  treaty,  trade  followed  its  natural 
channels.^ 

Canada  raised  comparatively  little  corn,  but  nowhere 
could  corn  be  raised  so  cheaply  as  in  our  western  states. 
During  the  treaty  period  there  was  exported  to  all  the 
Provinces  $10,680,000  worth  of  American  corn.  No  return 
is  made  in  American  reports  of  corn  received  from  Canada, 
as  the  item  was  too  small  to  list  separately,  but  a  Canadian 
source-  shows  $39,000  worth  imported  up  to  1863.  Most 
of  this  corn  was  sent  to  Canada  to  be  distilled  into  whiskey, 
which  was  extensively  used  to  soften  the  rigors  and  hard- 
ships of  the  Canadian  winters  in  the  lumbering  camps  or 
on  the  fishing  boats. 

Cheap  corn  made  the  raising  of  hogs  cheaper  in  the 
western  states  than,  perhaps,  anywhere  else.  Pork  is  the 
staple  article  of  diet  of  the  lumbermen  and  of  the  fishermen, 
the  most  numerous  of  the  colonial  industrial  classes,  except- 
ing the  farmers."  Canada  raises  few  hogs  and  therefore 
imports  pork  from  the  United  States.  During  the  period 
of  the  treaty,  all  the  Provinces  imported  from  the  United 
States  $14,267,000  worth  of  pork;  for  the  same  time  they 
exported  to  the  United  States  in  meats  of  all  kinds  including 

'  For  these  and  figures  following,  see  Appendix,  Table  III.  Ameri- 
can coal  imported  during  the  Treat)'  was  $447,000  ;  provincial  coal, 
$7,085,000. 

-  Harvey  :  The  Recip.  Treaty,  p.  9. 

-  Repts.  of  Contm.  No.  4  ;  p.  15,  32  Cong.  2  Sess. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  1854.  47 

pork,  only  $2,708,000^  worth.  It  was  argued  before  the 
treaty  that  the  duty  imposed  on  this  pork  in  Canada  was 
really  paid  in  the  increased  price  given  by  the  eastern  buyer 
of  Canadian  lumber,-  and  that  the  admission  of  pork  free 
of  duty  would  lower  the  price  of  lumber. 

Barley  of  a  peculiar  kind  and  excellence  for  making  beer 
was  raised  in  Canada  that  could  not  be,  or  was  not  raised 
in  the  United  States.  Beginning  with  $58  worth  exported 
to  the  United  States  in  1856,  it  had  reached  $4,093,000  in 
1864,  and  for  the  entire  treaty  period  was  $9,640,348.  In 
the  American  returns  barley  is  not  separately  reported,  but 
a  Canadian  authority^  gives  for  both  barley  and  rye  $75,000 
imported  to  Canada  up  to  1863.  This  remarkable  growth 
of  imports  of  barley  for  making  beer  is  probably  due  to  the 
immigration  of  the  Germans,  who  began  to  come  from 
Europe  in  such  great  numbers  after  the  Revolution  of  1848, 
and  who  settled  in  our  northwestern  states. 

Here  then  is  a  further  example  of  what  was  hoped  for 
from  reciprocity.  The  Canadian  raised  no  corn,  but  had 
barley  to  sell.  The  American  had  corn  to  sell,  and  wanted 
to  buy  barley. 

Canada  furnished  a  wool  of  peculiar  fineness  that  we  did 
not  then  produce,  but  which  we  used  in  the  manufacture  of 
fine  fabrics.  Freed  from  duty,  this  wool  was  exported  to 
the  United  States  during  the  treaty  worth  $7,367,000 ; 
imported  from  the  United  States  during  same  period 
$1,131,000.* 

How  great  our  need  was  of  provincial  timber  and  lumber, 
and  how  the  consumer  benefited  from  the  free  market,  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  during  the  years  of  the  treaty  we 
imported  from  the  Provinces  $33,600,000  worth  of  lumber 

^  Sen.  Ex.  Docs.  No.  106  ;  p.  32,  2  Sess.  53  Cong.  Vol.  4. 
"^  Repts.  of  Coram.  32  Cong.  2  Sess.  No.  4,  p.  15. 
'  The    Recip.   Treaty ;    Arthur   Harvey,    p.    9,    Statistical    Clerk    in 
Finance,  Dept.  Quebec. 
*  Sen.  Ex.  Docs.  53  Cong.  2  Sess.  Vol.  3  ;   1893. 
Appendix,  Table  III. 


4^  The  Treaty  imth  Canada  in  1854. 

and  timber  mostly  in  planks  and  board,  while  we  exported 
to  them  in  that  time  $251,000  worth. ^ 

In  butter  and  cheese  there  was  a  more  equal  exchange. 
We  imported  $4,000,000  and  exported  $3,000,000  worth.^ 

The  returns  for  fish  exported  and  imported  show  what  a 
valuable  market  the  United  States  offered  for  this  provincial 
staple.  From  1855  to  1866  the  United  States  exported  to 
the  British  Provinces  $679,660  worth  of  fish  of  all  kinds. 
During  the  same  time  the  United  States  imported  from  the 
Provinces  fish  valued  at  $16,081,629.^ 

The  trade  in  wheat  and  flour  is  more  complicated  and  is 
not  so  germane  to  the  subject  of  reciprocity,  because  wheat 
had  been  made  free  before  the  treaty.* 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Canada  makes  a  great  wedge- 
like projection  between  Lake  Huron  and  Lakes  Erie  and 
Ontario  into  the  northern  boundary  of  the  United  States,  so 
that  Canada  lies  practically  between  Michigan  and  New 
York.  Besides  this,  the  St.  Lawrence  river  does  not  flow 
east,  but  almost  northeast.  This  geographical  situation 
made  it  very  natural  that  wheat  gathered  up  at  Chicago, 
Milwaukee,  Detroit,  and  Toledo  from  the  western  states 
should  enter  Canadian  territory  as  wheat  exported  from  the 
United  States,  and  reappear  at  Buffalo  as  wheat  imported 
from  Canada,  and  so  travel  by  the  Erie  Canal  to  New  York ; 
or,  having  entered  the  Canadian  canals,  appear  again  at 
Ogdensburg  and  Cape  Vincent  to  reach  New  York  by  the 
Champlain  Canal  and  the  Hudson  river,  or  Boston  and 
Portland  by  rail.  The  difficulty  of  tracing  this  wheat  was 
increased  by  the  fact  that  actual  Canadian  wheat  was  added 
to  shipments  originally  American  as  it  passed  through 
Canadian  territory.  Much  of  this  American  wheat,  too,  was 
imported  into  Canada  for  the  purpose  of  grinding  it  into 
flour  which  was  sent  back  to  the  United  States  as  Canadian 
flour.     The  Treasury  Department  of  the  United  States  finally 

^  Same.  '  Same.  *  Same. 

*  Canadian  Provincial  Statutes,  12  Vict.  Cap.  i. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4.  49 

passed  a  regulation  prohibiting  Canadian  flour  made  from 
American  wheat  from  being  admitted  free. 

It  will  be  plain  from  what  has  been  said  that  the  table  of 
total  exports  and  imports,  which  includes  this  movement  of 
wheat  and  flour  to  and  from  Canada,  will  show  much  larger 
returns  than  the  consumption  of  either  country  would  war- 
rant, and  that  these  returns  are  not  reliable  for  our  purpose. 

Both  Canada  and  the  United  States  raised  much  more 
wheat  than  they  could  consume,  so  that  the  question  of  the 
wheat  trade  became  one  not  of  consumption,  but  of  com- 
petition in  the  carrying  trade,  especially  to  England.  As 
our  ocean  freights  to  Europe  were  cheaper^  than  those  of 
the  Provinces,  this  vast  stream  of  wheat  from  Canada  and 
our  western  states  so  gorged  our  canals  that  it  was  declared 
in  Congress  that  any  delay  at  the  locks  piled  up  great 
quantities  of  merchandise  at  either  terminus,  and  gave  the 
canal  always  the  appearance  of  a  busy  street  crowded  with 
vehicles.  This  traffic  was  bound  to  be  a  great  stimulus  to 
other  branches  of  commerce,  but  it  is  undeniable  that  the 
interests  which  most  benefited  by  the  treaty,  throughout, 
were  the  canal,  railroad,  and  shipping  interests. 

During  the  treaty  period  the  United  States  sent,  ostensibly 
to  Canada,  really  through  Canada  to  other  ports,  $33,000,000 
worth  of  wheat  and  $45,000,000  worth  of  flour.  Canada  in 
the  same  time  sent  apparently  to  the  United  States,  though 
really  through  the  United  States  elsewhere,  $29,000,000 
worth  of  wheat,  and  $28,000,000  worth  of  flour.  The  ques- 
tion was  largely,  as  I  have  said  before,  which  country  should 
furnish  the  best  means  of  transportation  from  the  wheat 
field  to  the  foreign  markets. 

In  the  record  of  prices-  for  these  commodities  and  others 
in  the  free  list,  given  for  the  time  the  treaty  lasted,  it  is 
interesting  to  notice  that,  opposed  to  influences  that  tend  to 
sustain  prices,  the  effect  of  the  treaty  was  not  pronounced 
enough  to  cause  prices  to  go  down.     This  was  possibly  due 

'  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  1864,  p.  102. 
"^  Appendix,  Table  IV.     Price  in  New  York. 
4 


5°  The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

to  the  fact,  that  except  for  wheat  and  lumber,  Canada  and 
the  Provinces  did  not  throw  commodities  upon  the  market  in 
sufficient  quantities  to  affect  the  market  price. 

Much  had  been  hoped  by  the  American  shippers  from  the 
free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  river  and  the  canals. 
Before  the  treaty  was  signed,  it  had  been  confidently  pre- 
dicted^ that  if  the  St.  Lawrence,  the  great  natural  outlet 
from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  ocean,  could  be  freed  from 
restrictions  upon  its  navigation,  an  immense  commerce  would 
be  borne  upon  its  waters  from  the  lake  ports  to  Liverpool 
and  to  European  markets.  It  was  further  urged,"  that 
when  the  ice  closed  the  navigation  of  the  Great  Lakes  in 
winter,  vessels  lay  idle  at  the  wharves,  and  capital  unem- 
ployed, until  navigation  re-opened  in  the  spring.  With 
freedom  to  use  the  St.  Lawrence  as  a  highway,  it  was 
thought  that  an  American  vessel  could  load  at  any  port  on 
the  Great  Lakes  with  wheat,  corn,  pork,  and  other  pro- 
visions, the  products  of  the  western  states,  carry  them  to 
Halifax  or  St.  Johns,  make  coasting  trips  on  the  Atlantic 
seaboard  while  the  St.  Lawrence  was  closed,  and  in  the 
spring  return  to  the  lake  ports  with  a  cargo  of  sugar  and 
molasses  from  the  West  Indies,  or  wheat  from  the  Maritime 
Provinces.  All  this  was  made  possible  by  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty. 

When  the  treaty  was  first  put  into  operation,  it  worked 
without  friction,  and  foreign  trade  began  to  leave  the  St. 
Lawrence  river  route  for  the  more  convenient  one  across 
the  United  States. 

'  Repts.  of  Comm.  32  Cong.  2  Sess.  H.  Rep.  No.  4  ;  pp.  85  and  86. 
Mr.  Buell's  Rept.  on  Free  Navigation  of  St.  Lawrence  (May  2,  1850). 

"The  free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  is  only  necessary  to  show 
us,  in  the  fall  of  every  year,  long  lines  of  vessels  seeking  the  Atlantic, 
through  Canada,  laden  with  western  produce,  and  in  the  spring  making 
their  way  back  with  foreign  wares,  and  with  the  avails  of  profitable 
labor  for  nearly  half  a  year."  Repts.  of  Comm.  2  Sess.  37  Cong.  Vol.  3. 
Ward's  Rept.,  p.  15. 

*  Same,  p.  86. 


7'hc  Treaty  with-  Canada  in   18^4.  51 

In  1854,  the  year  before  the  treaty,  the  value 

of  imports  via  the  St.  Lawrence  was $21,000,000 

of  exports  via  the  St.  Lawrence  was 12,000,000 

Total  trade  was $33,000,000 

In  1855,  t^^  ysar  after  the  treaty,  the  value  of 
imports  via  the  St.  Lawrence  decreased  to  $11,000,000 
Exports  to 7,000,000 

Total  trade   $18,000,000 

Total  trade  1854 $33,000,000 

Total  trade  1855 18,000,000 

Decrease    $15,000,000 

This  difference  was  transferred  to  the  carrying-  trade  of 
the  L'nited  States,  which  rose  at  the  same  time  from 
$25,000,000  to  $40,000,000.^ 

Thus,  in  spite  of  the  efforts  made  by  Canadian  legislation^ 
to  bring  about  that  result,  the  expectations  of  the  American 
grain  carriers  that  the  St.  Lawrence  would  come  to  compete 
with  the  Erie  Canal  for  their  trade  was  not  realized.  The 
accompanying  table'"  shows  that  from  1855  to  1863  but  forty- 
four  American  vessels  cleared  from  lake  ports  for  Europe, 
and  thirty-three  returned.  This  number  is  insignificant  in 
amount  when  compared  with  the  tonnage  on  the  Great  Lakes 
for  a  single  year.  During  1857,  for  example,  one  hundred 
and  nine  Canadian  vessels  cleared  from  the  port  of  Chicago 
alone.  There  seems  no  doubt  that  the  effort  to  divert 
American  trade  into  this  new  channel  was  a  failure. 
Canadian  shippers  had  so  long  held  the  monopoly  of  this 

'  Repts.  of  Committees  No.  22,  p.  26  ;  37  Cong.  2  Sess.  1861-2. 

I  have  not  been  able  to  verify  these  figures  further  than  as  they  coin- 
cide with  the  tables  given  in  the  Appendix,  though  I  have  no  doubt 
that  the}'  are  correct. 

-  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce  1864,  p.  100. 

^  See  Appendix,  Table  IVa. 


52  The  Treaty  ivith  Canada  in  18^4. 

trade,  that  there  seems  to  have  been  but  Httle  competition 
for  it.  To  what  extent  they  traded  with  England,  in  Ameri- 
can products,  by  way  of  Lake  Michigan,  is  shown  in  the 
report  of  the  American  Consul  at  Montreal  in  1864,  who 
says : 

"Under  the  treaty  Canadian  vessels  have  free  access  to 
the  ports  on  Lake  Michigan,  and  land  their  cargoes  at  the 
ports  of  Chicago  and  Milwaukee  under  the  same  restrictions 
only  as  apply  to  American  vessels.  These  vessels  bring  back, 
wheat,  beef,  pork,  lard,  and  other  merchandise  which  will 
bear  shipment  to  England.  With  wheat  many  of  the  mills 
of  Canada  are  stocked,  and  although  flour  manufactured 
from  American  wheat  cannot  go  to  the  markets  of  the  L^nited 
States  free,  much  of  the  flour  finds  its  way  there  under 
Canadian  brands  without  payment  of  duty.  The  beef,  pork, 
lard,  hams,  etc.,  are  here  reshipped  in  British  vessels  to 
Liverpool,  and  these  vessels  bring  for  return  cargo  tea,  and 
other  East  Indian  goods,  and  from  this  point  (Montreal) 
they  are  distributed  to  the  West  in  Canadian  vessels ;  to 
Boston  via  the  Grand  Trunk  railroad;  to  Portland,  thence 
to  Boston,  and  to  New  York  via  Lake  Champlain  in 
Canadian  vessels  to  Whitehall,  thus  giving  them  monopoly 
of  the  carrying  trade  both  ways." 

The  benefit  to  American  commerce  from  freedom  to 
use  the  Canadian  canals  was  much  greater.  The  use  of 
the  Welland  Canal  around  the  Niagara  Falls  was  especi- 
ally beneficial  to  the  grain  trade  on  the  Great  Lakes.  From 
1854  to  1859,  of  all  the  vessels  upon  the  canals^  from 
one-third  to  one-fourth  were  American.  Beginning  with 
1859,  however,  the  number  of  American  vessels  dropped  to 
about  one-eleventh  of  the  number  of  Canadian  vessels.  This 
falling  ofif  in  the  number  was  probably  due  in  part  to  the 
depressing   influence   upon    American    trade    with    Canada 

'  See  Table  V  in  Appendix,  of  vessels  on  all  the  Canadian  canals 
from  1854  to  1864. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  i8j4.  53 

brought  about  by  the  Canadian  tariff  acts  of  1858  and  1859. 
These  will  be  considered  later. 

Under  an  enactment  of  i860,  if  vessels  and  goods  having 
paid  toll  on  the  Welland  Canal  entered  the  St.  Lawrence 
canals,  or  any  Canadian  port,  all  except  ten  per  cent,  of 
the  Welland  charges  were  refunded.  Besides  this,  a  free 
passage  was  given  through  several  of  the  canals  on  the  St. 
Lawrence.  It  was  maintained^  that  this  refunding  of 
charges  to  vessels  proceeding  down  the  St.  Lawrence,  was  a 
discrimination  of  ninety  per  cent,  against  the  lake  ports  of 
northern  New  York,  as  well  as  against  the  Lake  Champlain 
and  Hudson  river  routes.  While  its  intention  seems  to 
have  been  to  influence  the  course  of  western  trade  to  follow 
the  St.  Lawrence,  and  thus  to  benefit  Canada,  this  enactment 
cannot  be  urged  as  an  infringement  upon  the  treaty,  for  it 
was,  as  Sir  Edmund  Head  says,^  a  movement  toward  greater 
freedom  of  trade.  Just  here  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  clause  in  the  treaty  relative  to  making  an  effort  to  have 
the  various  states  open  their  canals  to  Canadian  vessels 
had  remained  a  dead  letter.  From  whatever  motives  the 
enactment  was  made,  it  seems  to  have  operated  against  the 
use  of  the  Canadian  canals  by  American  vessels  in  the  samiC 
proportion  as  before.  The  table  shows  in  i860,  and  1861, 
for  every  12,000  Canadian  vessels,  only  2,000  American  ves- 
sels, and  in  1863,  and  1864,  it  is  2,000  American  vessels  for 
every  15,000  Canadian  vessels. 

Another  cause  for  dissatisfaction  arose  from  change  in 
the  Canadian  tariff.  In  a  perfectly  legitimate  effort  to 
divert  into  Canadian  channels  the  trade  coming  from  the 
western  states,  Canada  had  burdened  herself  with  an  enor- 
mous debt  of  $43,000,000  in  improving  her  canal  system, 
and  in  extending  her  railroads.  The  expected  volume  of 
trade  did  not  follow  this  venture,  at  least  not  at  once,  and 
Canada,  compelled  by  a  series  of  misfortunes  and  obliga- 

*  Ward's  Rept.,  p.  12  ;  Repts.  of  Comm.  2  Sess.  37  Cong.,  Vol.  3. 
'  July  26,  i860. 


54  The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

tions/  was  obliged  to  find  an  immediate  means  for  raising 
revenue.  For  this  purpose  an  increased  duty  was  levied  on 
American  manufactured  goods  beginning  with  the  Customs 
Act  of  1858.- 

The  result  of  this  policy  by  the  Canadian  government 
could  not  fail  to  have  an  adverse  effect  upon  the  exports 
of  United  States  manufactures  to  Canada.  Due  to  this  cause 
alone,  apparently,  the  export  of  manufactured  goods  shows 
a  steady  decline  from  the  time  these  laws  were  put  into 
operation.  During  the  year  1858-59,  the  United  States 
exported  to  Canada  $4,185,516  worth  of  American  manu- 
factures paying  duty.  In  1859-60,  $3,448,114  worth;  in 
1860-61,  $3,501,642  worth;  in  1861-62,  $2,596,930  worth; 
and  in  1862-63,  $1,510,802  worth.  The  table^  does  not 
extend  beyond  1863,  but  it  shows  sufficiently  well  the  falling 
off  in  the  movement  of  American  manufactured  goods  to 
Canada. 

'  "The  indirect  public  debt  of  Canada,  including  railway  advances, 
in  1858,  was  $6,271,762  bearing  six  per  cent,  interest,  which,  prior  to 
1857,  had  not  been  a  charge  upon  the  revenue.  In  that  year,  owing  to 
the  commercial  crisis  it  became  necessary  to  make  large  payments 
upon  it  and,  in  1858,  almost  the  whole  amount  had  to  be  met  from  the 
general  revenue.  In  addition  to  the  commercial  depression,  the  har- 
vest of  1857  was  below  an  average,  and  that  of  1858  was  nearly  a  total 
failure.  It  became  manifest  that  the  indirect  debt  must  for  many  years 
be  a  charge  upon  the  country,  and  Parliament  was  required  to  make 
provisions  for  it.  The  interest  on  the  public  debt,  direct  and  indirect, 
thus  required  in  1858  was  $636,667  ;  and  without  flagrant  breach  of 
faith  it  could  neither  be  postponed  nor  repudiated.  The  pressure  had 
come  suddenly  and  heavily  upon  the  people  of  Canada  ;  but  neither 
the  Government  nor  the  Legislature  hesitated  in  making  such  provi- 
sion as  in  their  judgment  would  meet  the  exigencies.  The  Customs 
Act  of  1858  was  therefore  passed,  and  subsequently,  with  the  same 
objects  in  view,  others.    The  Customs  Act  of  1859  was  also  passed." 

A.  T.  Gait,  Canada,  1849-1859  ;  pp.  34-35. 

^  Report  of  Committees,  Vol.  3  ;  No.  22,  37  Cong.  2  Sess.  1861-62. 

See  Appendix,  Table  X. 

'  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  Rept.  of  Treasurer,  1864. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4.  55 

Still  more  vital  than  the  high  tariff  to  the  interests  of  the 
American  trade  was  the  adoption  in  the  Canadian  Customs 
Act  of  1859,  of  the  ad  valorem  principle  of  levying  duty. 
It  was  the  avowed  intention  of  Hon.  A.  T.  Galt,^  the 
Canadian  Minister  of  Finance,  by  extending  this  principle  to 
all  dutiable  importations,  to  raise  revenue  and  to  further  and 
develop  the  direct  trade  between  Canada  and  all  foreign 
countries  by  sea  and  thus,  he  declares,  to  benefit  the  shipping 
interest  of  Great  Britain. 

This  object  was  attained  by  taking  duty  on  the  value  in 
the  market  where  the  goods  were  last  bought.  That  is  to 
say,  goods  of  foreign  production  sold  in  the  United  States 
to  Canadian  merchants  would  have  to  pay  duty  at  the 
Canadian  frontier  on  the  original  cost  of  the  article  plus 
shipping  and  freight  charges,  as  well  as  the  United  States 
customs  charges. - 

Mr.  Gait  states  further,^  "The  levy  of  specific  duty  for 
several  years  had  completely  diverted  the  trade  of  Canada 
in  teas,  sugars,  etc.,  to  American  markets,  and  had  destroyed 
a  very  valuable  trade  which  formerly  existed  from  the  St. 
Lawrence  to  the  lower  Provinces  and  West  Indies.  It  was 
believed    that   the    completion    of    our    canal    and    railroad 

'  A.  T.  Gait,  Canada  ;  1849-1859,  p.  36. 

*  The  Canadian  tariffs  are  chiefly  levied  ad  valorem  on  the  invoice 
values  of  goods  at  the  point  of  purchase  for  importation  into  Canada, 
whether  that  be  in  the  United  States  or  in  Europe,  and  the  consequence 
is  a  practical  difference  against  purchasing  in  the  United  States,  which 
increases  with  every  accession  to  prices  here,  and  has  now  attained  to 
the  full  nominal  measure  of  the  duty  levied. 

The  increase  in  the  price  of  fabrics,  caused  by  the  successive  tariff 
acts  of  the  United  States  and  by  the  internal  duties,  has  steadily 
increased  this  difference,  in  connection  with  the  higher  rates  of  ad  val- 
orem duty  levied  in  Canada  until  it  now  amounts  very  nearly  to  a  pro- 
hibition of  purchases  in  the  United  States  of  duty-paj-'ing  articles.  A 
duty  of  twenty  per  cent,  on  invoices  made  in  England  can  scarcely  fail 
to  amount  to  two  such  percentages  when  the  same  or  similar  goods  are 
purchased  in  the  United  States,  simply  through  the  duplication  of 
prices  attained  here. — Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  1864,  p.  104. 

*  Canada,  1849-1859,  p.  36. 


56  TJic  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  1854. 

systems  together  with  the  improvements  in  the  navigation 
of  the  Lower  St.  Lawrence  justifies  the  belief  that  the  supply 
of  Canadian  wants  might  be  once  more  made  by  sea  and  the 
benefits  of  this  commerce  obtained  for  our  own  merchants 
and  forwarders."  The  results  of  the  application  of  the  ad 
valorem  principle  and  the  tariff  of  1858  and  1859  on  the 
imports  from  the  United  States  of  manufactured  goods,  and 
goods  of  foreign  production,  is  shown  in  Diagram  L  This 
diagram  shows  the  course  of  importations  of  foreign  and 
manufactured  goods  into  Canada  from  Great  Britain  (solid 
line)  and  from  the  United  States  (dotted  line). 

Following  the  panic  year  of  1857,  the  imports  from  Great 
Britain  fall  in  1858  to  $11,000,000,  and  then  gradually 
increase  to  $17,500,000  in  1864.  Those  from  the  United 
States  also  fall  after  1857,  to  $8,500,000  and  then  gradually 
decrease  to  $4,000,000  in  1864.  A  corresponding,  thoug^h 
not  so  striking  a  result,  is  obtained  by  plotting  the  importa- 
tions of  foreign  productions  reaching  Canada  by  the  St. 
Lawrence,  and  through  the  United  States.  This  is  shown 
in  Diagram  IL  Here  the  importations  by  way  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  (solid  line)  from  $11,000,000,  in  1858,  increase  to 
$18,500,000  in  1865.  Similar  importations  reaching  Canada 
through  the  United  States,  shown  in  the  diagram  by  the 
dotted  line,  from  $13,500,000,  in  1858,  decrease  to  $9,500,000 
in  1865. 

Diagrams  I  and  II  indicate  that  trade  between  Canada 
and  foreign  countries,  mainly  England,  has  been  increasing 
since  1858,  while  that  of  Canada  with  the  United  States  has 
been  decreasing;  and  that  the  route  by  the  St.  Lawrence 
river  for  importations  of  foreign  goods  is  being  officially 
favored  at  the  expense  of  the  American  railroads  and  canals, 
as  well  as  at  the  expense  of  American  merchants.  Diagram 
III  shows  the  exports  of  Canadian  goods,  mainly  natural 
products,  to  Great  Britain  (solid  line),  and  to  the  United 
States  (dotted  line).  The  export  trade  of  Canada  to  the 
United  States  shows  a  gradual  rise  from  $11,500,000  in 
1859,  to  $20,500,000  in  1865.     The  trade  to  Great  Britain 


I. 

GREA 

i860 


8,526 
ipers  18 


3.970 
1.24.- 


706 


^ijo.sjj  Zsf*.'; 


Table  for  Diagram  i. 

VALUES'   OF   MANUFACTURED   GOODS   IMPORTED    INTO   CANADA    FROM    GREAT   BRITAIN    AND    FROM   THE   UNITED   STATES. 


Cxoi.t^i  i,,ojj. 


1,187  m.6jj  S,64s,t62  3>4I7>6T4 


g,Bs6  138,389  88,538  64,jj 


7.89*  8^3.308  'iSJ*.387  383,55 


'  Compiled  from  Canadian  Sessional   Papers  1853-1865. 


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DIAGRAM     I 


58 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  18^4. 


Table  for  Diagram  II. 

GOODS    OF    FOREIGN    PRODUCTION    DESTINED    FOR 

CANADA    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES    IMPORTED 

VIA    THE    ST.     LAWRENCE    RIVER.' 


Values  of  goods 

Values  of  goods 

destined  for 

In  transit  for  the 

Canada. 

United  States. 

1853 

$21,864,353 

$1,257,556 

1854 

24,811,713 

594,388 

1855 

13,711,214 

21,614 

1856 

18,367,041 

17,190 

1857 

17,153,710 

210,545 

1858 

10,768,161 

26,916 

1859 

11,472,754 

76,314 

i860 

13,548,665 

21,505 

1 861 

16,726,541 

522,514 

1862 

17,601,019 

490,298 

1863 

16,439,930 

515,245 

1864 

6,411,591   %  year. 

282,667 

1865 

18,828,495 

289,685 

GOODS   OF    FOREIGN    PRODUCTION    DESTINED    FOR 

CANADA    PASSING    THROUGH    THE 

UNITED    STATES. 5 


Goods  passing 

Goods  purchased 

Total  values 

through 

in  U.  S.  in  bond 

in  dollars 

the  U.  S. 

free,  or  having 

passing  througl 

in  bond. 

paid  duty. 

the  U.  S. 

1854 

/l, 367, 770 

£  674,054 

$  9,800,755 

1855 

1,115,943 

811,135 

9,239,974 

1856 

1,231,730 

1,279,779 

12,055,243 

1857 

1,395,660 

947,579 

11,247,547 

1858 

$2,057,024 

$1,444,742 

13,501,766 

1859 

4,546,491 

5,351,865 

9,898,356 

i860 

3.041,877 

4,650,654 

7,692,531 

I86I 

5,688,952 

4,927,962 

10,616,914 

1862 

5,508,427 

4,045,080 

9,553,507 

1863 

6,172,483 

2,821,601 

8,994,084 

1864 

7,925,177 

1,489,098 

9,414,2753 

1865 

6,511,771 

3,103,430 

9,615,201 

'  Compiled  from  the  annual  reports  of  the  Canadian  Commissioner 
of  Customs. 

^  Compiled  from  annual  reports  of  R.  S.  M.  Bouchette,  Canadian 
Commissioner  of  Customs. 

The  difference  between  these  figures  and  those  given  in  Foreign  and 
Domestic  Commerce  appears  only  in  the  value  given  to  the  pound  stg. 
I  have  taken  it  to  be  $4.80  ;  the  government  report  seems  to  have  made 
it  equal  to  $4.00. 

^  An  apparent  misprint  in  the  Canadian  reports  gives  this  as  the 
value  for  ^  year. 


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DIAGRAM         H 


6o 


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DIAGRAM       HI 


62 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854. 


Table  for  Diagram  IV. 

VALUE   OF    GOODS    IMPORTED    FREE    UNDER   THE    RECI- 
PROCITY  TREATY    FROM    CANADA    INTO    THE 
UNITED    STATES,   AND    FROM    THE 
UNITED    STATES    INTO 
CANADA. 


Fiscal  year 
ending 
June  30. 

1854 
1855 
1856 

1857 
1858 

1859 
i860 
1861 
1862 
1863 
1864 
1865 


Value  of  goods 

imported  from 

Canada. 2 


^15,959.850 
16,731,984 
10,900,168 

12,307,371 
16,218,767 
16,327,824 
14,295,562 
12,807,354 
23,000,000^ 
25,602,561 


Value  of  goods     Calen- 
imported  from         dar 
the  United  States,  i    year. 

$      697,968  (7  mos.) 

9,270,686 

9,699,384 

10,370,448 

5,564,615 

7,106,116 

7,069,098 

9,980,937 
14,430,626 
12,339,367 

4,875,630  {%  yr.) 

9,131,641 


^  Annual  reports  of  Canadian  Commissioner  of  Customs. 

■^  U.  S.  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  1864,  p.  93,  and  U.  S. 
Commerce  and  Navigation,  1864  and  1865. 

^  Estimated.  1864,  $27,051,130  for  Canada  and  the  other  Provinces; 
1865,  $4,967,107  for  the  other  Provinces  not  including  Canada,  Imports 
from  Canada  taken  to  be  equal  to  the  difTerence. 


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DIAGRAM       is: 


64  The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

rises  from  $8,000,000  in  1859,  to  $17,000,000  because  of 
unusual  shipments  of  grain  in  1861  and  1862,  and  falls  by 
1865  to  $12,000,000.  This  tendency  of  Canada  to  export 
her  natural  products  to  the  United  States  rather  than  else- 
where is  further  shown  in  Diagram  IV.  This  diagram 
indicates  the  exports  of  goods  free  under  the  Reciprocity 
Treaty,  {natural  products,)  from  Canada  to  the  United 
States  (solid  line),  and  from  the  United  States  to  Canada 
(dotted  line).  In  1858,  following  the  panic  year  1857, 
Canada  exported  to  the  United  States  $11,000,000  worth  of 
free  goods.  This  export  had  reached  $25,500,000  worth 
in  1865.  In  1858,  the  United  States  exported  to  Canada 
$5,500,000  worth  of  free  goods.  In  1862,  due  to  the  large 
shipments  of  grain  referred  to  in  connection  with  Diagrami 
III,  the  exports  of  free  goods  by  the  United  States  and 
Canada  are  equal.  From  $14,000,000  for  this  year  the 
exports  of  the  United  States  fall  to  $9,000,000  in  1865. 
Diagrams  III  and  IV  indicate  that  Canada  is  disposing  of 
the  bulk  of  her  products  in  the  markets  of  the  United  States. 
Diagrams  I,  II,  III,  and  IV  now  taken  together  show  that 
Canada  from  the  year  1858  to  the  end  of  the  treaty  was 
tending  more  and  more  to  buy  her  foreign  and  manufac- 
tured goods  from  England,  and  to  sell  her  own  natural 
products  to  the  United  States. 

The  demand  for  most  of  these  natural  products  we  our- 
selves could  not  meet,  and  as  we  paid  very  nearly  the  usual 
prices,  there  is  reason  to  think  that,  except  for  the  advantage 
of  paying  for  a  limited  amount  in  kind,  the  volume  of  our 
imports  would  have  been  much  the  same  without  a  treaty. 
The  balance  of  trade  against  us  here  was  paid  to  Canada 
by  England,  to  be  sure,  in  manufactured  goods,  for  an 
equivalent  amount  of  English  imports  from  the  United 
States  ;  but  this  was  not  the  reciprocity  aimed  at  in  the 
treaty. 


Chapter  ill. 

TJie  Circumstances  ivhicli  Led  to  its  Abrogation. 

It  must  of  course  be  remembered  that  the  years  1863, 
1864,  and  especially  1865,  of  our  Civil  War  produced  abnor- 
mal conditions ;  and  in  judging  the  trade  returns,  we  must 
keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  we  are  not  viewing  conditions 
that  would  have  prevailed  in  times  of  peace,  yet  these  were 
the  conditions  that  did  exist,  when  the  treaty  period  was 
drawing  to  a  close,  and  the  question  of  renewing  it  was 
under  discussion  in  Congress. 

The  unfriendly  and  even  hostile  attitude  of  Canada 
towards  the  northern  states  during  the  war  was  hardly 
touched  upon  in  the  debates  on  the  subject  in  Congress, 
although  this  attitude  produced  its  effect  upon  the  minds  of 
the  people  at  large  in  still  further  increasing  the  dissatisfac- 
tion with  which  most  Americans  had  come  to  regard  the 
treaty.  The  position  taken  by  Canada  was  not  distin- 
guished by  them  from  the  unfriendly  attitude  of  England 
toward  the  Union.  The  utterances  of  the  English  and  Cana- 
dian newspapers ;  the  precipitate  sending  of  English  troops 
to  Canada  when  the  United  States  had  not  yet  decided  as  to 
the  surrender  of  Messrs.  Mason  and  Slidell  after  they  had 
been  taken  from  the  British  mail  steamer  Trent;  the  raid 
into  Vermont  by  a  band  of  southern  sympathizers,  asylumed 
in  Canada,  who  looted  the  bank  at  St.  Albans,  killed  an 
American  citizen,  and  found  a  safe  refuge  on  British  soil ; 
the  destruction  wrought  upon  our  commerce  by  English- 
built  privateers ;  all  these  circumstances  tended  inevitably  to 
increase  the  feeling  that  a  treaty,  which  had  given  to  Canada 
manifestly  greater  advantages  than  it  had  given  to  the  United 
States,  should  not  be  prolonged  under  its  existing  form. 

Yet  in  spite  of  this  feeling  of  restiveness,  under  the  then 
unsatisfactory  condition  of  an  arrangement  that  had  tended 
to  promote  mutual  comity  and  good-will,  that  had  aimed  at 
securing  peaceful  intercourse  with  our  northern  neighbor, 


66  The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^,4. 

and  that  had  conferred^  so  many  undoubted  benefits  upon 
both  countries,  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  the  treaty  would 
have  suffered  a  complete  overthrow  in  Congress,  rather  than 
an  extension  of  its  provisions,  had  it  not  been  for  the  press- 
ing need  for  revenue  that  faced  our  government  at  the  close 
of  the  war. 

The  treaty  had,  by  1864,  "released  from  duty  a  total  sum 
of  $42,333,257  in  value  of  goods  of  Canada,  more  than  of 
goods  the  produce  of  the  United  States."^  The  debt  of  the 
United  States  June  30,  1865,  was  $2,682,593,026  ;2  the  bal- 
ance in  the  United  States  Treasury  July  i,  1865,  was 
$858,309,''  a  condition  which  made  the  need  of  revenue 
imperative.  There  existed  a  feeling  that  the  American 
producer  should  not  be  loaded  with  taxes,  while  at  the  same 
time  the  Canadian  producer  who  competed  with  him,  con- 
tributed nothing  to  the  revenue  of  our  government.  But 
according  to  prevailing  sentiment*  in  the  Senate  one  reason 

^  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  1864,  p.  93. 

*  Rept.  of  U.  S.  Treasurer,  1865,  p.  19.  ^  Same,  p.  18. 

"*  Senator  Cowan  (Pennsylvania),  p.  233  ;  Cong.  Globe,  1864-5  ;  pt.  i. 

I  am  in  favor  of  the  proposition  before  the  Senate  {to  tertninate 
treaty)  ;  and  I  am  in  favor  of  it  for  this  single  reason,  that  I  have  dis- 
covered that  by  this  treaty  we  have  been  deprived  of  our  power  of  taxa- 
tion over  the  products  of  our  own  country  for  revenue  purposes. 

Senator  Chandler  (Mich.),  p.  230  ;  Cong.  Globe,  1864-5  ;  pt.  i. 

The  citizens  of  Michigan  are  largely  taxed  for  the  support  of  this 
government,  taxed  directly  and  indirectly  ;  taxed  upon  their  income, 
and  upon  their  products,  and  upon  their  consumption  ;  taxed  in  every 
way  ;  while  the  inhabitants  of  Canada  raise  precisely  the  same  articles, 
are  engaged  in  the  same  business,  and  send  their  products  here  to 
compete  with  ours  without  contributing  one  dollar  to  the  support  of 
this  government. 

Senator  Sherman  (Ohio),  p.  209  ;   Cong.  Globe,  1864-5  ;  pt.  i. 

It  is  manifest  .  .  .  that  while  we  maintain  our  present  system  of 
internal  taxation,  the  reciprocity  treaty  is  a  direct  benefit  to  the  Cana- 
dian producer,  farmer,  and  mechanic,  and  it  is  a  discrimination  against 
our  own  farmers  and  mechanics.  It  seems  to  me  therefore  for  this 
reason  alone,  if  there  were  no  other,  that  this  treaty  ought  to  fall. 

Senator  Sumner  (Mass.),  Cong.  Globe,   p.  207  ;  1864-5  ;    pt.  i. 

In  every  direction  we  are  now  turning  for  subjects  of  taxation,  our 
own   people  are  contributing  in  every  way  largely.     Commerce,  manu- 


The  Treaty  luitJi  Canada  in   1854.  67 

alone,  that  it  hampered  the  raising  of  revenue,  was  sufficient 
for  the  treaty's  abrogation. 

In  the  House  of  Representatives  there  had  been  a  feehng 
that  the  treaty  should  be  abrogated  on  account  of  its 
unequal  operation.  This  is  shown  in  the  wording  of  the 
House  Resolution^  (No.  56)  which  passed  the  House-  and 
reached  the  Senate  in  this  form  :^ 

factures  in  every  form  are  obliged  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  the 
country.  I  know  no  reason  why  the  large  amounts  enfranchised  by 
this  treaty  should  enjoy  the  immunity  which  has  been  thus  far  con- 
ceded them. 

Senator  Morrill  (Maine),  Cong.  Globe,  p.  229  ;  1864-5  ;  pt.  i. 

I  believe  .  .  .  that  whatever  may  be  said  in  favor  of  the  treaty,  that 
the  principle  on  which  it  started,  that  of  reciprocity,  has  been  sacrificed 
and  does  not  hold  good  to-day  ;  for  this  reason  alone,  it  is  proper  to 
give  notice.   .    .   . 

It  seems  by  our  peculiar  circumstances  to  have  been  rendered  abso- 
lutely necessary  b}'  the  emergency  of  public  affairs  to  lay  an  internal 
revenue,  and  this  treaty  interferes  with  that,  and  this  renders  its  ter- 
mination almost  absolutely  necessary. 

Senator  Doolittle  (Wisconsin),  Cong.  Globe,  p.  232  ;  1864-5  ;  pt.  i. 

...  I  believe  that  our  new  revenue  system,  which  has  been  forced 
on  us  by  the  necessities  of  our  position  growing  out  of  this  war  abso- 
lutely demands  that  this  treaty  should  be  abrogated. 

Senator  Richardson  (Illinois),    Cong.  Globe,   p.  234;   1864-5;  pt.    i. 

If  the  times  now  were  such  as  they  were  when  the  treaty  was  nego- 
tiated, I  should  not  regard  it  of  very  much  importance  either  one  way 
or  the  other.  I  apprehend  that  the  great  difficulty  that  has  arisen  in 
this  case  has  arisen  in  consequence  of  our  recent  laws  for  raising  inter- 
nal revenue,  and  that  is  all  there  is  to  the  whole  case,  I  think.  If  there 
is  anything  beyond  that  I  have  not  been  able  to  perceive  it.  If  things 
were  now  as  they  were  when  the  treaty  was  made,  I  do  not  believe  I 
should  give  my  vote  to  give  the  notice.  But  a  change  of  circumstances 
has  made  it  necessary,  in  m}'^  opinion,  to  terminate  the  treaty. 

'  For  history  of  this  resolution,  and  debate  upon  it  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  see  Congressional  Globe  1863-4  ;  pp.  9,  19,  1371. 
1387,  2298,  2333,  2364,  2452,  2453,  2476,  2482,  2502,  2508. 

*  House  Resolution  No.  56  passed  the  House,  Tuesday,  December 
13,  1864.     Yeas,  85  ;  nays,  57  ;  not  voting,  40. 

Six  of  the  members  not  voting,  recorded  their  votes  in  affirmative 
upon  news  that  the  St.  Albans  raiders  had  been  released  by  the  Cana- 
dian courts  for  want  of  jurisdiction. 

*  Cong.  Globe,  p.  96  ;   1864-5  ;  pt.  i. 


68  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854. 

Whereas  .  .  .  nearly  all  the  articles  ivhich  Canada 
has  to  sell  are  admitted  into  the  United  States  free  of  duty, 
zvhile  heazy  duties  are  now  imposed  tipon  many  of  those 
articles  ivhich  the  people  of  the  United  States  have  to  sell, 
with  the  intention  of  excluding  them  from,  the  Canadian 
markets;     ... 

Resolved,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of 
America  in  Congress  assembled — that  the  President  of  the 
United  States  be,  and  he  is  hereby  authorised  and  requested 
to  give  to  the  government  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  the  notice  required  by  the  fifth  article 
of  the  reciprocity  treaty  of  the  ^th  of  June  18^4,  for  the 
termination  of  same. 

This  was  amended  on  motion  in  the  Senate  by  Mr.  Sum- 
ner^ to  read: — 

Whereas  it  is  provided  .  .  .  that  this  treaty  shall 
remain  in  force  for  ten  years  from  the  date  at  zvhich  it  may 
come  into  operation,  and  further  until  the  expiration  of 
twelve  months.  .  .  .  And  whereas  further,  it  is  no 
longer  for  the  interests  of  the  United  States  to  continue 
the  same  in  force:   Therefore 

Resolved:  .  .  .  That  notice  be  given  of  the  termina- 
tion of  the  reciprocity  treaty,  according  to  the  provisions 
therein  contained  for  the  termination  of  the  same;  and  the 
President  of  the  United  States  is  hereby  charged  with  the 
communication  of  such  notice  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

This  was  the  form  in  which  the  resolution  was  finally 
passed.  It  shows  that  the  Senate  was  not  willing  to  have 
the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  rest  upon  the  generally  accepted 
objections  to  it. 

The  only  considerable  argument  offered  against  the  reso- 
lution to  terminate  the  treaty  came  from  Senator  Howe  of 
Wisconsin,  that  to  cut  off  the  trade  of  the  United  States 

^  Cong.  Globe,  1864-5,  pt.  i,  P-  96- 


TJie  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854.  69 

was  a  very  improper  way  to  make  them  better  able  to  pay 
taxes/  This  objection  was  met  by  the  reply  of  Senator 
Chandler  of  Michigan,-  that  a  great  part  of  that  trade  with 
Canada  was  a  carrying  trade  only. 

Thirty-three  of  the  Senators,  January  12,  1865,  voted  for 
the  resolution,  eight  voted  against  it,  and  eight  were  absent.* 

'  Senator  Howe  : — .  .  .  The  lumber  product  of  the  United  States  is 
not  less  than  $100,000,000,  and  if  you  put  five  per  cent,  upon  that  they 
have  to  pay  directly  $5,000,000,  as  a  consideration  for  being  relieved 
from  this  competition  of  $2,000,000.  I  think  the  lumber  men  of  the 
United  States  can  do  without  this  sympathy.   .   .   . 

To  cut  down  their  trade  is  not  the  way  in  which  to  prepare  the  people 
to  be  taxed.  It  is  not  sound  argument  to  adduce  here  or  elsewhere  to 
say  that  when  you  have  deprived  the  people  of  this  trade  which  now 
amounts  to  $40,000,000  annually,  they  will  be  in  a  better  position  to 
pay  your  taxes  and  sustain  the  public  credit. — Senator  Howe,  p.  228, 
Cong.  Globe,  1864-5,  pt.  i. 

"  The  constituents  of  that  Senator  (Howe  ot  Wisconsin)  are  taxed, 
and  largely  taxed,  upon  everything  that  they  consume,  yet  every  pro- 
duct of  theirs  of  the  plow,  of  the  anvil,  of  the  mill,  and  of  the  mine  is 
brought  in  direct  competition  with  our  own.  ...  It  is  true  they 
receive  the  same  articles  but  for  transportation,  and  for  no  other  pur- 
pose. If  the  Senator  will  look  at  the  exports  from  Chicago,  one-third 
of  which  goes  to  Canada,  he  will  find  that  not  one-tenth  of  that  one- 
third  stops  in  Canada  longer  than  enough  to  transport  it  to  Portland, 
Maine,  or  to  Niagara  Falls  or  Buflfalo.— Chandler  (Mich.)  38  Cong. 
2  Sess.,  p.  230,  pt.  I,  1864-5. 

3  Voting  for  the  abrogation  of  treaty  (Southern  States  not  repre- 
sented): 

Sen.  Henry  B.  Anthony  (Rhode  Island),  Unionist. 

B.  Gratz  Brown  (Missouri), 

Zachariah  Chandler  (Michigan), 

Daniel  Clark  (New  Hampshire), 

Jacob  Collamer  (Vermont), 

John  Conness  (California)," 

Edgar  Cowan  (Pennsylvania), 

GarreU  Davis  (Kentucky),  Democrat. 

James  W.  Doolittle  (Wisconsin),        Unionist. 

Nathan  A.  Farewell  (Maine), 

Solomon  Foote  (Vermont), 

Lafayette  S.  Foster  (Connecticut), 

James  W.  Grimes  (Iowa), 


70 


The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  1854. 


On  January  16,  1865,  the  House  accepted  the  amendment, 
and  so  the  joint  resolution  passed. 

As  the  ten  years  of  the  treaty  would  be  completed  March 
17,  1865,  the  twelve  months'  notice  was  given  in  accordance 
with  the  treaty  stipulations,  and  March  17,  1866,  the  reci- 
procity treaty  came  to  a  close. 

In  the  debates  at  Quebec  upon  confederation  of  the  British 
Provinces,  from  February  3  to  March  14,  1865,  we  have, 
perhaps,  the  best  record  of  contemporary  public  opinion  in 
Canada  upon  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty.     Here  there  was 

Benj.  F.  Harding  (Oregon),  Unionist. 

James  Harlon  (Iowa), 

Ira  Harris  (New  York), 

John  B.  Henderson  (Missouri), 

Henry  S.  Lane  (Indiana), 

Edwin  D.  Morgan  i^New  York), 

Lot  M.  Morrill  (Maine), 

James  W.  Nesmith  (Oregon),  Democrat. 

Samuel  C.  Pomeroy  (Kansas),  Unionist. 

Lazarus  W.  Powell  (Kentucky),         Democrat. 

Wm.  A.  Richardson  (Illinois),  " 

George  R.  Riddle  (Delaware),  " 

John  Sherman  (Ohio),  Unionist. 

William  Sprague  (Rhode  Island),  " 

Charles  Sumner  (Mass.),  " 

John  C.  TenEyck  (Ne%v  Jersey),  " 

Lyman  Trumbull  (Illinois),  " 

Benj.  F.  Wade  (Ohio), 

Waitman  T.  Willey  (W.  Virginia), 

Henry  Wilson  (Mass.),  " 


Senators  voting  to  continue  treaty  relation  : 
Sen.  Chas.  W.  Buckalew  (Penn.), 
James  Dixon  (Conn.), 
John  P.  Hale  (New  Hampshire), 
Thos.  A.  Hendricks  (Indiana), 
Thos.  H.  Hicks  (Maryland), 
Timothy  O.  Howe  (Wisconsin), 
Alex.  Ramsay  (Minnesota), 
Peter  G.  Van  Winckle  (W.  Virginia), 


33 

Democrat. 
Unionist. 

Democrat. 

Unionist. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854.  71 

but  one  opinion  ■}  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  was  a  lever 
to  force  Canada  from  her  allegiance  to  England  and  into 
the  United  States.  For  by  withdrawing  the  trade  privileges 
that  Canada  enjoyed,  and  upon  which  she  was  dependent, 
the  United  States,  it  was  claimed,  would  use  Canada's  help- 
less position  to  bring  about  annexation.  The  apathy  with 
which  Great  Britain  had  regarded  the  abrogation  of  the 
treaty,  and  the  indifiference  with  which  Canada's  commer- 
cial needs  in  general  were  viewed  in  England,  convinced  the 
Canadians  that  commercially  they  would  be  left  to  stand  or 
fall  alone,  and  alone  Canada  was  sure  to  become  a  part  of 

'  Mr.  Dunkin,  p.  531,  Debates  on  Confederation,  3d  Sess.,  8th  Pro- 
vincial Parliament,  Canada  : — 

"The  real  danger  is  not  of  war  with  the  United  States.  It  is  from 
what  I  call  their  pacific  hostility,  from  trouble  to  be  wrought  by  them 
within  this  country,  trouble  to  arise  out  of  refusal  of  reciprocity,  repeal 
of  the  bonding  system,  custom  house  annoyances.  .  .  .  That  the 
United  States  or  those  portions  of  the  United  States  near  us  may  avail 
themselves  of  every  opportunity  to  perplex  us,  to  embroil  us  in  trouble, 
to  make  us  come  within  the  disturbing  influences  of  their  strong  local 
attraction." 

Mr.  Ross,  p.  802  : — 

"...  I  firmly  believe  it  to  be  the  policy  of  the  United  States  to  intro- 
duce coercive  measures  with  a  view  to  make  us  feel  that  our  commer- 
cial interests  are  identified  with  them.  .  .  .  They  do  not  intend  imme- 
diate invasion,  but  instead  of  that,  they  will,  so  to  speak,  put  on  the 
screws  in  order,  if  possible,  to  make  us  feel  that  our  interest  is  with 
them  and  not  separate  from  them." 

Mr.  Remillard,  p.  788  :— 

"...  But  if  we  are  not  desirous  of  being  annexed  to  the  United 
States,  and  if  we  are  desirous  of  preserving  the  institutions  which  are 
so  dear  to  us,  I  maintain  that  we  must  construct  a  Confederacy  which 
shall  be  competent  to  protect  us  from  the  United  States." 

MacDonald,  p.  650  : — 

"The  threatened  repeal  of  the  Reciprocity  Treaty,  the  hazard  of  the 
United  States  doing  away  with  the  system  of  bonding  goods  in  transitu 
and  the  unsatisfactory  position  of  commercial  relations  with  the  neigh- 
boring country,  all  this  calls  for  immediate  action." 

Mr.  McGivern,  p.  466  : — 

"  Placed  as  we  are  now,  with  the  abrogation  of  the  Reciprocity  Treaty 
threatened,  does  it  not  become  our  duty,  I  ask,  to  make  some  effort  to 
change  and  improve  our  condition?" 


72  The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

the  United  States.  They  did  not  desire  to  be  annexed,  yet 
it  was  firmly  beheved  that  the  United  States  either  would 
play  the  part  of  Prussia  in  the  German  Zoll-verein,  and  by 
refusing  transit  to  Canada  force  a  union,  or  by  non-inter- 
course, and  in  case  of  war  by  actual  invasion,  bring  about  the 
same  result;  thus  it  was  said  they  would  secure  Canada's 
trade,  and  strike  a  blow  at  England.  War,  the  Canadians 
feared,  would  soon  follow  the  strained  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  England,  and  the  extreme  uncertainty 
which  attended  the  settlement  of  the  Alabama  claims  even 
up  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington  in  187 1,  gave  ample  reason 

Hon.  Mr.  Rose,  p.  397  : — 

"At  the  present  time  we  are  almost  entirely  dependent  upon  the 
United  States.  Commercially  we  are  dependent  upon  them  for  an 
outlet  to  the  ocean  during  the  winter  months.  If  they  choose  to  sus- 
pend the  bonding  system,  or  by  a  system  of  consular  certificates  make 
it  practically  useless  ;  if  they  abolish  the  reciprocity  treaty  and  carry 
the  passport  system  to  a  greater  degree  of  stringency,  we  should  feel 
our  dependence  upon  that  country  even  in  a  greater  and  more  practical 
way  than  we  do  at  the  present  time. 

And  perhaps,  sir,  it  is  worth  our  while  to  consider  whether  this  may 
not  be  the  real  motive  which  dictates  the  policy  they  are  now  pursuing." 

Hon.  Mr.  M.  C.  Crea,  p.  173  : — 

"The  imminence  of  war  with  the  United  States,  the  certainty  of  the 
abrogation  of  the  Reciprocity  Treaty,  the  danger  of  non-intercourse,  the 
opportunity  presented  by  the  Charlottetown  Convention  (of  Maritime 
Provinces  for  Union)  and  the  consequent  necessity  of  the  Intercolonial 
Railway,  all  point  to  this  Confederation." 

Hon.  Sir  E.  P.  Tache  (Premier),  p.  6  : — 

"  If  the  opportunity  which  now  presented  itself  (of  Confederation) 
were  allowed  to  pass  by  unimproved,  whether  we  would  or  would  not, 
we  would  be  forced  into  the  American  union  by  violence,  and  if  not  by 
violence,  would  be  placed  upon  an  inclined  plane  which  would  carry 
us  there  insensibly.  In  either  case  the  result  would  be  the  same.  In 
our  present  condition  we  could  not  long  continue  to  exist  as  a  British 
colony." 

Mr.  Horwood,  p.  833  : — 

"Moreover,  if  in  the  meantime  the  Maritime  Provinces,  taking  up 
again  their  old  scheme  of  a  union  among  themselves,  should  refuse  to 
listen  to  any  overtures  we  might  make,  we  should  like  madmen  have 
lost  the  golden  opportunity.  Nothing  would  remain  for  us  but  annexa- 
tion to  the  United  States." 


The  Treaty  imth  Canada  in  1854.  73 

for  such  fear.  In  event  of  war,  Canada  would  be  the  first 
point  of  attack,  and  alone,  Canada's  position  was  defenseless. 
To  Canadian  popular  opinion,  then,  the  abrogation  of  the 
reciprocity  treaty  meant  exposure  to  the  danger  of  aggres- 
sion by  the  United  States.  It  is  plain  that  the  abrogation 
of  the  reciprocity  treaty,  from  whatsoever  cause  it  rose, 
was  a  powerful  means  in  bringing  about  the  confederation 

Extract  Mr.  Buchanan,  p.  870  : — 

"  The  continuation  of  the  Reciprocity  Treaty  with  the  United  States 
is  favorable  not  only  to  the  farmers  of  Canada,  and  to  all  other  classes 
through  them,  but  also  to  the  English  Government ;  for  without  the 
existence  of  that  Treaty,  the  Canadians  are  in  a  position  to  be  greatly 
benefited  in  an  industrial  and  commercial  sense  by  the  annexation  of 
Canada  to  the  United  States  unless  other  industrial  or  intercolonial 
arrangements  should  take  place.  Annexation  is  far  preferable  in  an 
industrial  point  of  view,  to  our  'free  trade  in  raw  products'  which  is 
unaccompanied  by  protection  for  home  industry." 

Mr.  Horwood,  p.  827  : — 

"Either  we  shall  form  part  of  a  Confederation  of  the  British  North 
American  Provinces,  or  we  shall  fall  into  the  unfathomable  gulf  of  the 
Confederation  of  the  neighboring  States,  formerly  the  United  States." 

Hon.  A.  T.  Gait  (Minister  of  Finance),  p.  64  : — 

"...  When  we  have  reason  to  fear  that  the  action  of  the  United 
States  will  prove  hostile  to  the  continuance  of  free  commercial  relations 
with  this  country,  when  we  know  that  the  consideration  of  this  ques- 
tion is  not  grounded  on  just  views  of  the  material  advantages  resulting 
to  each  country,  but  that  the  irritation  connected  with  political  events 
exercises  a  predominant  influence  over  the  minds  of  American  states- 
men, it  is  the  duty  of  the  House  to  provide,  if  possible,  other  outlets 
for  our  productions,  ...  to  seek  by  free  trade  with  our  fellow  colo- 
nists for  a  continued  and  uninterrupted  commerce  which  will  not  be 
liable  to  be  disturbed  at  the  capricious  will  of  any  foreign  country." 

Hon.  Mr.  Brown  (Pres.  of  Ex.  Council),  p.  106  : — 

"On  the  whole  then,  sir,  I  come  firmly  to  the  conclusion  that,  in 
view  of  the  possible  stoppage  of  the  American  Reciprocity  Treaty  and 
our  being  compelled  to  find  new  channels  for  our  trade,  this  union 
presents  to  us  advantages,  in  comparison  with  which  any  objection  that 
has  been  offered,  or  can  be  oflfered  to  it,  is  utterly  insignificant." 

"...  I  am  in  favor  of  a  union  of  these  provinces  because  it  will 
enable  us  to  meet  without  alarm  the  abrogation  of  the  American 
Reciprocity  Treaty,  in  case  the  United  States  should  insist  on  its  aboli- 
tion." 


74  The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

of  the  British  North  American  Provinces  in  1867,  and  in 
the  construction  of  the  Intercolonial  Railroad,  which  to  a 
certain  extent  took  the  place  of  transit  through  the  United 
States. 

These  fears,  on  the  part  of  Canada,  of  the  sinister  designs 
of  our  government,  were  somewhat  allayed  when  the  real 
reason  for  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  appeared  in  the 
debates  in  the  Senate,  but  they  were  revived  by  a  bill  intro- 
duced by  Mr.  Banks  July  2,  1866,^  providing  for  "the 
admission  of  the  States  of  Nova  Scotia,  New  Brunswick, 
Canada  East  and  Canada  West,  and  for  the  organization  of 
the  Territories  of  Selkirk,  Saskatchewan,  and  Columbia" 
as  States  and  Territories  of  the  United  States  under  certain 
conditions.  More  stress  has  been  laid  on  this  bill  than  its 
importance  would  warrant.^  It  was  read  twice  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  referred  to  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs  and  ordered  to  be  printed,  but  so  far  from 
becoming  a  law,  it  did  not  even  come  up  for  debate  in  Con- 
gress. It  cannot  be  denied  that  there  was  a  feeling  that  if 
Canada  desired  annexation  she  would  be  welcomed  as  a  part 
of  the  Union,  England  being  willing,  and  there  seems  to  be 
no  doubt  that  if  the  abrogation  of  the  reciprocity  treaty 
were  to  help  to  bring  about  that  result,  the  United  States 
would  look  with  complacency  upon  such  outcome.  For 
example,  when  the  delegates  from  Canada,  New  Brunswick, 
and  Nova  Scotia  were  in  Washington  from  January  24 
to  February  6,  1866,  for  the  purpose  of  prolonging  the 
treaty,  if  possible,^  Mr.  Morrill,  Chairman  of  the  Ways  and 
Means  Committee,  is  reported  to  have  replied  to  their  propo- 
sition to  place  trade  upon  a  better  footing,  "That  will  have 
to  be  postponed  until  you,  gentlemen,  assume  your  seats 
here."^     If  this  remark  meant  anything  it  meant  that  there 

'  Cong.  Globe,  1865-6,  pt.  4,  p.  354S. 

'  See  C.  G.  D.  Roberts'  History  of  Canada,  p.  348,  where  he  sa3's  the 
bill   was  passed  by  Congress  in  the  hope  of  heading  off  confederation. 

^  Watkin,  Canada  and  the  United  States,  pp.  405-418,  gives  the 
memoranda  reported  by  this  committee  to  the  Provincial  Governments. 

''  Same,  p.  425. 


The  Treaty  zuith  Canada  in  1854.  75 

was  an  indisposition  to  have  the  United  States  do  anything 
that  would  help  to  maintain  Canada's  independent  position. 
The  evidence  is  lacking,  however,  that  the  United  States 
took  positive  action  and  repealed  the  treaty  with  the  expec- 
tation of  bringing  about  annexation. 

In  reviewing  the  history  of  this  treaty,  we  have  found 
that,  due  to  the  geographical  position  and  the  economic  needs 
of  the  Provinces,  there  was  a  desire  by  them  for  free  inter- 
course with  the  United  States.  Such  arrangement  was  not 
easily  brought  about,  as  we  have  seen,  mainly  because  of  the 
disproportionate  benefits  to  the  Canadas,  which  it  was 
thought  would  result  from  it,  but  a  balance  was  secured  by 
adding  to  free  trade  and  free  canals,  a  satisfactory  solution 
for  the  fishery  question,  which  had  become  acute  in  the 
summer  of  1852.  By  this  adjustment  the  two  parties  to  the 
treaty  started  upon  conditions  that  seemed  absolutely  fair 
and  equal. 

The  fishery  contention  ceased  entirely,  and  was  not  heard 
from  until  after  the  treaty  came  to  an  end.  This  must  be 
reckoned  as  a  positive  and  undeniable  benefit  to  the  United 
States  intrinsically,  and  in  the  peace  and  harmony  which 
it  contributed  to  the  period  of  prosperous  trade  that  followed. 

The  Maritime  Provinces  throughout  the  treaty's  duration 
purchased  largely  of  the  United  States,  and  sold  their  own 
commodities  in  our  markets,  but  the  balance  of  trade  was 
always  very  greatly  in  our  favor.  If  they  benefited  much, 
the  United  States  benefited  much  more.  Yet  it  is  to  Canada 
that  we  must  look  for  the  most  definite  results.  But  here 
we  find  conditions  adverse  to  reciprocity,  yet  which  could 
have  been  provided  against,  for  they  were  foreseen  by  Mr. 
Marcy  when  the  treaty  was  drawn  up. 

The  building  of  railroads  and  canals  in  Canada,  about 
completed  in  1859,  was  in  itself  profitable  to  the  United 
States,  which  furnished  a  large  part  of  the  materials  for 
construction.  But  it  forced  Canada  to  lay  a  heavy  duty 
on  manufactures,  and  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  adverse  to  the 
trade  of  the  United  States  and  of  Canada  as  well,  for  after  all, 


76  The  Treaty  tvith  Canada  in  18^4. 

Canada  herself  had  to  pay  the  revenue  so  raised.  Of  the 
statesmanship  that  caused  Canada  to  assume  so  heavy  a  debt 
we  have  nothing  to  say.  Canada  had  to  meet  her  obHga- 
tions.  That  the  means  chosen  could  operate  so  powerfully 
against  reciprocal  trade  must  be  charged  as  a  defect  in  the 
treaty,  inasmuch  as  the  treaty  failed  only  where  it  did  not  pro- 
vide for  manufactured  goods.  The  provision  that  Canada 
was  to  buy  our  manufactures  as  we  bought  her  natural 
products,  rested  upon  a  tacit  understanding  only,  as  to  the 
spirit  of  reciprocity,  and  not  upon  any  treaty  stipulation. 
This  was  the  great  defect  of  the  treaty,  and  it  will  be  the 
cause  of  the  failure  of  any  reciprocity  treaty  which  we  may 
make  with  Canada  that  does  not  expressly  provide  for 
manufactured  goods.  In  the  treaty  of  1854,  the  difficulty 
might  have  been  avoided  by  fixing  the  limit  beyond  which  the 
Canadian  tariff  should  not  go,  or  by  placing  the  customs  in 
charge  of  officers  of  both  nations,  to  distribute  the  receipts 
according  to  population.  Such  arrangement  would,  of 
course,  have  rested  upon  a  uniform  tariff  for  both  countries. 
This  defect  in  the  original  treaty  might  have  thus  been 
remedied,  and  its  provisions  so  altered  that  the  principle 
would  have  continued  to  operate  had  the  desire  for  recip- 
rocal relations  been  as  great  as  before^  the  Civil  War. 

From  1862  to  1866  the  war  was  such  a  disturbing  factor, 
and  its  operations  so  distorted  all  our  relations  with  the 
British  North  American  Provinces  both  commercially  and 
politically,  that  these  years  must  not  be  included  in  our 
estimate  of  the  results  of  the  treaty.  Even  here,  however, 
the  United  States  reaped  greater  benefits  than  are  at  once 
apparent.  As  we  have  shown,  the  imports  from  Canada  of 
natural  products  increased  enormously  during  those  years. 
This  simply  meant,  as  has  been  recently  pointed  out,^  that 

'  Mr.  Ward  in  his  report  made  Feb.  5,  1862,  gives  the  opinions  of 
the  leading  cities,  from  Minnesota  to  Maine,  as  to  the  advantages  of 
reciprocity.  The  opinion  is  almost  unanimous  in  favor  of  the  principle 
aimed  at  in  the  Treaty. 

Ward's  report,  p.  21,  Repts.  of  Comm.  2  Sess.  37  Cong.,  Vol.  3. 

'^  Collier's  WeeMr,  Feb.  i,  1902;  Annexation  of  Canada  ;  W.  T.  Stead. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Canada  in  18^4.  77 

while  the  South  was  cut  off  by  our  blockading  fleets,  the 
North  drew  upon  Canada  as  an  almost  inexhaustible  store- 
house for  supplies,  not  least  among  which  were  wool  for 
blankets  and  horses  for  army  service.^ 

For  the  reasons  given,  it  has  been  quite  impossible  to 
trace  the  reciprocity  treaty  in  the  years  from  1854  to  1866 
through  an  unimpeded  course.  Conditions  never  permitted 
the  treaty,  faulty  as  it  was,  to  show  what  would  have  been 
the  results  under  favorable  circumstances.  Yet  there  were 
so  many  positive  and  well  defined  benefits  to  both  countries 
that  it  is  to  be  hoped  a  future  reciprocity  treaty  may  be  so 
drawn  up,  that  while  it  will  avoid  the  defects  of  the  treaty 
of  1854,  it  will  secure  to  both  Canada  and  the  United  States 
all  the  advantages  which  reciprocal  relations,  with  Canada, 
at  least,  can  not  fail  to  produce. 

'  See  Harvey,  p.  9. 


Bibliography  of  the  Canadian  Reciprocity  Treaty 


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Contains  nearly  all  the  papers  referred  to  in  Senate  Document  No. 

100,  ist  Sess.,  32d  Cong.,  and  several  more. 
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953-958. 

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32d  Cong.,  pp.  197,  198,  210,  211,  229. 
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subject  of  the  fisheries  and  commercial  reciprocity  with  Canada, 

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negotiations  pending  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 

on  the  subject  of  the  fisheries,  and  of  reciprocal  intercourse  with 

the  British  North  American  Provinces. 
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8,  1853. 

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(Senate)  pp.  2212,  2219. 


8o  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854. 

1859.     Letter  from  the  Secretar}'  of  the  Treasury  transmitting  statistics 
of  the  trade  under  the  reciprocity  treaty  with  Great  Britain. 
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15,  1859. 
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James  W.  Taylor,  dated  May  2,  i860.     The  reports   of  Mr.  Hatch 
and  of  Mr.  Taylor  take  opposite  views  as  to  the  value  of  the  treaty. 
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pp.  1-60. 
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Feb.  5,  1862,  on  the  reciprocity  treaty  with  Great  Britain.     Without 
doubt  the  best  report  made  on  the  subject  up  to  that  time. 
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1-36. 
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statement  showing  the  quantity  and  value  of  the  different  articles 
of  merchandise  imported  into  the  United  States  from  the  British 
North   American   Colonies,    during  the   fiscal    j^ears  ending  June 
30th,  1859,  i860  and  1861,  under  the  treaty  of  reciprocity. 
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1862. 
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Canada. 
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July  12,  1862. 
1862.     Letter  from   Mr.  Salmon   P.  Chase,   Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
on  commercial  intercourse  with  Canada,  July  12,  1862. 
Executive  Documents,  No.  149,  37th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1861-2,  Vol.  10, 
pp.  1-21. 
1863-1864.      Congressional  Globe,   1st  Sess.,   38th  Cong.  (1863-4),  (H.  of 
R.)  pp.  9,  19,   1371,    1387,   2298,   2333-3S,   2364,   2452,   2453,    2476, 
2482,  2502,  2508-9  ;  (Senate)  p.  134. 
1864.     Letter  from  the   Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in   relation   to  the 
operations  of  the  reciprocity  treaty  with  Canada. 
House  Executive  Documents,  No.  32,  38th  Cong.,    ist   Sess.,    pp.    61, 
Feb.  I,  1864. 
1864.     Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.     Foreign  and  Domestic 

Commerce,  1864,  p.  93. 
1864.  Report  of  Mr.  Elijah  Ward  from  the  Committee  on  Commerce, 
April  I,  1S64,  on  The  Reciprocity  Treaty.  (This  report  was  to 
accompany  House  Resolution,  No.  56.)  It  deals  with  the  subject 
of  the  restrictions  upon  American  manufactures  entering  Canada. 
House  Reports,  No.  39,  38th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  pp.  8,  Apr.  i,  1864. 


The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854.  81 

1864-65.      Congressional  Globe,  38th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  (1864-5),  (H.  of  R.) 

pp.  31-35,  265,   267,   276,   277,  291  ;  (Senate)  pp.  34,  35,  71,  95-97. 

204,  213,  226-234,  293. 
1865.      Parliamentary  Debates  on   the  Subject  of  the  Confederation  of  the 

British  North  American  Provinces ;  8th  Provincial   Parliament  of 

Canada,  3d  Sess.,  Quebec,  1865. 

1867.  A  report  from  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  W.  H.  Seward,  rela- 
tive to  the  practicability  of  establishing  equal  reciprocal  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  the  British  North  American  Prov- 
inces, and  the  actual  condition  of  the  question  of  the  fisheries. 
This  contains  a  very  complete  report  by  Mr.  E.  H.  Derby. 

Senate  Executive  Documents,  No.  30,  39th  Cong.,   2d   Sess.,  pp.  186, 
Feb.  16,  1867. 

1868.  Statement  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  of  the  trade  of  the 
United  States  with  the  British  North  American  Provinces  since  the 
abrogation  of  the  reciprocity  treaty. 

Executive  Documents,  No.  240,  4Qth  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1S67-68,  pp.  1-18. 

Mar.  30,  1868. 
1S68.     Trade  with  the  British  Provinces.     Letter  from  the  Secretary  of 

the  Treasurj-  transmitting  information  as  to  the  trade  between  the 

United  States  and  the  British  North  American  Provinces  since  the 

abrogation  of  the  reciprocity  treaty. 
Executive  Documents,  3d  Session,  40th  Congress,  1868-69,  PP-  16-26. 
House  Executive  Documents,  No.  240,  40th  Cong.,    2d  Sess.,   pp.  t8. 

Mar.  31,  1868. 

1869.  Letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  transmitting  the 
report  of  Mr.  Israel  T.  Hatch  upon  the  Commercial  relations  of 
the  United  States  with  the  Dominion  of  Canada.  This  report  con- 
siders the  trade  since  1865  together  with  the  Canal  systems  of  the 
United  States  and  of  Canada. 

Executive  Documents,  No.  36,  40th  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  i868-g,  pp.  1-26, 

Jan.  12,  1869. 
1873-4.      Foreign  Relations,  State  Department,  Messages  and  Documents, 

part  3,  1873-4,  PP-  275-306. 
1891.      Wholesale  Prices,    Wages,  and  Transportation  :  Senator  Aldrich 

from  the   Finance  Committee.     Report   No.  1394,    52d  Cong.,   2d 

Sess.,  4  vol.,  Mar.  3,  1891. 
1893-4.     Letter  from  Mr.  John  G.  Carlisle,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 

on  the  trade  between  the  United  States  and  Canada. 
Senate  Executive  Documents,  No.  106,  53d  Cong.,  2d   Sess.,  1893-94, 

Vol.  4,  pp.  1-97. 
For  a  very  complete  bibliography  of  the  Canadian  Reciprocity  down  to 

the  present  time,  the  reader  is   referred   to  A  List  of  References  on 

Reciprocity.     Books,  articles  in  Perodicals,  Congressional  Documents. 
6 


82  The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  1854. 

Compiled  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  A.  P.  C.  Griffin,  Chief  of  Divi- 
sion of  Bibliography.  Government  Printing  Office.  Washington, 
igo3. 

Reciprocity  Treaties  and  Agreements  between  the  United  States  and 
Foreign  Countries  since  iSjO.      0.  P.  Austin. 

Treasury  Department,  Bureau  of  Statistics.  Monthly  Summary  of  Com- 
merce and  Finance,  for  September,  1901,  III  pp.,  pp.  959-968.  Pub- 
lished also  separately  as  a  monograph. 

Reciprocity,  by  J.  Laurence  Laughlin,  Ph.D.  and  II.  Parker  Willis, 
Ph.D.      The  Baker  6^  Taylor  Co.,  New  York,  igoj! 

A  century  of  American  Diplomacy  :  being  a  brief  review  of  the  foreign 
relations  of  the  United  States,  lyyb-iSqb.  John  W.  Foster.  Boston 
and  New  York  :  Houghton,  Mifflin  dr"  Co.,  XIII pp.,  497 pp-  Cana- 
dian Reciprocity  Treaty  of  1854,  pp.  337-339- 
James  G.  Blaine;  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  Vol.  II,  chapter  XXVII, 
pp.   615-622. 

The  Reciprocity  Treaty  with  Canada  of  18^4,  Frederick  E.  Haynes, 
Ph.D.,  Vol.  VII,  No.  6.  Publications  of  the  American  Economic 
Association,  November,  1892. 

Letters  and  Journals  of  James,  Eighth  Earl  of  Elgin;  edited  by  Theo- 
dore Walrond,  C.B.     London,  1873.     John  Murray. 

Canada  and  the  States  ;  Recollections,  18^1  to  1886,  chapters  XIV  and 
XVIII,  Sir  E.  W.  Wat  kin. 

Episodes  in  a  Life  of  Adventure  ;  Lawrence  Oliphant. 

The  Reciprocity  Treaty,  its  advantages  to  the  United  States  and  Canada, 
Prize  Essay,  Arthur  Harvey,  Government  Statistical  Clerk,  Quebec, 
1865. 

Among  the  articles  referred  to  in  Poole's  Index,  the  most  important 
are  North  American  Review,  Vol.  74,  page  171  et  seq..  Vol.  62,  369 
at  seq.  Hunfs  Merchants'  Magazine,  Vol.  44,  p.  275,  and  Vol.  28, 
p.  160.     Debow's  Review,  15,  433. 

The  Canadian  Reciprocity  Treaty  of  1834 ;  an  address  by  Sidney 
Webster,  September,  1892. 

Canada  and  the  Canadian  Question,  Goldwin  Smith. 

C.  G.  D.  Roberts,  A  History  of  Canada. 

J.  G.  Bourinot:  Story  of  Canada. 

Canada  :  An  Encyclopedia  of  the  country,  5  volumes.     Hopkins. 


RECIPROCITY  TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED 
STATES  AND  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

Her  Majesty,  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain,  being  equally 
desirous  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  avoid 
further  misunderstanding  between  their  respective  Subjects 
and  Citizens,  in  regard  to  the  extent  of  the  right  of  Fishing 
on  the  Coasts  of  British  North  America,  secured  to  each  by 
Article  I,  of  a  Convention  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,  signed  at  London  on  the  20th  day  of  October, 
1818,  and  being  also  desirous  to  regulate  the  Commerce 
and  Navigation  between  their  respective  Territories  and 
People,  and  more  especially  between  Her  Majesty's  Posses- 
sions in  North  America  and  the  United  States  in  such 
manner  as  to  render  the  same  reciprocally  beneficial  and 
satisfactory,  have  respectively  named  Plenipotentiaries  to 
confer  and  agree  thereupon,  that  is  to  say :  Her  Majesty, 
the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  James,  Earl  of  Elgin  and  Kincardine,  Lord  Bruce, 
and  Elgin,  a  Peer  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Knight  of  the 
Most  Ancient  and  Most  Noble  Order  of  the  Thistle,  and 
Governor  General  in  and  over  all  Her  Britannic  Majesty's 
Provinces  on  the  Continent  of  North  America,  and  in  and 
over  the  Island  of  Prince  Edward ;  and  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  William  L.  Marcy,  Secretary  of 
State  of  the  United  States,  who,  after  having  communicated 
to  each  other  their  respective  full  Powers,  found  in  good 
and  due  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  following  Articles: 

Article  I. 

It  is  agreed  by  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  that  in 
addition  to  the  liberty  secured  to  the  United  States  fishermen 
by  the  above  mentioned  Convention  of  October  20,  18 18, 
of  taking,  curing,  and  drying  fish  on  certain  Coasts  of  the 
British  North  American  Colonies  therein  defined,  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  United  States  shall  have  in  common  with  the 
subjects  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty,  the  liberty  to  take  fish  of 
every  kind,  except  shell-fish  on  the  sea-coasts  and  shores, 
and  in  the  bays,  harbors,  and  creeks  of  Canada,  New  Bruns- 
wick, Nova  Scotia,  Prince  Edward's  Island,  and  of  the 
several  Islands  thereunto  adjacent,  without  being  restricted 
to  any  distance  from  the  shore ;    with  permission  to  land 


84  The  Treaty  zvifh  Canada  in  1854. 

upon  the  coasts  and  shores  of  those  Colonies  and  the  Islands 
thereof,  and  also  upon  the  Magdalen  Island  for  the  purpose 
of  drying  their  nets  and  curing  their  fish ;  provided  that  in 
so  doing,  they  do  not  interfere  with  the  rights  of  private 
property  or  British  fishermen  in  the  peaceable  use  of  any 
part  of  the  said  coast  in  their  occupancy  for  the  same 
purpose. 

It  is  understood  that  the  above  mentioned  liberty  applies 
solely  to  the  sea  fishery,  and  that  the  salmon  and  shad  fish- 
eries, and  all  fisheries  in  rivers,  and  the  mouths  of  rivers, 
are  hereby  reserved  exclusively  for  British  fishermen. 

And  it  is  further  agreed,  that  in  order  to  prevent  or  settle 
any  disputes  as  to  the  places  to  which  the  reservation  of 
exclusive  right  to  British  fishermen  contained  in  this  Article, 
and  that  of  fishermen  of  the  United  States  contained  in  the 
next  succeeding  Article,  apply,  each  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties,  on  the  application  of  either  to  the  other,  shall, 
within  six  months  thereafter,  appoint  a  Commissioner. 
The  said  Commissioners  before  proceeding  to  any  business, 
shall  make  and  subscribe  a  solemn  declaration  that  they 
will  impartially  and  carefully  examine  and  decide  to  the  best 
of  their  judgment,  and  according  to  justice  and  equity, 
without  fear,  favor  or  affection  to  their  own  country,  upon 
all  such  places  as  are  intended  to  be  reserved  and  excluded 
from  the  common  liberty  of  fishing  under  this  and  the  next 
succeeding  Article ;  and  such  declaration  shall  be  entered  on 
the  record  of  their  proceedings.  The  Commissioners  shall 
name  some  third  person  to  act  as  an  Arbitrator  or  Umpire 
in  any  case  or  cases,  on  which  they  may  themselves  differ 
in  opinion.  If  they  should  not  be  able  to  agree  upon  the 
name  of  such  third'  person,  they  shall  each  name  a  person, 
and  it  shall  be  determined  by  lot  which  of  the  two  persons  so 
named  shall  be  the  Arbitrator  or  Umpire  in  cases  of  differ- 
ence or  disagreement  between  the  Commissioners.  The 
person  so  to  be  chosen  to  be  Arbitrator  or  Umpire  shall, 
before  proceeding  to  act  as  such  in  any  case,  make  and  sub- 
scribe a  solemn  declaration  in  a  form  similar  to  that  which 
shall  already  have  been  made  and  subscribed  by  the  Com- 
missioners, which  shall  be  entered  on  the  record  of  their 
proceedings.  In  the  event  of  the  death,  absence,  or  incapac- 
ity of  either  of  the  Commissioners  or  of  the  Arbitrator  or 
Umpire,  or  of  their  or  his  omitting,  declining  or  ceasing  to 
act  as  such  Commissioner,  Arbitrator  or  Umpire,  another 
and  different  person  shall  be  appointed  or  named  as  afore- 


TJic  Treaty  li'ith  Canada  in   18^4.  85 

said,  and  shall  make  and  subscribe  such  declaration  as 
aforesaid. 

Such  Commissioners  shall  proceed  to  examine  the  Coasts 
of  the  North  American  Provinces  and  of  the  United  States 
embraced  within  the  provisions  of  the  first  and  second 
Articles  of  this  treaty,  and  shall  designate  the  places  reserved 
by  the  said  Articles  from  the  common  rights  of  fishing 
therein. 

The  decision  of  the  Commissioners  and  of  the  Arbitrator 
or  Umpire  shall  be  given  in  writing  in  each  case,  and  shall 
be  signed  by  them  respectively. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  hereby  solemnly  engage  to 
consider  the  decision  of  the  Commissioners  conjointly,  or 
of  the  Arbitrator  or  Umpire,  as  the  case  may  be,  as  abso- 
lutely final  and  conclusive  in  each  case  decided  upon  by  them 
or  him,  respectively. 

Article  II. 

It  is  agreed  by  the  High  Contracting  Parties  that  British 
subjects  shall  have,  in  common  with  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  the  liberty  to  take  fish  of  every  kind,  except 
shell-fish,  on  the  Eastern  sea  coasts  and  shores  of  the  United 
States,  North  of  the  36th  parallel  of  North  Latitude,  and 
on  the  shores  of  the  several  Islands  thereunto  adjacent,  and 
in  the  bays,  harbors,  and  creeks  of  the  said  sea  coasts  and 
shores  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  said  Islands,  without 
being  restricted  to  any  distance  from  the  shore,  with  per- 
mission to  land  upon  the  said  coasts  of  the  United  States  and 
of  the  Islands  aforesaid,  for  the  purpose  of  drying  their  nets 
and  curing  their  fish ;  provided  that  in  so  doing  they  do 
not  interfere  with  the  rights  of  private  property,  or  with  the 
fishermen  of  the  United  States  in  the  peaceable  use  of  any 
part  of  the  said  coasts  in  their  occupancy  for  the  same 
purpose. 

It  is  understood  that  the  above  mentioned  liberty  applies 
solely  to  the  sea  fishery,  and  that  salmon  and  shad  fisheries, 
and  all  fisheries  in  rivers  and  mouths  of  rivers  are  hereby 
reserved  exclusively  for  fishermen  of  the  United  States. 

Article  III. 

It  is  agreed,  that  the  Articles  enumerated  in  the  Schedule 
hereunto  annexed,  being  the  growth  and  produce  of  the 
aforesaid  British  Colonies  or  of  the  United  States,  shall  be 
admitted  into  each  Country  respectively  free  of  duty: 


86  The  Treaty  with  Canada  in  1854. 


Schedule. 

Grain,  flour,  and  breadstuffs  of  all  kinds. 

Animals  of  all  kinds. 

Fresh,  smoked  and  salted  meats. 

Cotton- wool,  seeds  and  vegetables. 

Undried  fruits,  dried  fruits. 

Fish  of  all  kinds. 

Products  of  fish  and  of  all  other  creatures  living  in  the 
w^ater. 

Poultry,  eggs. 

Hides,  furs,  skins  or  tails  undressed. 

Stone  or  marble  in  its  crude  or  unwrought  state. 

Slate. 

Butter,  cheese,  tallow. 

Lard,  horns,  manures. 

Ores  of  metals  of  all  kinds. 

Coal. 

Pitch,  tar,  turpentine,  ashes. 

Timber  and  lumber  of  all  kinds,  round,  hewed,  sawed, 
unmanufactured  in  whole  or  in  part. 

Firewood. 

Plants,  shrubs  and  trees. 

Pelts,  wool. 

Fish-oil. 

Rice,  broomcorn,  and  bark. 

Gypsum,  ground  or  unground. 

Hewn  or  wrought  or  unwrought  burr  or  grindstones. 

Dye-stuffs. 

Unmanufactured  tobacco. 

Rags. 

Article  IV. 

It  is  agreed  that  the  citizens  and  inhabitants  of  the  United 
States  shall  have  the  right  to  navigate  the  river  St.  Lawrence 
and  the  canals  in  Canada,  used  as  the  means  of  communicat- 
ing between  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  with 
their  vessels,  boats  and  crafts,  as  fully  and  freely  as  the 
subjects  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty,  subject  only  to  the  same 
tolls  and  other  assessments  as  now  are  or  may  hereafter  be 
exacted  of  Her  Majesty's  said  subjects,  it  being  understood 
however,  that  the  British  Government  retains  the  right  of 
suspending  this  privilege  on  giving  due  notice  thereof  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Canada  in  18^4.  87 

It  is  further  agreed  that  if  at  any  time  the  British  Govern- 
ment should  exercise  the  said  reserved  right,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  shall  have  the  right  of  suspending, 
if  it  think  fit,  the  operation  of  Article  III,  of  the  present 
treaty  in  so  far  as  the  Province  of  Canada  is  affected 
thereby,  for  so  long  as  the  suspension  of  the  free  navigation 
of  the  river  St.  Lawrence  or  the  Canals  may  continue. 

It  is  further  agreed  that  British  subjects  shall  have  the 
right  freely  to  navigate  Lake  Michigan  with  their  vessels, 
boats  and  crafts,  so  long  as  the  privilege  of  navigating  the 
river  St.  Lawrence  secured  to  American  citizens  by  the 
above  clause  of  the  present  Article  shall  continue,  and  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  further  engages  to  urge 
upon  the  State  Governments  to  secure  to  the  subjects  of  Her 
Britannic  Majesty,  the  use  of  the  several  State  Canals  on 
terms  of  equality  with  the  inhabitants  of  the  United  States. 

And  it  is  further  agreed  that  no  Export  duty  or  other 
duty  shall  be  levied  on  lumber  or  timber  of  any  kind  cut  on 
that  portion  of  the  American  territory  in  the  State  of  Maine, 
watered  by  the  river  St.  John  and  its  tributaries  and  floated 
down  that  river  to  the  sea,  when  the  same  is  shipped  to  the 
L^nited  States  from  the  Province  of  New  Brunswick. 


Article  V. 

The  present  treaty  shall  take  effect  as  soon  as  the  laws 
required  to  carry  it  into  operation  shall  have  been  passed  by 
the  Imperial  Parliament  of  Great  Britain  and  by  the  Pro- 
vincial Parliaments  of  those  of  the  British  North  American 
Colonies  which  are  affected  by  this  treaty  on  the  one  hand, 
and  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  on  the  other. 
Such  assent  having  been  given,  the  treaty  shall  remain  in 
force  for  ten  years  from  the  date  at  which  it  may  come  into 
operation,  and  further  until  the  expiration  of  twelve  months 
after  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  give 
notice  to  the  other  of  its  wish  to  terminate  the  same ;  each 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  being  at  liberty  to  give  such 
notice  to  the  other  at  the  end  of  the  said  term  of  ten  years, 
or  at  any  time  afterwards. 

It  is  clearly  understood,  however,  that  this  stipulation  is 
not  intended  to  affect  the  reservation  made  by  Article  IV,  of 
the  present,  treaty  with  regard  to  the  right  of  temporarily 
suspending  the  operation  of  Articles  III.  and  IV.  thereof. 


88  The  Treaty  zvitJi  Canada  in  18^4. 

Article  VI. 

And  it  is  hereby  further  agreed  that  the  provisions  and 
stipulations  of  the  foregoing  Articles  shall  extend  to  the 
Island  of  Newfoundland,  so  far  as  they  are  applicable  to 
that  Colony.  But  if  the  Imperial  Parliament  of  New- 
foundland, or  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  shall  not 
embrace  in  their  laws  enacted  for  carrying  this  treaty  into 
effect,  the  Colony  of  Newfoundland,  then  this  Article  shall 
be  of  no  effect,  but  the  omission  to  make  provision  by  law 
to  give  it  effect,  by  either  of  the  legislative  bodies  aforesaid, 
shall  not  in  any  way  impair  the  remaining  Articles  of  this 
treaty. 

Article  VII. 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  duly  ratified  and  the  mutual 
exchange  of  ratification  shall  take  place  in  Washington 
within  six  months  from  the  date  thereof,  or  earlier  if 
possible. 

In  faith  whereof,  We,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  this  treaty  and  have  hereunto  affixed  our  Seals. 

Done  in  triplicate,  at  Washington,  the  Fifth  day  of  June, 
Anno  Domini,  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty-four. 

(Signed)  Elgin  and  Kincardine, 

L.S. 
W.  L.  Marcy, 

L.S. 
Certified  Copy, 

L.  Oliphant,  Private  Secretary. 


PART  II 

THE   RECIPROCITY  TREATY  WITH   THE 
HAWAIIAN  ISLANDS  IN  1876 


Chapter  I.' 

Annexation  or  Reciprocity  with  the  United  States ;  the  J-fi story  of 
Hawaii's  Early  International  Relations. 

The  negotiation  of  a  reciprocity  treaty  with  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  was  successful  in  1876,  where  other  attempts  with 
the  same  object  in  view,  made  in  1855  and  in  1867,  had 
failed.  These  attempts  had  their  origin  in  fundamental 
economic  and  political  conditions  of  relatively  unequal 
importance,  when  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  Hawaii, 
and  from  the  standpoint  of  the  United  States. 

American  missionaries  and  American  whale  ships  opened 
the  way  for  commerce  with  the  United  States ;  yet  it 
was  not  to  secure  this  commerce  that  led  our  Government 
primarily  to  these  proposed  commercial  treaties.  To  her, 
their  object  was  strategic  and  political  rather  than  com- 
mercial. They  were  viewed  as  a  legitimate  means  to 
strengthen  the  growing  American  influence  there  ;  for  it  was 
hoped,  that  by  binding  the  Islands  closely  to  the  United 
States  by  firm  commercial  ties,  the  intercourse  that  would 
follow  would  secure  ends  more  remote,  yet  more  desirable. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  economic  dependence  of  Hawaii  upon 
the  United  States  made  satisfactory  trade  relations  a  con- 
sideration of  the  first  importance  in  her  dealings  with  the 
American  Republic.  Thus,  while  each  was  to  a  certain 
extent  concerned  in  both  the  political  and  the  commercial 
results  of  treaty  agreements,  they  approached  the  matter 
from  different  points  of  interest.  The  interest  of  the  United 
States  in  reciprocity  with  Hawaii  was  political ;  the  interest 
of  Hawaii  in  reciprocity  with  the  United  States  was  com- 

'  Besides  using  the  United  States  Government  Documents  in  the 
preparation  of  this  chapter,  the  writer  has  made  a  liberal  use  of  Alex- 
ander's Brief  History  of  ike  Ha-waiian  People,  Jarves'  History  of  the 
Sandwich  Islands,  and  Bingham's  A  Residence  of  Twetity-one  Years  in 
the  Sandwich  Islands  for  the  early  political  history  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands. 


92  The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  in   i8y6. 

mercial.  The  history  of  the  treaty  of  1876,  therefore, 
will  show  how  these  two  worked  to  bring  about  the  same 
end. 

For  a  hundred  years  after  the  discovery  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  the  French,  the  English  and  the  Americans  there 
intermittently  contended  for  pre-eminence.  How,  and  by 
what  means  the  United  States  was  able  to  outstrip  her 
rivals,  is  shown  by  the  political  and  foreign  history  of 
the  Islands  from  the  time  they  came  into  view,  in  their 
degraded  moral  state  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
until  christianized  and  civilised,  this  island  group  became  a 
part  of  the  territory  of  the  United  States  at  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

The  year  1820  marks  an  epoch  in  Hawaiian  history.  Up 
to  that  time,  although  it  had  been  more  than  forty  years  since 
their  discovery,  the  Islands  were  little  influenced  by  the  out- 
side world.  An  occasional  fur-trader  bound  for  China  from 
the  northwest  coast  of  America  spent  the  winter  there,  or  a 
vessel  put  into  Honolulu  after  a  long  voyage,  for  repairs  or 
provisions ;  but  aside  from  these,  life  on  the  Islands  con- 
tinued to  be  much  as  it  had  been  for  hundreds  of  years. 

Events  of  this  year,  however,  brought  with  them  a  com- 
plete change  in  everything  that  concerned  the  Hawaiians  as 
a  people.  In  181 7,  while  they  were  still  given  over  to 
human  sacrifices,  to  worshipping  their  idols,  and  were 
governed  by  the  terrible  tabu  system,  whose  every  viola- 
tion was  punished  by  death,  there  was  being  established 
in  Cornwall,  Connecticut,  a  foreign  mission  school.  Among 
its  pupils  were  five  Hawaiians  brought  back  by  the  fur- 
traders  to  the  United  States.  The  description  which  they 
had  given  of  the  miserable  condition  of  their  own  people 
had  so  aroused  an  interest  in  Hawaii,  that  on  October  23, 
1819.  there  sailed  from  New  Haven  harbor  a  band  of  mis- 
sionaries on  the  ship  Thaddeus.  They  were  bound  for  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  having  set  out  with  many  misgivings, 
renouncing  forever  home,  kindred,  and  native  land  to  preach 
the  gospel  to  the  unknown  heathen. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Haivaii  in   18/6.  93 

Strangely  enough,  while  they  were  being  storm-tossed 
around  Cape  Horn,  the  whole  system  of  religion  that  had 
existed  for  centuries  on  the  Hawaiian  Islands  was  over- 
thrown in  a  single  day.  The  weak  successor  of  the  great 
Kamehameha  had  been  persuaded  to  formally  and  openly 
violate  the  sacred  fab  11  which  forbade  the  men  and  women 
to  eat  together.  This  having  been  done,  and  the  gods 
having  been  defied  in  the  sacred  person  of  the  King,  the 
whole  structure  of  both  idol  worship  and  of  the  tabu  fell 
at  once  into  ruins.  The  chief  priest  himself  applied  the 
torch  to  the  idols  and  temples,  and,  "as  they  went  up  in 
smoke,"  Jarves  says,  "Hawaii  presented  the  singular  spec- 
tacle of  a  nation  without  a  religion." 

When  the  Thaddcns  arrived  March  30,  1820,  the  mission- 
aries heard  with  unbounded  joy,  and  thanks  to  God,  that  the 
idols  had  been  overthrown,  the  tabu  system  abolished,  and 
that  the  people  were  in  so  favorable  a  condition  for  receiving 
a  new  religion.  The  absolute  rule  of  the  kings  and  chiefs 
made  it  natural  that  the  people  should  accept  what  their 
leaders  believed,  and  this  circumstance  helped  to  make  pos- 
sible the  marvelous  progress  of  the  whole  nation  to  Christian 
civilisation. 

The  same  year  that  witnessed  the  arrival  of  the  American 
missionaries  saw  the  first  American  whale  ship  come  to 
anchor  in  the  harbor  at  Honolulu.  Thus  started  together 
two  powerful  influences  that  turned  the  attentioit-of  the 
Hawaiians  to  the  great  Republic  to  the  east  of  them,  and 
upon  whose  good  offices  their  increasing  commercial  inter- 
course, and  their  unfortunate  relations  with  other  nations, 
led  them  more  and  more  to  rely  for  advice  and  protection. 
To  a  certain  extent,  while  bringing  about  the  same  end,  the 
influence  of  the  missionaries  and  that  of  the  whale  ships 
each  counteracted  the  other.  The  Christian  teachings  of 
the  missionaries  were  hardly  the  ideals  of  the  whalers,  whose 
dogma,  "there  is  no  God  this  side  of  Cape  Horn,"  sums  up 
their  defiance  of  any  moral  restraint  when  on  shore  leave  in 
the  Pacific. 


94  The  Treaty  zvith  Hawaii  in  iSyd. 

The  pure  teachings  of  the  missionaries,  and  the  example 
of  their  daily  lives  of  self-sacrifice,  on  the  other  hand,  helped 
to  hold  back  the  people,  through  their  kings  and  chiefs,  from 
the  life  of  unrestrained  licentiousness  to  which,  as  a  nation, 
they  had  always  been  prone.  When  it  is  considered  that  at 
this  time  over  one  hundred  whale  ships  visited  the  Islands 
in  the  course  of  a  year,  and  that  often  thirty  were  at  anchor 
together  in  one  harbor,  it  will  be  seen  how  incessant  and 
unremitting  the  efforts  of  the  missionaries  had  to  be  to  make 
any  head  whatever  against  the  tide  of  lust  and  drunkenness 
that  threatened  to  sweep  the  whole  people  away  with  it. 

The  missionaries  were  several  times  in  danger  of  violence 
from  ships'  crews,  who  held  them  responsible  for  the  law 
that  prevented  native  women  from  going  on  board  ships  in 
the  harbor,  for  immoral  purposes,  as  they  had  formerly  been 
permitted  to  do  in  great  numbers. 

Disgraceful  to  relate,  the  British  Consul  Charleton,  who 
had  arrived  in  1825,  at  once  allied  himself  with  the  faction 
in  favor  of  unrestrained  vice,  and  by  his  action  sought  in 
many  ways  to  embarrass  the  honest  efforts  of  the  native 
government.  Perhaps  nothing  tended  so  much  to  under- 
mine the  otherwise  secure  influence  of  Great  Britain,  as  the 
unfortunate  choice  of  this  man  as  her  representative. 

A  possible  explanation  of  his  conduct  at  the  time  and 
subsequently,  is  that  he  hoped  by  embroiling  the  rulers  with 
the  people,  to  make  it  evident  to  the  world  that  a  state  of 
lawlessness  existed,  and  that  the  hand  of  some  strong  nation 
was  necessary  to  prevent  anarchy,  and  the  loss  of  the  lives 
and  property  of  foreign  residents.  This  strong  hand  would 
be  England's,  and  having  once  established  a  protectorate 
over  them,  the  Islands  would  eventually  pass  under  English 
control.  That  it  was  the  purpose  of  Mr.  Charleton  to  bring 
about  the  annexation  of  the  Islands  to  England  there  can  be, 
I  think,  but  little  doubt.  How  far  his  plans  were  to  succeed 
and  how  little  his  government  sanctioned  them,  and  approved 
him,   is   shown   by   succeeding  events   in   the   international 


The  Treaty  zvith  Haivaii  in  i8y6.  95 

troubles  which  begin  to  thicken  around  the  Hawaiian  gov- 
ernment. 

We  pass  here  over  certain  minor  events,  and  come  to  the 
compHcations  with  France,  and  with  Great  Britain.  The 
cause  of  trouble  with  France  lay  in  the  undoubted  purpose 
of  the  French  government  to  carry  out  in  Hawaii  what  was 
even  then  being  accomplished  in  Tahiti ;  to  make  demands, 
upon  a  fitting  occasion,  that  the  Islands  could  not  comply 
with,  and  in  justification  of  these  demands  to  seize  a  foot- 
hold upon  the  land  that  should  not  be  relinquished.  The 
occasion  was  furnished  in  the  dispute  as  to  the  right  of  the 
French  Roman  Catholic  priests  to  land  upon  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  and  to  teach  their  religion  in  defiance  of  the  express 
prohibition  of  the  King. 

The  cause  of  the  dispute  with  England  lay  in  the  character 
of  her  Consul,  and  in  the  unabating  zeal  of  this  official  to 
secure  the  control  of  the  Islands  for  the  English  government. 
The  occasion  for  English  interference  was  a  preposterous 
claim  to  personal  ownership  of  lands  made  by  the  English 
Consul  Charleton. 

Toward  the  introduction  of  the  Roman  Catholic  religion 
the  attitude  of  the  Hawaiian  government  was  this.  The 
people,  they  said,  were  content  under  the  teachings  of  the 
Protestant  missionaries,  and  the  establishment  of  a  rival 
faith  would  lead  to  discord  and  contention.  Moreover,  they 
maintained,  it  would  make  possible  political  divisions  on  the 
basis  of  religious  differences,  which  those  who  sought  to 
embarrass  the  government  would  not  be  slow  to  use. 

Without  doubt  this  position  was  advised  by  the  Protestant 
missionaries  ;  but  it  would  have  been  wise  statecraft  could 
the  King  have  enforced  obedience  to  his  edicts,  for  the 
matter  was  political  and  not  religious.  This,  however,  he 
could  not  secure,  and  in  spite  of  his  order  against  it,  French 
Roman  Catholic  priests  were  landed  in  1826.  Mr.  Charleton 
and  one  of  the  powerful  disaffected  native  chiefs  at  once 
gave  them  countenance,  and  in  defiance  of  the  government, 
they  remained. 


9^  The  Treaty  with  Hawaii  in  18/6. 

The  attitude  of  the  British  Consul  at  this  time  in  siding 
with  the  French  against  the  native  Hawaiian  government 
admits  of  only  one  explanation.  Hostile  to  the  influence 
which  their  moral  lives  had  secured  to  the  American  mis- 
sionaries, he  championed  the  French  cause  and  the  introduc- 
tion of  the  Catholic  religion  as  a  means  of  destroying  the 
power  which  the  Americans  exercised  over  the  King  and 
people.  He  seems,  also,  to  have  aimed  at  neutralizing  in 
this  way  the  American  influence  as  a  factor  in  determining 
the  fate  of  the  Islands.^ 

In  1832,  however,  after  previous  unsuccessful  attempts, 
the  government  was  strong  enough  to  compel  the  priests  to 
leave  the  Islands.  In  1837  they  returned  and  were  landed 
from  a  vessel  bearing  the  English  colors.  The  King  ordered 
them  on  board  again,  but  the  captain  of  the  ship  refused  to 
receive  them.  They  were  then  placed  on  board  by  Hawaiian 
officers,  whereupon  the  captain  hauled  down  the  English  flag 
and  delivered  it  to  the  English  Consul,  who  burned  it  pub- 
licly in  the  streets  of  Honolulu. 

This  was  in  May,  1837.  In  July,  a  British  sloop  of  war 
and  a  French  frigate  arrived.  Upon  the  demand  made  by 
the  captains  of  these  vessels,  the  priests  were  permitted  to 
remain.  In  November,  other  priests  came  from  Valparaiso, 
but  were  permitted  to  remain  only  under  bond  that  they 
would  depart  at  a  given  time.  During  the  dispute,  however, 
the  King's  right  was  not  questioned,  under  international 
law,  to  exclude  persons  from  his  kingdom  as  he  saw  fit. 

Pressure  was  now  brought  to  bear  upon  the  King  by  the 
missionaries  to  permit  all  forms  of  religion  to  be  practiced. 
The  King  yielded  and  in  June,  1839,-  religious  toleration 
was  established. 

'  "  The  remedy  adopted  by  the  French  was  the  introduction  of  a 
rival  religion.  It  was  the  belief  of  the  British  Consul  that  American 
influence  might  be  thus  broken  and  the  field  left  clear  for  a  settlement 
of  the  question  of  ultimate  sovereignty  between  these  two  powers." 

H.  Ex.  D.  2d  S.  53  C,  1893-4,  Vol.  27,  No.  48,  p.  251.  Found  also 
in  A.  H.  Allen's  Report,  in  S.  Ex.  Doc.  2  S.,  53  C,  1892-3,  Vol.  8. 

'  Jarves,  p.  317. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Hazvaii  in  i8y6.  97 

The  edict  of  toleration  had  been  passed  in  June.  In 
July  the  French  60-gun  frigate  Artemise,  commanded  by 
Captain  LaPlace,  dropped  anchor  in  the  harbor  at  Honolulu. 
Without  making  inquiry,  LaPlace  issued  a  manifesto  com- 
plaining of  the  ill  treatment  the  French  had  received  and 
declaring  that  "to  persecute  the  Catholic  religion,  to  tarnish 
it  with  the  name  of  idolatry,  and  to  expel  under  this  absurd 
pretext  the  French  from  this  Archipelago  was  to  offer  an 
insult  to  France  and  its  sovereign.  .  .  .  Such  a  state  of 
affairs  being  contrary  to  the  laws  of  nations,  insulting  to 
those  of  Catholics  can  no  longer  continue,  and,"  he  says, 
"1  am  sent  to  put  an  end  to  it."  He  demanded  therefore 
that  the  Catholic  worship  be  declared  free  throughout  the 
Islands ;  that  a  site  for  a  Catholic  church  be  given  by  the 
government  at  Honolulu  ;  that  all  Catholics  imprisoned  on 
account  of  religion  be  set  free ;  that  the  King  of  the  Sand- 
wich Islands  deposit  $20,000  as  a  guarantee  of  future  con- 
duct towards  France. 

"These,"  continued  the  manifesto,  "are  the  equitable 
conditions  at  the  price  of  which  the  King  of  the  Sandwich 
Islands  shall  conserve  the  friendship  of  France  .  .  .  but 
if  .  .  it  should  be  otherwise  .  .  .  war  will  immediately 
commence." 

The  demands  of  this  singularly  conciliatory  message  will 
be  better  understood  by  supposing  they  had  been  made  of 
England,  or  of  some  nation  powerful  enough  to  have  will- 
ingly accepted  war  as  the  alternative. 

The  Hawaiians  had  no  such  choice.  They  had  neither 
fleets,  nor  forts,  nor  harbor  defenses,  and  were  absolutely 
at  the  mercy  of  a  single  warship.  The  conditions  stipulated 
could  not  be  acceded  to  with  any  show  of  dignity,  and 
the  production  at  once  of  $20,000  seemed  a  sheer  impossi- 
bility. But  through  a  loan  made  by  foreign  merchants  the 
sum  was  finally  obtained,  and  taken  aboard  the  warship, 
where  the  money  was  paid  over.  The  pledges  were  given ; 
and  the  King  still  retained  possession  of  his  Islands. 
7 


98  TJic  Treaty  with  Hawaii  in  18/6. 

With  the  payment  of  this  money  the  evident  plan  of  the 
French  captain  fell  to  the  ground.  He  did  not  expect  that 
this  sum  could  be  raised,  and  had  apparently  counted  on 
taking  immediate  possession  of  the  Islands  upon  the  failure 
of  the  King  to  pay  the  amount  demanded/ 

Concessions  forced  in  this  way  naturally  did  not  produce 
harmony  between  the  French  priests  and  the  natives.  Dis- 
putes, helped  along  by  the  French  Consul,  soon  arose  as  to 
the  new  school  and  marriage  laws,  and  again  a  war  vessel 
sailed  into  the  harbor  to  right  the  wrongs  and  to  demand 
satisfaction  for  the  French  nation.  This  time  it  was  the 
Emhuscade.  She  brought  the  re-assuring  news  that  the 
French  had  just  taken  possession  of  the  Marquesas  Islands 
July,  1842,  and  that  the  matters  in  dispute  would  be  referred 
to  the  French  Admiral,  who  would  soon  appear  at  the 
Hawaiian  Islands.  He  was  then  busy  with  affairs  in  the 
Society  Islands,  over  which  a  French  protectorate  was 
extended  in  September,  1842. 

In  1797,  the  London  Missionary  Society  had  sent  out  a 
band  of  English  clergymen  to  work  as  missionaries  among 
the  natives  of  the  Society  Islands.  These  men  had  worked 
earnestly  and  faithfully  to  instruct  the  mild  mannered 
Tahitians  in  the  Christian  religion,  and  to  bring  to  them  the 
benefit  of  a  better  civilisation  than  their  own.  All  had  gone 
well  as  a  result  of  their  labors  and  there  had  been  neither 
civil  dissentions  nor  religious  strife.  But  besides  the  Eng- 
lish, some  French  settlers  had  been  attracted  to  Tahiti,  and 

'  "When  Capt.  LaPlace  was  here  in  1839  the  French  consul  was 
Jules  Dudoit  ;  I  am  told  on  good  authority  that  he  says  it  was  the 
intention  of  LaPlace  to  seize  and  retain  the  islands,  and  that  in 
demanding  the  sum  of  $20,000,  in  default  of  which  he  would  take 
possession  he  had  no  idea  the  king  could  raise  the  money,  and  was 
much  disappointed  when  he  did  so  by  borrowing  it  of  the  foreign 
residents.  M.  Dudoit  has  now  large  interests  here  and  entirely  dis- 
approves of  the  present  conduct  of  the  French." 

Mr.  Severance  to  Mr.  Webster,  Mar.  12,  1851,  Vol.  27,  p.  333. 

(This  money  was  returned  by  the  French  government  a  few  years 
later  with  the  seals  unbroken.) 


The  Treaty  unth  Hazvaii  in  iS/6.  99 

for  some  time  there  had  been  a  growing  national  rivalry. 
In  1838,  two  French  Catholic  priests  attempted  to  land  on 
the  island,  but  as  in  the  case  of  Hawaii,  and  governed  by 
the  same  motives,  the  Protestant  missionaries  used  their 
influence  with  the  government  of  Tahiti,  and  the  priests 
were  not  allowed  to  land.  This  incident  fanned  the  flame 
of  French  jealousy  of  the  English  influence,  and  the  French 
Admiral  Thouars  having  been  appealed  to,  gave  the  priests 
aid  and  protection  as  Frenchmen,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
used  the  incident  to  advance  the  French  influence  by  com- 
pelling the  Tahitian  Queen,  under  threat  of  war,  to  grant  to 
French  subjects  the  right  to  land  upon  the  islands  with  the 
same  freedom  as  other  nationalities.  He  further  compelled 
the  pa}'ment  of  2000  piastres  as  an  indemnity  to  the  French 
priests. 

The  rivalry,  thus  brought  to  an  issue,  continued  along 
other  lines.  The  adroit  French  Consul  gained  influence 
with  the  Queen,  and  finally  persuaded  her  that  her  interests 
required  that  she  should  ask  for  French  protection.  This 
she  did.  And  the  French  Admiral,  after  communicating 
Avith  his  government,  willingly  proclaimed  the  French  Pro- 
tectorate over  Tahiti,  September  9,  1842. 

No  sooner,  however,  had  the  French  Admiral  departed, 
than,  having  been  instructed  by  the  English  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  the  French  action,  the  natives  offered  an  enraged 
resistance  to  the  hoisting  of  the  French  flag,  and  to  the 
taking  of  possession  by  the  French  representative.  Some 
sided  with  the  Queen  and  the  French,  however,  and  a  bloody 
civil  war  followed. 

The  French  faction  was  finally  victorious,  but  had  to 
subdue  another  uprising  against  them  by  the  natives  in  1852. 
After  this  the  French  held  peaceful  possession,  and  in  1880 
formally  annexed  the  Islands  to  the  French  Republic. 

In  1842,  at  almost  the  same  time  as  possession  was  taken 
of  the  Society  Islands,  the  Marquesas  Islands  were  surren- 
dered to  the  French.  Here,  however,  the  occupation  was 
peaceful  and  created  no  discord,  inasmuch  as  only  French 


loo  The  Treaty  zvith  Hazvaii  in   i8j6. 

priests  had  settled  among  the  natives.  This  settlement  had 
been  made  four  years  before,  in  1838,  when  the  French 
priests,  Carey  and  Leval,  had  attempted  to  land  in  Tahiti/ 

Rumors  of  the  direction  affairs  were  taking  in  Tahiti 
having  reached  them,  and  remembering  the  visit  of  LaPlace 
in  1839,  the  Hawaiians  did  not  look  forward  eagerly  to 
this  promised  visit  of  the  French  Admiral,  and  were  much 
perturbed  as  to  what  course  they  should  take. 

This  apprehension  and  embarrassment  on  the  part  of  the 
Hawaiian  government  was  not  lost  sight  of  by  the  British 
Consul  Charleton.  It  looked  as  if  the  French  might  take 
possession,  but  surely  the  Islands  would  be  much  bet- 
ter in  the  hands  of  the  English  than  of  the  French,  and  as 
there  was  not  then  at  hand  a  specific  grievance  that  the 
Consul  could  use  to  bring  about  English  intervention,  he 
seems  to  have  deliberately  made  one.  This  was  his  claim 
to  the  land  on  which  stood  a  prosperous  business  block  in 
Honolulu.  His  claim  was  based  on  a  document  dated  1826, 
and  produced  by  him  for  the  first  time  in  1840,  fourteen 
years  after  it  was  supposed  to  have  been  drawn  up.  The 
King,  however,  refused  to  recognize  the  grant. 

Two  years  later  the  knowledge  came  to  the  English  Con- 
sul that  an  embassy  was  setting  out  for  Europe  to  negotiate 
new  treaties,  and  to  bring  to  nothing  his  plans  and  labor 
for  annexation  to  Great  Britain  by  securing  a  recognition 
from  that  power,  and  from  others,  of  the  independence  of 
the  Sandwich  Islands.  This  was  more  than  enough  to  war- 
rant him  in  taking  measures. 

He  suddenly  left  for  London  by  way  of  Mexico  in  Sep- 
tember, 1842,  a  month  after  the  arrival  of  the  French  corvette 
Emhnscade,  having  appointed  as  acting  Consul,  Mr.  Alexan- 

'  La  France  Coloniale,  par  M.  Alfred  Ramboud.  pp.  629-633.  Paris, 
1895. 

Les  Colonies  francaises,  par  Paul  GafFarel.   pp.    505-516.     Paris,   1899. 

Colonial  France,  Chap.  V,  C.  B.  Norman.  W.  H.  Allen  Co.  Lon- 
don, 1886. 

O-Tatti,  par  Henri  Lutteroth.      Paris,  1843. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Haivaii  in  i8'j6.  loi 

der  Simpson,  "an  avowed  advocate  of  annexation  of  the 
Islands  to  Great  Britain."  The  King  refused  to  receive  him 
as  Consul  and  the  time  seemed  ripe  for  English  interference, 
and  for  Mr.  Charleton's  coup  d'etat. 

The  commission  left  in  July,  1842,  for  the  United  States 
by  way  of  Mexico.  Mr.  Charleton  left  in  September  by  the 
same  route  for  London.  At  Mazatlan,  Mexico,  he  found 
the  British  frigate  Carysfort,  commanded  by  Lord  George 
Paulet,  who  lent  a  willing  ear  to  the  Consul's  troubles,  and 
upon  the  arrival  of  alarming  despatches  from  Mr.  Simpson, 
the  Carysfort  sailed  for  Honolulu. 

Mr.  Charleton  proceeded  to  London,  and  the  commission 
to  Washington,  where  they  explained  their  mission  to  Mr. 
Webster,  and  their  fears  for  the  independence  of  the  Islands. 
In  a  letter,  he  replied  to  them  that  it  was  the  sense  of  his 
government  that  no  power  ought  to  take  possession  of  the 
Islands  either  as  a  conquest  or  for  the  purposes  of  colonisa- 
tion,^ and  later  President  Tyler  in  his  message  to  Congress 
December  30,  1842,  defined  the  future  policy  of  the  United 
States  toward  the  Islands  thus :  "Considering  therefore," 
he  said,  "that  the  United  States  possesses  so  very  large  a 
share  of  the  intercourse  with  those  islands,  it  is  deemed  not 
unfit  to  make  the  declaration  that  their  government  seeks 
nevertheless  no  particular  advantages,  no  exclusive  control 
over  the  Hawaiian  government,  but  is  content  with  its  inde- 
pendent existence,  and  anxiously  wishes  for  its  security  and 
prosperity.  Its  forbearance  in  this  respect  under  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  large  intercourse  of  their  citizens  with  the 
islands  would  justify  this  government,  should  events  here- 
after arise  to  require  it,  in  making  a  decided  remonstrance 
against  the  adoption  of  an  opposite  policy  by  any  other 
power." 

Ignorant  of  this  declaration  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  the  Carysfort  arrived  at  Honolulu  from 
Mexico,  February  10,  1843.  Fully  persuaded  that  he  had 
the  true  condition  of  affairs  from  the  British  Consul  Charle- 

'  Webster's  Works,  Vol.  VI,  p.  477-8. 


I02  The  Treaty  zvith  Hawaii  in  i8y6. 

ton  and  from  the  Vice  Consul  Simpson,  Lord  Paulet  acted 
accordingly,  and  again  the  feeble  government  yielded  to  the 
persuasion  of  a  broadside  trained  on  its  chief  port. 

The  demands  made  by  Lord  Paulet  in  satisfaction  of  the 
English  claims  were  so  astounding  that,  rather  than  give  up 
his  dominion  piecemeal,  the  King  surrendered  his  kingdom 
entire  to  Lord  Paulet,  pending  the  result  of  an  appeal  to  the 
Queen  of  England  against  the  injustice  of  his  acts. 

Lord  Paulet  at  once  took  possession.  The  flag  over  the 
British  Consulate  was  struck,  and  the  British  flag  raised  to 
denote  English  sovereignty  over  the  Islands.  Lord  Paulet 
now  took  over  entire  charge  of  the  government,  and  the 
English  occupation  was  complete. 

Meanwhile,  successful  in  their  mission  to  the  United 
States,  and  recognition  assured  to  them,  the  Hawaiian 
envoys  sailed  for  England.  The  recognition  of  their  inde- 
pendence by  the  United  States  at  this  particular  time  had  a 
more  important  effect  on  the  history  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
than  could  then  be  foreseen,  and  it  became  apparent  only 
later. 

In  England  they  met  with  a  rebuff  at  first.  Lord  Aber- 
deen, Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  refused  to 
receive  them  as  envoys  of  an  independent  state.  He 
declared  that  their  island  government  "was  exclusively 
under  the  influence  of  Americans  to  the  detriment  of  British 
interests,"^  and  he  maintained  that  the  United  States  had 
not  recognized  Hawaiian  independence.  When,  however, 
he  was  convinced  that  the  United  States  had  given  formal 
recognition,  he  pledged  his  government  March,  1843,  to 
recognize  the  Islands  as  independent,^  and  April,  1843,  the 
envoys  were  officially  notified. 

This  course  of  the  British  government  was  due  largely  to 
the  action  of  the  L^nited  States,  and  to  the  well  known 
aggressions  of  the  French  in  the  neighboring  islands  in  the 

'  Alexander,  p.  239. 

^  Mr.  Everett  to  Mr.  Webster,  Mar.  28,  1S43. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Haivaii  in  18/6.  103 

Pacific  during  the  previous  summer.^  Her  act  of  recog- 
nition is  the  more  creditable  to  England  when  we  remember 
that  the  "opium  war"  with  China  which  England  had  just 
brought  to  a  close  had  opened  up  five  free  ports  in  China  to 
English  commerce,  and  would  have  thus  greatly  enhanced 
the  value  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  to  England  as  a  mid-ocean 
possession. 

England's  recognition  of  the  Hawaiian  government  had 
taken  place  before  news  came  of  Lord  Paulet's  seizure  of 
the  Islands.  This  was  a  fortunate  circumstance  for  the 
Hawaiians,  for  without  such  a  pledge  England  would  prob- 
ably not  have  given  up  her  possession  of  them.  As  it  was, 
Lord  Paulet  had  taken  them  just  in  time  to  prevent  the 
French  from  seizing  them,  as  a  French  squadron  was  on  the 
way  at  that  time.-  This,  too,  was  in  turn  fortunate  for 
the  Hawaiians,  for  the  French  without  doubt  would  have 
retained  them,  as  they  were  bound  by  no  pledges  to  recog- 
nize the  independence  of  the  Islands. 

Even  after  England's  declaration,  the  independence  of  the 
Islands  seemed  to  Mr.  Everett,  our  Minister  to  England,  so 
serious!}'  threatened,  that  he  thought  the  use  of  force  by  the 
United  States  might  be  justified  in  preventing  their  falling 
into  the  hands  of  France  or  England.^ 

^  "  .  .  .  I  cannot  but  regard  the  recognition  of  the  United  States  as 
having  determined  the  character  of  all  the  succeeding  occurrences, 
.  .  .  and  the  occupation  of  the  Marquesas  by  the  French  no  doubt 
united  with  our  recognition  in  hastening  the  decision  of  this  govern- 
ment."— Mr.  Everett  to  Mr.  Upshur,  Aug.  15,  1843,  p.  359,  Vol.  27. 

'■'  "There  is  now  reason  to  think  that  the  occupation  of  the  islands 
by  Lord  George  Paulet  was  a  fortunate  event,  inasmuch  as  it  pre- 
vented them  from  being  taken  possession  of  by  a  French  squadron, 
which  it  is  said  was  on  its  way  for  that  purpose.  Had  France  got 
possession  of  the  islands  she  would  certainly  have  retained  them.  Had 
intelligence  been  received  here  of  Lord  George  Paulet's  occupation  of 
them,  England  I  think  would  not  have  given  them  up." 

Mr.  Everett  to  Mr.  Upshur,  Aug.  15,  1843,  p.  359,  Vol.  27. 

^  "  There  is  something  so  entirely  peculiar  in  the  relations  between  this 
little  commonwealth  and  ourselves  that  we  might  even  feel  justified,  .  .  . 
in  interfering  by  force  to  prevent  its  falling  into  the  hands  of  one  of  the 
Great  European  powers." — Mr.  Everett  to  Mr.  Webster,  June  13,  1843. 


I04  The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  in  18/6. 

England  had  been  led  to  recognize  the  independence  of 
the  Hawaiians,  and  though  in  actual  possession  of  their 
territory  she  could  not  for  that  reason  hold  it.  But  by  this 
occupation  she  hoped  to  bring  France  to  agree  with  her 
never  to  take  possession.^  This  group  was  a  strategic  point 
of  such  importance  that  neither  France  nor  England  could 
yield  it  to  the  other,  but  if  both  would  agree  to  recognize 
the  Islands  as  independent,  and  bind  themselves  reciprocally 
not  to  take  possession  of  the  whole  or  of  part  of  them  in  any 
way,  then  the  Sandwich  Islands  would  practically  cease  to 
exist  as  a  strategic  point  in  the  Pacific ;  for  there  was  the 
constant  fear  among  the  powers  that  some  nation  would 
seize  and  fortify  these  Islands  to  the  great  detriment  of  the 
others.  As  it  was  only  for  war  purposes  that  they  were 
desirable,  they  may  be  regarded  as  commercially  insignficant 
at  this  time. 

The  elimination  of  these  Islands  as  a  war  factor  actually 
took  place  November  28,   1843,-  when  France  and  Great 

"...  With  respect  to  the  acknowledgment  of  the  independence  of 
the  islands,  the  follo%ving  seems  to  be  the  precise  state  of  the  case. 

The  English  Government,  following  our  example,  acquainted  Messrs. 
Hanlileo  and  Richards  in  April  last  that  they  were  prepared  to 
acknowledge  their  independence.  Meantime  Lord  George  Paulet, 
acting  without  instructions,  had  taken  provisional  possession  of  the 
islands  by  a  treaty  extorted  from  the  weakness  of  the  native  govern- 
ment. 

Great  Britain  feels  herself  pledged  to  adhere  to  the  recognition  of 
their  independence  and  has  invited  France  to  follow  her  example. 
France  has  agreed  to  do  so  as  soon  as  Great  Britain  withdraws  her 
occupation. 

Great  Britain,  before  giving  up  the  occupation,  means  to  do  two 
things  :  one,  to  obtain  satisfaction  to  the  matters  of  complaint.  .  .  . 
The  other,  to  come  to  some  arrangement  with  France  which  will  pre- 
vent that  power,  at  some  subsequent  period,  from  taking  possession  of 
those  islands,  as  they  have  lately  done  to  the  Marquesas. — Mr.  Everett 
to  Mr.  Upshur,  Aug.  15,  1843,  p.  359,  Vol.  27. 

*  In  the  meantime  Admiral  Thomas  had  returned  the  islands  to  the 
King,  July,  1843.  He  probably  acted  under  the  orders  of  his  govern- 
ment on  this  occasion,  though  I  find  no  record  of  such  instructions 
to  him. 


The  Treaty  unth  Hawaii  in   iS/6.  105 

Britain  mutually  agreed  never  to  take  possession  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands  nor  any  part  of  them  upon  any  occasion 
whatsoever.^ 

Before  the  next  foreign  trouble  in  which  Hawaii  was 
involved,  the  interest  of  the  United  States  in  her  fortunes 
had  been  vastly  increased  by  the  acquisition  of  California, 
and  other  territory  on  the  Pacific  coast,  as  a  result  of  the 
Mexican  war ;  an  acquisition  which  brought  about  the  reci- 
procity treaty  of  1876,  and  ultimate  annexation  to  the  United 
States. 

The  agreement  between  France  and  England  was  followed 
by  a  period  of  tranquillity  for  Hawaii.  Her  troubles  with 
foreign  nations  seemed  now  to  have  come  to  a  close.  Peace 
reigned,  but  it  was  not  for  long. 

The  new  French  Consul  soon  involved  himself  in  a  dispute 
with  the  government,  and  his  complaints  of  injuries  and 
insults  to  France  brought  a  French  warship  to  Honolulu  in 
August,  1849.  Upon  the  refusal  of  the  King  to  grant  the 
extravagant  demands  made  of  him  concerning  duty  on 
French  brandy,  the  management  of  the  Catholic  schools, 
port  duties,  and  the  use  of  the  French  language  for  ofificial 
intercourse,  force  was  again  resorted  to.  The  fort  was 
seized  by  French  sailors  from  the  warships  and  great  dam- 
age was  wantonly  done.  The  disorder  lasted  for  ten  days, 
during  which  time  business  was  for  the  most  part  suspended. 

These  acts  of  the  French  created  great  turmoil  in  diplo- 
matic circles.  The  English  Consul  at  Hawaii  protested 
against  them  as  a  violation  of  the  convention  of  November 
28,  1843,  ^"d  the  American  Consul  protested  that  American 
commerce  was  being  seriously  embarrassed.     As  soon  as  the 

'  "  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  and  his  Majesty,  the  King  of  the  French,  taking  into  con- 
sideration the  existence  in  the  Sandwich  Islands  of  a  government  capa- 
ble of  providing  for  the  regularity  of  its  relations  with  foreign  nations, 
have  thought  it  right  to  engage  reciprocally  to  consider  the  Sandwich 
Islands  as  an  independent  state  and  never  to  take  possession,  either 
directly  or  under  the  title  of  a  protectorate  or  under  any  other  form,  of 
any  part  of  the  territory  of  which  they  are  composed." 


io6  TJie  Treaty  ivith  Hazvaii  in  18/6. 

matter  became  known  at  Washington,  Secretary  of  State 
Buchanan  sent  a  despatch  to  the  United  States  Minister  at 
Honohilu  September  3,  1849,  ^^  which  he  said:  .  .  "It 
would  be  highly  injurious  to  our  interests  if,  tempted  by 
their  weakness,  they  should  be  seized  by  Great  Britain  or 
France,  more  especially  so  since  our  recent  acquisitions  from 
Mexico  on  the  Pacific  Ocean. "^ 

In  1 85 1,  a  renewal  of  the  French  aggressions  brought 
forth  more  protests,  and  resulted  in  the  final  phase  of  the 
question  of  international  relations,  by  which  France  ceased 
altogether  to  be  a  factor  in  the  matter. 

The  King,  wearied  of  being  coerced  on  account  of  his 
defenseless  position,  first  by  one  power  and  then  by  another, 
drew  up  a  document  ceding  his  dominions  to  the  government 
of  the  United  States  until  satisfactory  arrangements  could 
be  made  with  France,  and  if  these  could  not  be  made,  then 
the  cession  to  the  United  States  was  to  be  perpetual.- 

Relying  upon  the  strength  of  this  move,  the  Hawaiian 
government  now  assumed  a  lofty  air  with  the  French  agent, 
M.  Perrin,  and  assured  him  that  his  demands  were  quite 
inadmissible.  Upon  the  intimation  that  he  would  be  obliged 
to    use    force,    he    was    significantly    told    that    the    King's 

'  On  Jul)'  5,  1850,  in  reference  to  the  same  matter  the  United  States 
Minister  at  Paris  received  from  the  Secretary  of  State  the  following 
instructions  : 

"The  Department  will  be  slow  to  believe  that  the  French  have  any 
intention  to  adopt,  with  reference  to  the  Sandwich  Islands,  the  same 
policy  which  they  have  pursued  in  regard  to  Tahiti.  If,  however,  in 
your  judgment  it  should  be  warranted  by  circumstances,  you  may  take 
a  proper  opportunity  to  intimate  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
France  that  the  situation  of  the  Sandwich  Islands,  in  respect  to  our 
possessions  on  the  Pacific,  and  the  bonds  commercial  and  of  other 
descriptions  between  them  and  the  United  States,  are  such  that  we 
could  never  with  indifference  allow  them  to  pass  under  the  dominion 
or  exclusive  control  of  any  other  power." 

^  On  the  document  of  cession  was  written  in  Hawaiian,  "The  King 
requests  the  Commissioner  of  the  U.  S.,  in  case  the  flag  of  the  U.  S.  is 
raised  above  the  Hawaiian,  to  open  the  enclosed  and  to  act  accord- 
ingly."— H.  Ex.  Docs.,  Vol.  27,  251  ;  1892-3.  A.  H.  Allen's  Report  ; 
Mar.  II,  1851. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Hawaii  in   1876.  107 

independence  would  cease  in  that  event.  Upon  this  intelli- 
gence, the  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  French  agent  was 
marked,  and  his  demands  became  at  once  modest  and  reason- 
able.i 

To  the  communication  made  by  the  United  States  Minister 
at  Honolulu,^  Mr.  Webster  thus  defined  the  policy  of  the 
United  States. 

"It  cannot  be  expected  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  could  look  on  a  course  of  things  leading  to  such  a 
result  with  indifference. 

The  Hawaiian  Islands  are  ten  times  nearer  to  the  United 
States  than  to  any  of  the  powers  of  Europe.  Five-sixths 
of  all  their  commercial  intercourse  is  with  the  United  States, 
and  these  considerations,  together  with  others  of  a  more 
general  character,  have  fixed  the  course  which  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  will  pursue  with  regard  to  them. 
The  announcement  of  this  policy  will  not  surprise  the  civilised 
world,  and  that  policy  is,  that  while  the  government  of  the 
United  States  itself,  faithful  to  its  original  assurance,  scrupu- 
lously regards  the  independence  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
it  can  never  consent  to  see  those  islands  taken  possession  of 
by  either  of  the  great  commercial  powers  of  Europe,  nor 
can  it  consent  that  demands  manifestly  unjust  and  deroga- 
tory and  inconsistent  with  bona  fide  independence  shall  be 
enforced  against  that  government."" 

A  copy  of  this  letter  was  sent  in  circular  form  to  all 
members  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  in  Washington.  In  the 
belief  that  the  United  States  had  a  secret  understanding  with 
the  Hawaiian  Islands,  the  effect  of  this  letter  was  to  cause 
France  to  cease  from  her  aggressions. 

^  Mr.  Severance  to  Mr.  Webster,  Mar.  21,  1851,  Vol.  27,  p.  337,  No. 
6  ;  and  Mr.  Rives  to  Mr.  Webster,  Oct.  30,  1851,  Vol.  27,  p.  345. 

'^  Mr.  Severance  to  Mr.  Webster,  Mar.  21,  1851,  Vol.  27,  p.  337,  No.  6. 

*  Mr.  Webster  is  quoted  as  having  privately  said  to  the  Hawaiian 
agent  sent  to  Washington  to  represent  the  French  aggressions, 

"I  trust  the  French  will  not  take  possession,  but  if  they  do,  they 
will  be  dislodged  if  my  advice  is  taken,  if  the  whole  power  of  the 
government  is  required  to  do  it." 


io8  The  Treaty  with  Haivaii  in  i8y6. 

Mr,  Webster  now  instructed  Mr.  Severance  to  return  the 
document  of  cession,  and  then  for  the  eyes  of  the  French 
agent  and  of  others,  he  enclosed  a  statement  that  our  naval 
armament  would  be  placed  upon  such  a  footing  in  the  Pacific 
as  to  uphold  the  dignity  of  the  United  States,  and  the  safety 
of  the  government  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

This  threatening  front  was  to  impress  the  foreign  powers, 
but  it  was  plainly  a  diplomatic  move  only.  For,  lest  Mr. 
Severance  should  be  carried  away  by  it,  Mr.  Webster  writes, 
for  his  agent's  eye  alone,  that  the  war-making  power  rests 
entirely  with  Congress,  and  that  no  power  is  given  to  the 
Executive  to  oppose  an  attack  by  one  independent  nation  on 
another ;  "but,"  he  continues,  "it  is  not  necessary  that  you 
should  enter  into  these  explanations  with  the  French  com- 
missioners or  the  French  naval  commander."^ 

Here  ceases  the  active  interference  of  foreign  powers  in 
the  affairs  of  Hawaii,  and  from  now  on  control  of  the 
Islands  is  attempted  by  means  of  their  commercial  relations. 
With  the  advantage  of  position  altogether  with  the  United 
States,  England  is  the  only  power  that  attempts  to  dispute 
her  supremacy  commercially  and  politically. 

1  Mr.  Webster  to  Mr.  Severance,  July  14,  1S51,  Vol.  27,  p.  340-3. 


Chapter  II. 

The  Folitical  and  the  Commercial  Ekme/its  in  the  Treaty;  the 
History  of  its  Ratification,  and  its  Adoption  by  Congress. 

It  may  be  safely  assumed  that  the  power  which  develops 
the  resources  of  a  country  is  the  one  which  in  the  end 
controls  it.  This  has  not  been  less  true  of  Hawaii  than  of 
other  undeveloped  countries.  To  be  sure,  the  United  States 
was  bound  to  maintain  the  independence  of  Hawaii  against 
foreign  aggression,  but  this  could  not  prevent  the  annexation 
of  Hawaii  to  the  United  States  if  this  was  the  plain  desire 
of  the  Hawaiian  government,  nor  would  it  prevent  the 
resources  of  the  Islands  from  being  developed  by  American 
capital  if  this  were  favored  by  a  reciprocity  treaty. 

The  nearness  of  the  western  coast  of  the  United  States 
made  it  natural  that  the  United  States  rather  than  some  other 
power  should  profit  by  the  commercial  prosperity  of  Hawaii, 
and  it  was  the  duty  of  wise  statesmanship  to  secure  this 
advantage.  To  thus  bind  the  interests  of  Hawaii  more 
closely  to  her,  the  United  States  had  three  courses  from 
which  to  choose  ;  a  protectorate,  annexation,  and  commercial 
reciprocity. 

The  French  trouble  had  been  settled  in  1851,  but  it  had 
not  removed  the  feeling  of  insecurity  on  the  part  of  the 
Hawaiians.  It  had  rather  strengthened  the  conviction  that 
their  defenseless  position  would  sooner  or  later  compel  them 
to  become  part  of  a  stronger  nation.  The  business  interests 
of  the  foreign  population,  which  was  largely  American,  com- 
bined with  the  fear  of  the  natives  that  the  Islands  would  be 
forcibly  seized  by  some  European  power,  made  the  advan- 
tages of  annexation  by  the  United  States  seem  of  greater 
importance  to  the  Hawaiians  than  the  preservation  of  their 
national  independence.  This  attitude  toward  the  United 
States  became  so  pronounced  that  in  1852-3  annexation  was 
considered  almost  certain. 

Other  circumstances,  too,  contributed  to  make  such  an 
alliance  desirable.     There  had  been  many  rumors  of  filibus- 


no  The  Treaty  zvith  Hazvaii  in  iS/d. 

tering  expeditions  against  Hawaii  by  lawless  adventurers  in 
California,  and  these  rumors  had  kept  the  government  in 
constant  fear  of  attack.  In  addition  to  this  uncertainty,  the 
Crimean  War  broke  out,  and  although  hostilities  had  actually 
begun  in  the  fall  of  1853,  it  was  not  until  March  of  1854  that 
France  and  England  declared  war  against  Russia.  The 
war  vessels  of  the  allies  soon  after  appeared,  scouring  the 
Pacific  to  destroy  Russian  commerce  between  the  northwest 
coast  of  America  and  Siberia,  and  to  threaten  the  Russian 
possessions  in  America.  The  Hawaiian  Islands  would  be 
a  very  desirable  base  of  operations  for  the  combined  fleets, 
and  the  convention  which  bound  each  of  them  not  to  take 
possession  might  not  prevent  them  from  occupying  the 
Islands  jointly,  so  long  as  the  war  made  it  desirable. 

As  soon  as  it  was  known,  therefore,  that  the  annexation 
movement  was  likely  to  succeed,  there  came  a  very  prompt 
and  very  natural  protest  from  Great  Britain  and  from 
France.  The  representatives  of  each  of  these  powers  in 
Washington  urged  upon  Mr.  Marcy  that  the  United  States 
should  promise  to  take  no  measures  to  acquire  the  sov- 
ereignty of  these  Islands,  or  even  to  accept  it,  if  it  was 
offered  voluntarily.  Mr.  Marcy  of  course  refused  to  prom- 
ise anything  of  the  kind,  whereupon  both  representatives 
tried  to  impress  him  with  the  belief  that  such  transfer  would 
be  forcibly  resisted.^  -He  did  not  believe  it  would  be,  and 
continued  his  negotiations  with  Hawaii.  He  expected,  how- 
ever, that  England  and  France  would  use  every  opportunity 
to  defeat  any  transfer  of  the  Islands  to  the  United  States.^ 

While  the  Hawaiian  government  was  in  fear  of  enemies 
from  without,  the  fear  of  a  revolution  from  within  worked 
powerfully  in  favor  of  annexation.  Mr.  Gregg,  writing  to 
Mr.  Marcy  from  Honolulu,  July  26,  1854,  says,  "I  am  con- 
vinced that  a  revolution  will  soon  take  place  if  a  treaty  of 

^  Mr.  Marcy  to  Mr.  Mason,  U.  S.  Minister  at  Paris,  Dec.  16,  1853  ; 
H.  Ex.  D.,  Vol.  27,  1893-4,  p.  347. 

■■^  Mr.  Marcy  to  Mr.  Gregg,  Apr.  4,  1854  ;  H.  Ex.  D.,  Vol.  27,  p.  364, 
No.  6,   1893-4. 


TJic  Treaty  zi'ifh  Hazvaii  in  i8y6.  m 

annexation  is  not  concluded.^  He  feared  also  that  the 
Islands  might  be  seized  by  hostile  powers  from  without 
before  the  transfer  could  be  made,  for  on  August  7,  1854, 
he  wrote  to  Mr.  Marcy  that  an  immediate  transfer  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Islands  to  the  United  States  was  necessary 
to  guard  against  pressing  danger. - 

The  negotiation  of  a  treaty  of  annexation  had  been  suc- 
cessfully carried  on  by  Mr.  Gregg,  Minister  from  the  United 
States  to  Hawaii,  and  by  Mr.  Wylie  for  Hawaii,  and  a 
treaty  satisfactory  to  the  government  of  the  United  States 
was  waiting  for  the  King's  signature,  but  before  this  final 
step  was  taken  the  King  died,  and  his  successor  refused  to 
agree  to  its  conditions.  As  there  was  then  no  present  hope 
for  annexation,  the  sentiment  of  the  foreign  population  and 
of  the  native  government  now  set  strongly  toward  recipro- 
city as  most  desirable  for  the  business  interests  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands. 

As  it  has  been  seen,  the  voluntary  cession  of  the  Islands 
to  the  United  States  made  in  1851  was  not  accepted.  A 
protectorate  of  this  kind  was  undesirable  because  the  United 
States  would  thereby  assume  heavy  responsibilities  with 
very  few  compensating  advantages.'  Annexation  would 
secure  protection  to  the  Islands,  and  an  advantageous  base 
in  time  of  war  to  the  United  States,  and  at  the  same 
time  it  would  obtain  all  the  results  of  the  most  favorable 
commercial  treaty  ;  but  there  were  many  obstacles  to  annexa- 
tion, constitutional,  political,  and  diplomatic,  which  had  no 
weight  when  considered  with  respect  to  a  reciprocity  treaty. 
Only  the  threatened  danger  of  war,  or  the  fear  that  some 
other  power  would  supplant  American  influence  there  and 
seize  the  Islands,  has  ever  secured  for  annexation  a  favorable 
consideration  by  our  government.     Reciprocity,  on  the  other 

^  Mr.  Gregg  to  Mr.  Marcy  July  26,  1S54  ;  H.  Ex.  Docs.,  Vol.  27,  p. 
364,  1893-4. 

*  Mr.  Gregg  to  Mr.  Marcy,  Aug.  7,  1854;  H.  Ex.  Docs.,  Vol.  27,  p. 
366.  1893-4. 

'  Letter  of  Mr.  Marcy. 


TI2  The  Treaty  with  Hawaii  in  iSyd. 

hand,  has  always  been  a  desirable  step  not  involving  any  of 
the  objections  to  annexation. 

The  commercial  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  were  of  more  importance  from  1850 
to  i860  than  at  any  time  before  the  treaty  of  1876  came  into 
operation  ;  and  it  was  during  this  decade  that  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  first  attained  to  any  commercial  importance.  The 
discovery  of  gold  in  California  in  1848  had  made  the  port  of 
San  Francisco  a  greedy  market  for  all  the  provisions  that 
Hawaii  could  supply,  and  thereby  gave  an  immense  stimulus 
to  every  latent  industry  in  the  Islands.  The  Hawaiian 
Islands,  too,  became  the  distributing  station  for  supplies  of 
all  kinds  needed  by  the  rapidly  growing  population  of  the 
Pacific  Coast,  when  the  lack  of  railroads  had  made  impossible 
any  direct  communication  with  the  East. 

The  whale  fishery  was  at  the  zenith  of  its  prosperity  in 
1853-4,  and  the  fitting  out  and  provisioning  of  the  hundreds 
of  whale  ships  which  touched  there  annually  was  the  chief 
source  of  Hawaii's  wealth.  The  greater  part  of  them  were 
American  vessels,  and  they  largely  fostered  American  influ- 
ence. It  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that  under  these  con- 
ditions a  reciprocity  treaty  would  prosper.     But  it  did  not. 

Mr.  Marcy,  Secretary  of  State,  successfully  negotiated  a 
reciprocity  treaty  July  10,  1855,  with  the  Hawaiian  govern- 
ment, providing  for  the  free  admission  of  American  products 
in  return  for  sugar  and  the  principal  native  productions  of 
the  Hawaiian  Islands.^  But  when  it  came  up  in  the  Senate 
for  discussion  the  measure  was  defeated,  largely  on  account 

^  Articles  being  the  gro'Mth  or  froduce  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

Schedule  (free). 
July  20,  1855. 

Muscovado,  brown,  Clayed,  and  all  other  unrefined  sugars,  syrups 
of  sugar,  molasses,  coffee,  arrow  root.  Live  stock.  Animals  of  all 
kinds.  Cotton  (unmanufactured),  seeds  and  vegetables  not  preserved. 
Undried  fruits  not  preserved.  Poultry,  eggs.  Plants,  shrubs  and 
trees.  Pilts,  wool  (unmanufactured).  Rags,  hides,  furs,  skins  (un- 
dressed). Butter,  tallow.— Sen.  Doc,  No.  231,  pt.  6,  p.  407;  56  C.  2 
S.     Rep't  of  Comm.  on  Foreign  Relations  1789-1901. 


The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  in  i8y6.  113 

of  the  opposition  of  Senators  Benjamin  and  Slidell  of 
Louisiana,  on  the  ground  that  this  free  sugar  would  injure 
the  sugar-growing  interest  of  the  Southern  States.^  There 
was  another  and  more  important  reason  for  its  defeat,  how- 
ever, and  that  was,  that  besides  the  loss  of  revenue  to  the 
United  States  resulting  from  such  a  measure,  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  gave  no  assurance  that  the  island  resources  would 
not  be  developed  by  American  capital,  only  perhaps  to  fall 
later  into  the  hands  of  some  European  power.  This  is  the 
more  satisfactor}^  explanation  in  the  light  of  later  nego- 
tiations. 

The  attempt  at  reciprocity  was  a  failure,  for  the  time  at 
least,  as  more  important  matters  crowded  the  question  out 
of  public  notice.  The  Civil  War  in  the  United  States,  and 
the  events  leading  up  to  it,  now  occupied  the  attention  of  the 
American  people,  and  Hawaii  was  lost  sight  of.  Yet  the 
war  brought  its  misfortunes  to  Hawaiian  commerce,  for  the 
cruisers  Florida  and  Shenandoah  destroyed  the  whaling  fleet 
in  the  Pacific,  and  thus  took  away  almost  at  a  blow  the 
Islands'  chief  source  of  wealth. 

The  whaling  industry  never  recovered  from  this  injury, 
and  in  time  ceased  to  be  an  industry  altogether.  This 
failure  was  also  in  part  due  to  the  scarcity  of  whales,  to  the 
increasing  use  of  gas  and  mineral  oils  for  illumination,  to 
the  production  of  stearin  and  paraffine,  and  to  the  substitu- 
tion of  steel  and  hard  rubber  for  whalebone  in  many  articles 
of  clothing,  umbrellas,  parasols  and  the  like.-     From  what- 

Ar tides  being  (he  groivth  or  produce  of  the  United  States. 

Schedule  (free). 
July  20,  1855. 

Flour  of  wheat,  fish  of  all  kinds,  coal,  timber  and  lumber  of  all 
kinds,  round,  hewed  and  sawed  (unmanufactured)  in  whole  or  in  part. 
Staves  and  heading,  cotton  (unmanufactured)  seeds,  and  vegetables 
not  preserved.  Poultry,  eggs,  plants,  shrubs  and  trees,  pelts,  wool 
(unmanufactured),  rags,  hides,  furs,  skins,  undressed,  button,  tallow. 
— S.  D.,  No.  231,  pt.  6,  p.  407. 

^  Cong.  Record,  49  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  p.  1420;  Report  of  Ways  and 
Means  Comm. 

'Am.  Ency.,  Vol.  XVI. 

8 


114  The  Treaty  with  Haivaii  in  i8y6. 

ever  cause  it  came,  it  brought  debt  and  stagnation  of  busi- 
ness to  the  Hawaiian  merchants.^  The  Civil  War  had 
affected  the  commercial  interests  of  Hawaii  in  yet  another 
way.  The  northern  blockade,  by  cutting  off  the  cotton 
supply  of  England,  had  turned  her  attention  to  Hawaii  as  a 
possible  new  source  for  getting  cotton.  Commissioners  had 
been  sent  out  and  had  found,  upon  experiment,  that  the 
cotton  grown  here  was  not  inferior  to  that  of  the  Southern 
States  either  as  to  quality  or  as  to  quantity  per  acre.- 

England  then  seems  to  have  assiduously  cultivated  the 
friendship  of  the  Hawaiian  king,  and  to  such  good  purpose 
as  to  completely  displace  the  American  influence  with  the 
King  and  with  the  royal  family,  and  American  diplomacy 
had  to  be  acknowledged  a  complete  failure  in  this  respect." 
Notwithstanding  this,  or  rather  on  this  account,  application 
was  made  in  1864,  by  Hawaii,  to  renew  negotiations  for  a 
reciprocity  treaty.  This  application  was  not  entertained, 
however,  by  the  United  States  because  of  its  probable  effect 
on  the  public  revenue.* 

The  English  advisers  of  the  Hawaiian  king  favored  reci- 
procity with  the  United  States  as  the  best  possible  means  of 

1  Number  of  whale  ships  touching  at  Hawaiian  ports  1850-76,  from 
Hawaiian  Almanac  and  year-book  : 


No.  ships. 

No.  ships. 

No.  ships. 

1850 

237 

1859 

549 

1868 

153 

IS5I 

220 

i860 

325 

1869 

102 

1852 

519 

1861 

190 

1870 

118 

1853 

535 

1862 

73 

1871 

47 

1854 

525 

1863 

102 

1872 

47 

1855 

468 

1864 

130 

1873 

63 

1856 

366 

1865 

180 

1874 

43 

1857 

387 

1866 

229 

1875 

41 

1858 

526 

1867 

243 

1876 

37 

'  Mr.  McBride  to  Mr.  Seward,  Honolulu,  Oct.  9,  1863  ;  p.  376,  Vol. 
27,  H.  Ex.  Docs.,  1S93-4. 

^  Same,  Vol.  27,  p.  375. 

*  Mr.  Seward  in  response  to  resolution  of  the  Senate,  Feb.  4,  1864  ; 
H.  Ex.  Docs.,  Vol.  27,  p.  377,  1893-4. 


The  Treaty  zvitli  Hawaii  in  i8j6.  115 

indefinitely  postponing  the  subject  of  annexation/  Annexa- 
tion was  preferred,  on  the  other  hand,  by  the  Administration. 
Secretary  of  State  Seward,  writing  to  Mr.  McCook  at  Hono- 
lulu, September,  1867,  concludes,  "if  the  policy  of  annexa- 
tion should  really  conflict  with  the  policy  of  reciprocity, 
annexation  is  in  every  case  to  be  preferred. "- 

The  move  to  negotiate  a  reciprocity  treaty  in  order  to 
defeat  the  growing  sentiment  for  annexation  was  very  adroit. 
It  was  well  known  that  an  interest  favorable  to  annexation 
would  be  active  in  Congress  to  defeat  a  reciprocity  treaty, 
because  reciprocity  would  tend  to  hinder  an  early  annexation 
of  the  Islands  to  the  United  States.^ 

Yet  in  the  face  of  this  opposition,  a  reciprocity  treaty  was 
negotiated  in  1867,  upon  the  advice  of  the  State  Department, 
by  Mr.  McCook,  our  Minister  to  Hawaii,  and  by  Mr.  Harris, 
who  had  been  appointed  by  the  Hawaiian  government  for 
the  purpose. 

The  treaty  which  they  drew  up  was  very  similar  to  the 
uncompleted  treaty  of  1854,  but  it  provided  for  a  somewhat 
more  liberal  admission  of  American  productions  into  the 
Hawaiian  Islands  free  of  duty,  in  return  for  the  free  admis- 
sion into  the  United  States  of  Hawaiian  productions. 

This  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Hawaiian  government  July 
30,  1867,  but  it  never  had  the  slightest  chance  of  being 
approved  by  the  United  States  Congress.  It  was  endorsed 
by  President  Johnson,  to  be  sure,  as  a  means  of  finally 
acquiring  the  Islands  permanently,"*  but  this  endorsement 
did  not  increase  the  chances  of  its  favorable  consideration. 
Its  provisions  difl^ered  very  little  from  those  of  the  treaty 
that  failed  under  more  favorable  circumstances  in  1855.     It 

'  Z.  S.  Spaulding,  Charg6  d'Affaires  at  Honolulu,  to  his  father,  a 
member  of  Congress,  Apr.  14,  1879;  Vol.  27,  p.  388,  H.  Ex.  Docs., 
1893-4. 

-Mr.  Seward  to  Mr.  McCook,  Sept.  12,  1867;  p.  384,  Vol.  27,  H. 
Ex.  Docs. 

3  Mr.  Seward  to  Mr.  McCook,  Sept.  12,  1867;  H.  Ex.  D.,  Vol.  27, 
p.  256. 

*  President  Johnson's  Message  to  tlie  Senate,  Dec.  9,  1868. 


ii6  The  Treaty  zvith  Hazvaii  in  i8y6. 

did  not  provide  any  guarantee  that  the  Islands  should  not 
pass  under  the  control  of  some  foreign  power ;  it  came  up 
for  consideration  in  conjunction  with  the  San  Domingo 
treaties  and  suffered  by  that  association ;  and  finally  it  came 
as  a  measure  for  decreasing  the  revenue  of  the  country,  only 
a  little  while  after  Congress  had  abrogated  the  Canadian 
reciprocity  treaty  because  of  its  adverse  effect  upon  the 
government  receipts.  It  came,  too,  just  before  the  congres- 
sional and  presidential  elections  of  1868,  when  each  of  the 
political  parties  rested  in  the  belief  that  economy  and 
retrenchment  in  national  finances  would  be  the  prevailing 
consideration  with  the  voters  in  that  election.^  And  if  these 
objections  were  not  enough,  it  came  when  the  time  and  the 
attention  of  Congress  was  fully  occupied  by  the  problems  of 
reconstruction. 

The  treaty  was  opposed  by  Senator  Sumner,  who  was 
chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  and  was 
rejected  by  the  Senate  Jime  i,  1870.- 

The  reciprocity  treaty  had  failed,  but  the  movement 
toward  annexation  went  on.  The  sentiment  in  the  United 
States  in  favor  of  annexation  had  a  particular  significance  at 
this  time.  The  unsettled  Alabama  claims  had  made  a  war 
with  England  a  more  or  less  remote  possibility,  and  there 
was  always  the  fear  that  in  such  case,  England  would  use 
her  influence  with  the  Hawaiian  king  and  officials  to  secure 
the  Islands  as  a  base  of  operations  against  the  United  States. 

It  was  in  this  unsettled  state  of  affairs  that  Mr.  Pierce, 
United  States  Minister  to  Hawaii,  wrote  to  Mr.  Fish,  Secre- 
tary of  State,  Feb.  25,  1871,  to  urge  upon  his  attention  the 
desirability  of  immediate  annexation.  The  death  of  the 
present  King,  leaving  no  heirs  or  successors,  would  produce 
a  crisis  in  political  affairs,  he  said,  which  would  be  used  to 
renew  measures  for  annexation  to  the  United  States.  The 
native  population  was  fast  disappearing,  and  the  country  and 

^  Confidential,   Mr.   Seward  to  Mr.  Spaulding,  July  5.  1868;  p.  386, 
Vol.  27,  H.  Ex.  D.,  etc. 
^  p.  256,  Vol.  27. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Hawaii  in  i8j6.  117 

sovereignty  would  soon  be  left  to  the  possession  of  for- 
eigners. After  recalling  what  damage  was  done  by  British 
cruisers  in  1812-14,  from  Bermuda  as  a  base,  he  thought  it 
not  probable  that  any  European  power  at  war  with  the 
United  States  would  refrain  from  taking  possession  of  this 
weak  kingdom  in  view  of  the  great  injury  that  could  be 
done  to  our  commerce  through  its  acquisition. 

At  this  same  time,  in  1873,  the  one  topic  of  interest  among 
all  classes,  officials,  planters,  and  merchants,  was  what  meas- 
ures could  be  taken  to  arrest  the  decline  of  the  kingdom  in  its 
population,  revenue,  agricultural  productions  and  commerce. 
The  panacea  for  all  these  evils,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Hawaiians,  was  to  be  found  in  a  reciprocity  treaty  with  the 
United  States.^  Yet  they  realized  that  a  commercial  reci- 
procity treaty,  pure  and  simple,  had  no  chance  of  success 
with  the  United  States  Congress. 

In  dealing  with  Hawaii,  and  in  weighing  the  value  of  a 
close  connection  with  her  government  and  people,  the  United 
States  was  then  governed  by  but  one  consideration  ;  this  con- 
sideration was,  that  the  geographical  position  of  the  Islands 
would  be  the  valuable  stronghold  of  some  nation  in  time  of 
war.  The  United  States  did  not  want  Hawaii,  but  if  this 
was  the  only  way  to  prevent  some  other  power  from  occupy- 
ing this  strong  position,  the  United  States  would  be  willing 
to  acquire  it.  The  whole  history  of  the  question  up  to  1898 
has  been  the  record  of  the  pursuit  by  the  United  States  of 
a  policy  of  prevention  and  precaution,  rather  than  one  of 
acquisition.  So  long  as  there  was  no  chance  of  their  falling 
into  alien  hands,  the  United  States  was  quite  indifferent  to 
the  Islands.  But  whenever  any  such  danger  arose  in  the 
past  there  was  at  once  renewed  agitation  for  annexation. 

The  movement  towards  reciprocity,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
always  originated  with  the  Hawaiians.  They  have  no  home 
demands  for  their  products,  and  they  are  therefore  obliged 
to  look  to  the  United  States  for  a  market.     As  their  econo- 

'  H.  A.  Pierce  to  Secretary  Fish,  Feb.  10,  1S73  \  S.  Ex.  Docs.,  2d  Sess. 
53d  Cong.,  Vol.  8,  p.  148. 


ii8  The  Treaty  zvith  Hazvaii  in  i8y6. 

mic  distress  would  be  relieved  equally  by  annexation  or 
reciprocity,  the  Hawaiian  merchant  and  planter  was  usually 
favorable  to  either,  though  he  preferred  annexation  because 
of  the  greater  stability  it  would  give  to  business  interests. 

The  Hawaiian  Islands  had  little  or  nothing  commercially 
to  offer  the  United  States  in  return  for  trade  concessions, 
and  the  picture  they  presented  of  their  economic  condition  at 
this  time  was  one  that  very  naturally  caused  statesmen  to 
hesitate  to  make  a  commercial  treaty  with  them.  The 
population  of  the  Islands  including  foreigners  was,  in  1872, 
56,000,  or  about  as  many  as  are  found  in  the  average 
American  town  of  the  fourth  class;  of  these  51,000  were 
natives.  The  total  area  was  6040  square  miles,  or  about 
one-seventh  the  size  of  the  state  of  Ohio. 

In  their  genial  sub-tropical  climate,  the  lives  of  the  people 
were  simple,  their  wants  few  and  easily  supplied.  "The 
daily  life  of  the  Hawaiian,"  says  Nordhoff,  "if  he  lives  near 
the  sea  coast,  and  is  master  of  his  own  life,  is  divided 
between  fishing,  taro  planting,  poi  making,  and  mat  weaving. 
All  these  but  the  last  are  laborious  occupations  ;  but  they  will 
provide  abundant  food  for  a  man  and  his  family.  He  has 
from  five  to  ten  dollars  a  year  taxes  to  pay  and  this  money  he 
can  easily  earn.  The  sea  always  supplies  him  with  fish ;  sea 
moss,  and  other  food.  He  is  fond  of  fussing  at  different 
things ;  but  he  also  lies  down  on  the  grass  a  great  deal — why 
shouldn't  he?  He  reads  his  paper,  he  plays  at  cards,  he 
rides  about  a  good  deal,  he  sleeps  more  or  less,  and  about 
midnight  he  gets  up  and  eats  a  hearty  supper.  Altogether 
he  is  a  very  happy  creature  and  by  no  means  a  bad  one."^ 

This  idyllic  picture  of  peaceful  sleep  on  the  grass,  card 
playing  and  late  suppers  is  all  that  the  fancy  could  wish, 
but  of  the  51,000  natives,  whose  life  it  pictures,  very  little 
might  be  hoped  for  in  the  way  of  industry  which  would 
develop  the  resources  of  their  country. 

There  was  the  further  consideration  that  the  Hawaiians 
were  practically  self-supporting. 

^  Nordhoff,  A^orthern  California,  Oregon,  and  the  Sandwich  Islands, 
p.  88. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Hawaii  in   i8y6.  119 

"The  population  is  not  only  divided  among  different  and 
distant  islands,  but  it  consists  for  much  the  largest  part  of 
people  who  live  sufficiently  well  on  taro,  sweet  potatoes,  fish, 
pork,  and  beef,  all  articles  which  they  raise  for  themselves, 
and  which  they  get  by  labor,  and  against  disadvantages 
which  few  white  farmers  would  encounter."^ 

Yet  kindly  as  nature  seemed,  she  offered  little  encourage- 
ment to  attempts  to  introduce  other  cultures,  save  sugar  and 
rice,  than  these  spoken  of.  "Coffee  had  been  planted,  and 
promised  to  become  a  staple  of  the  Islands,  but  a  blight 
attacked  the  trees  and  proved  so  incurable  that  the  best 
plantations  were  dug  up,  and  turned  into  sugar."  "Sea 
Island  cotton  would  yield  excellent  crops  if  it  were  not  that 
a  caterpillar  devours  the  young  plants  so  that  its  culture 
has  almost  ceased."  .  .  .  "The  orange  thrives  in  so  few 
localities  on  the  Islands  that  it  is  not  an  article  of  commerce ; 
only  two  boxes  were  exported  last  year."  .  .  .  "A  burr 
worse  than  any  found  in  California  discourages  the  sheep 
raiser  in  some  of  the  Islands."  "The  cocoa-tree  has  been 
tried,  but  a  blight  kills  it."  .  .  .  "I  saw  specimens  of  the 
cinnamon  and  allspice  trees,  but  again  I  was  told  that  the 
blight  attacked  them."  .  .  .  "Wheat  and  other  cereals 
grow  and  mature,  but  they  are  subject  to  the  attacks  of  wee- 
vil so  that  they  cannot  be  stored  or  shipped."  .  .  .  "Silk- 
worms have  been  tried  but  failed."  .  .  .  "The  Puni 
coast  of  Hawaii  is  a  district  where  for  thirty  miles  there  is  so 
little  fresh  water  to  be  found  that  travellers  must  bring  their 
own  supplies  in  bottles."  .  .  .  "Wells  are  here  out  of 
the  question  for  there  is  no  soil  except  a  little  decomposed 
lava.  There  are  few  or  no  streams  to  be  led  down  from  the 
mountains.  There  are  no  fields  according  to  our  meaning 
of  the  word." 

The  only  occupation  that  may  be  called  an  industry  was 
cattle-raising.  "Take  next  the  grazing  lands.  In  many 
parts  they  are  so  poorly  supplied  with  water  that  they  cannot 
carry  much  stock."    .    .    .    "On  Hawaii,  the  largest  Island, 

'  Nordhoff,  p.  93. 


I20  The  Treaty  with  Hawaii  in  i8y6. 

lava  covers  and  makes  desolate  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
acres,  and  on  the  other  islands,  except  perhaps  Kanai,  there 
is  corresponding  desolation.  But  cattle  are  very  cheaply 
raised  .  .  .  and  stock  owners  are  just  now  said  to  be 
the  most  prosperous  people  on  the  islands.  Twenty-five 
thousand  head  of  sheep  make  up  the  complete  number  of  all 
the  flocks  on  the  Islands."^ 

"Moreover  there  is  but  an  inconsiderable  local  market.  A 
farmer  in  Maui  told  me  he  had  sent  twenty  bags  of  potatoes 
to  Honolulu,  and  so  overstocked  the  market  that  he  got  back 
only  the  price  of  his  bags."- 

These  discouraging  conditions  make  apparent  to  what  an 
extent  the  Islands  were  commercially  dependent  on  the  out- 
side world,  and  at  the  same  time  they  show  how  necessary 
the  profitable  sale  of  their  crop  of  sugar  and  rice  would  be 
to  their  prosperity. 

I  have  quoted  Mr.  Nordhoff  at  length,  because  his  book, 
the  result  of  travel  and  residence  in  the  Islands,  came  out  in 
1874,  while  the  reciprocity  treaty  was  under  discussion. 
Congress  was  in  possession  of  these  facts,  and  this  book  was 
freouently  referred  to  in  the  debates,  but  mostly  to  feather 
the  Qirts  of  sarcasm  and  ridicule  which  its  opponents  shot 
at  this  very  vulnerable  side  of  the  proposed  commercial 
treaty.^ 

Any  treaty  that  could  hope  for  success,  therefore,  could 
not  lay  much  stress  on  the  commercial  advantage  to  be 
gained  by  the  United  States  from  commercial  reciprocity 
with  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  Political  advantage  alone  was 
what  the  Islands  had  to  offer  in  return  for  the  free  admission 
of  Hawaiian  products  entering  the  ports  of  the  United 
States.  The  bargain  then,  if  made,  would  have  to  take  this 
form.  If,  for  the  protection  of  the  United  States,  the 
Hawaiian  Government  could  furnish  to  them,  by  treaty,  the 
means  of  preventing  the  Islands  from  passing  into  the  hands 
of  a  European  power,  as  there  was  reason  for  thinking  that 

1  Nordhoff,  pp.  93-4.  '  Nordhoff,  p.  93. 

2  See  Congressman  Kelley,  Cong.  Record,  p.  1495,  vol.  4,  pt.  2,  44 
Cong.,  I  Sess. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Hawaii  in  i8y6. 


they  might/  the  United  States  would  favor  the  commercial 
interests  of  Hawaii  by  admitting  her  productions  free  of 
duty.  American  productions  might  be  admitted  free  in  re- 
turn to  Hawaiian  ports,  but  this  was  of  secondary  advantage 
as  compared  with  the  political  advantage  secured  to  the 
American  government. 

Having  learned  in  1855  and  1867  the  futility  of  offering 
simply  commercial  reciprocity,  the  Hawaiians  in  1873  were 
willing  to  offer  as  a  quid  pro  quo  for  free  trade  privileges, 
the  cession  of  sovereignty  and  proprietorship  of  the  spacious 
land-locked  and  easily  defended  harbor  known  as  Pearl 
River,^  situated  ten  miles  from  Honolulu,  and  to  give  as  well 

'  An  Englishman,  a  little  over  a  year  ago,  loaned  this  Government 
$90,000  for  ten  years  at  ten  per  cent,  per  annum,  interest  to  be  paid 
annually.  This  Government,  in  all  probability,  will  not  be  able  to  pay 
more  than  the  interest,  if  that,  and  will  be  more  likely  to  hypothecate 
lands  to  Englishmen,  or  to  the  English  Government.  Such  an  event 
would  be  a  sufficient  excuse  for  England  (Napoleon-like)  to  take  and 
hold  these  islands  as  an  indemnity,  and  everybody  knows  what  the 
result  would  be. — Mr.  McBride  to  Mr.  Seward,  Honolulu,  Oct.  9, 
1863. 

National  Debt  Nov.  20,  1874,  was  $372,300,  falling  due  at  different 
periods  up  to  1873.     Hawaiian  Year  Book  1S75. 

Table  ok  Reven'Ues  and  Expenditures  of  Hawaiian  Kingdom  for 
each  biennial  period  from  1s56-7  to  1872-3. 


Receipts. 

1856-7 

639,000 

1858-9 

655,000 

i86a-i 

668,000 

1862-3 

688, 000 

1864-5 

728,000 

1866-7 

831,000 

1868-9 

834,000 

1870-1 

964,000 

1S72-3 

1,136,000 

Deficit. 
27,000 


Balance. 


12,000 
146,000 


Expenditures. 
666,000 
643,000 
681,000 
666,000 
582,000 
834,000 
934,000 
969,000 
1,192,000 

This  table  shows  that  Hawaii  was  getting  deeper  into  debt  each 
year,  and  if  compelled  to  make  a  large  loan,  might  be  tempted  to  give 
a  lien  on  national  property  as  securit)'  to  some  foreign  power. 

*  H.  A.  Pierce  to  Secretary  Fish,  Feb.  lo,  1873  ;  S.  E.  Docs.,  1S92-3  ; 
Vol.  8,  p.  148  ;  and 

Gen.  J.  M.  Schofield  and  Col.  B.  S.  Alexander,  Rept.  to  Secretary  of 
War  Belknap,  May  8,  1S73  ;  S.  Ex.  D.  2d  S.  53  C,  Vol.  8,  p.  153-4. 


13,000 


3,000 
99,000 

5,000 
55,000 


122  The  Treaty  zvifh  Hawaii  in  18/6. 

the  territor}'  ten  miles  square  which  surrounds  it.  Further 
on  it  will  be  considered  why  this  cession  was  not  accepted. 

The  King  and  those  who  were  in  power  would  never  con- 
sent to  annexation,  for  this  would  mean  that  they  would  all 
be  retired  from  the  stage  of  action  when  the  United  States 
came  to  substitute  a  republican  for  a  monarchical  form  of 
government.  But  the  economic  condition  of  Hawaii  was 
so  desperate,  that  if  the  royal  objection  alone  stood  in  the 
way,  the  merchants,  planters  and  foreigners  generally  were 
represented  as  being  willing  to  overthrow  the  government, 
establish  a  republic,  and  then  seek  admission  to  the  United 
States.' 

This  annexation  clamor  in  Hawaii  did  not,  however, 
arouse  much  response  in  the  United  States.  It  was  here 
believed  that  an  arrangement  preferable  to  annexation  was 
one  by  which  a  political  concession  should  be  made  in  return 
for  commercial  privileges,  and  what  seems  to  indicate  that 
up  to  this  time  the  commercial  value  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
had  been  ignored,  is  found  in  a  letter  written  by  Secretary 
Fish  to  Mr.  Pierce,  asking  for  full  and  detailed  information, 
with  respect  to  the  population,  trade,  industry,  resources, 
debt,  etc.,  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  inasmuch  as  the  United 
States  government  had  no  such  information  at  that  time.^ 

The  outlook  was  indeed  favorable  for  a  treaty.  But  there 
was  nothing  new  in  the  trade  conditions  of  Hawaii,  and  there 
seemed  just  then  to  be  no  urgent  political  reason  why  the 
United  States  should  take  action.  She  already  controlled 
the  carrying  trade  between  San  Francisco  and  Honolulu, 
sold  to  the  Hawaiians  almost  everything  they  bought,  and 
was  obtaining  a  satisfactory  revenue  upon  all  the  produc- 
tions of  the  Sandwich  Islands  sold  in  return  to  the  United 
States.  It  was  quite  probable  that  unless  something  threat- 
ened to  disturb  this  status  quo,  that  the  want  of  interest  on 
the  part  of  the  Senate  would  cause  the  negotiations  to  fail, 

'  H.  A.  Pierce  to'Secretary  Fish,  Feb.  17,  1S73  ;  S.  Ex.  Doc,  53  C.  2 
S.,  Vol.  8,  p.  149. 

^  Secretary  Fish  to  Mr.  Pierce,  March  25,  1873. 


The  Treaty  with  Hawaii  in  iS/6.  123 

not  through  any  specific  objections,  but  for  lack  of  sufficient 
incentive  to  secure  a  vote.  There  was,  however,  an  incen- 
tive at  hand  which  was  enough  to  insure  the  success  of  the 
treaty. 

This  was  the  knowledge  which  reached  the  administration, 
that,  having  found  by  experiment  that  they  could  dispose  of 
their  sugar  to  a  much  greater  advantage  in  the  free  trade 
ports  of  Australia,  the  Hawaiian  planters  were  preparing 
to  send  thither  their  whole  crop  of  1875-6.  Sugar  was 
the  chief  export  of  the  Islands,  and  with  this  sugar  they  had 
bought  manufactured  goods  in  the  United  States.  But  if  on 
account  of  the  United  States  tariff  on  sugar  this  trade  was 
diverted  into  English  ports  and  was  carried  on  in  English 
vessels,  the  Hawaiians  would  no  longer  be  bound  by  com- 
mercial ties  to  the  United  States,  and  the  island  trade  would 
certainly  drift  to  English  control,  and  the  Islands  themselves 
would  in  time  become  a  dependency  of  Great  Britain. 

It  was  this  knowledge^  that  secured  favorable  considera- 
tion for  a  reciprocity  treaty  whose  fate  without  it  would  have 
been  problematical  at  least. 

The  negotiation  of  the  treaty  was  taken  in  hand  by  the 
State  Department,  and  was  carried  on  by  Mr.  H.  A.  P. 
Carter  and  Mr.  E.  H.  Allen  for  the  Hawaiian  government. 

The  suggested  cession  of  Pearl  River  Harbor  was  not 
made  by  the  Hawaiian  government.  This  was  possibly  due 
to  the  fear  of  the  political  complications  with  England  which 
such  a  cession  would  bring,  by  which  the  whole  treaty  might 
be  jeopardized.  Eor  the  difficulty  of  carrying  through  such 
a  provision  in  the  United  States  and  in  Hawaii  would  be 
greatly  increased  by  the  pressure  which  England  would  bring 
to  bear  in  her  own  interest  to  prevent  the  United  States  from 
getting  a  foothold  which  would  practically  give  her  perma- 
nent control.  If  this  was  the  reason  for  the  moderation  of 
the  commissioners,  and  I  think  it  was,  they  exercised  a  wise 
foresight ;  for  by  stipulating  as  they  did  in  the  treaty 
(Article   IV),   that  the   Hawaiian   government   should  not 

'  Senator  Morgan,  Rept.  53  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  Doc.  231,  Vol.  8,  pt.  8. 


124  The  Treaty  zvith  Hazvaii  in  18/6. 

make  any  concession  by  which  a  foreign  nation  might  secure 
a  foothold,  it  was  made  possible  for  the  United  States  to 
obtain  further  concessions  later  without  placing  the  whole 
negotiation  in  danger  of  defeat. 

Besides  the  political  stipulation,  which  was  the  most  im- 
portant so  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned,  provision 
was  made  for  the  free  admission  to  Hawaii  of  a  great  variety 
of  American  manufactured  articles,  and  for  free  admission 
to  the  United  States  of  the  natural  products  of  Hawaii.^ 

The  text  of  the  treaty  having  been  agreed  upon  between 
the  two  governments,  it  was  ratified  by  the  Hawaiian  legis- 
lature, and  upon  being  submitted  to  the  Senate  was  ratified 
by  an  almost  unanimous  vote  of  51  to  12,  But  this  vote 
was  not  final.  In  consequence  of  its  abolition  of  the  duty 
then  imposed  by  law  in  the  United  States  on  the  articles 
enumerated  in  the  schedule,  the  treaty  required  an  act  of 
Congress  to  carry  it  into  effect,  and  not  only  was  the  consent 
of  the  House  required,  but  the  bill  to  put  the  treaty  into 
operation  must  originate  there.-  The  government  records 
do  not  contain  the  debates  in  the  Senate  on  the  treaty,  but 
on  the  bill  itself  we  have  the  debate  on  the  merits  of  the 
treaty  in  both  the  House  and  in  the  Senate. 

January  16,  1876,  Mr.  Luttrell  of  California  introduced  a 
bill  (H.  R.  No.  612)  for  carrying  the  treaty  into  effect.  This 
was  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means. ^ 
February  24,  1876,  this  committee  returned  a  majority  report 
that  the  bill  pass,  and  a  minority  report  against  it. 

The  majority  report  dealt  with  the  loss  of  revenue  and 
the  commercial  side  of  the  treaty  only  in  a  negative  way, 
urging"  that  it  would  do  no  harm,  and  that  very  favorable 
results  might  follow.  But  the  majority  rested  their  case  on 
the  only  really  vital  point  in  the  treaty,  that,  although  it  did 
not  secure  to  the  United  States  any  new  foreign  trade,  and 
although  it  did  not  give  the  United  States  possession  of  the 

'  See  Appendix  for  text  of  treaty. 

2  Cong.  Record,  Vol.  4,  p.  1420,  44  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1875-6,  pt.  i. 

^  Cong.  Record,  44  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1875-6  ;  pt.  i,  Vol.  4,  p.  300. 


The  Treaty  zcith  Hazcaii  in  iS/6.  125 

Islands,  the  treaty  did  secure  them  against  the  occvipation 
of  Hawaii  by  any  other  power.  The  minority  report  vigor- 
ously attacked  the  commercial  side  of  the  treaty,  and  had 
no  difficulty  in  making  a  commercial  treaty  with  such  a 
country  as  Hawaii  appear  absurd  as  a  business  proposition. 

Commercially,  the  first  and  almost  the  only  interest  was  in 
Hawaiian  sugar,  and  as  sugar  formed  the  bulk  of  Hawaiian 
exports,  the  whole  question  revolved  about  these  points : 
first,  how  would  the  introduction  of  free  sugar  into  our 
ports  from  Hawaii  affect  our  foreign  and  domestic  sugar 
trade,  and  what  would  be  the  incidental  loss  to  the  United 
States  revenue ;  second,  what  would  be  the  value  of  the 
political  foothold  secured  to  the  United  States  by  the  treaty. 
As  the  argument  of  those  who  favored  the  treaty  in  Congress 
followed  very  closely  the  points  made  by  the  majority  report, 
and  as  those  who  opposed  it  followed  the  minority  report,  it 
will  be  well  to  consider  them  each  in  detail,  taking  first  the 
report  of  the  majority. 

This  report  includes  a  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  which  relates  to  the  commerce  of  Hawaii  with  the 
United  States,  and  is  favorable  to  the  treaty. 

"The  conditions,"  it  says,  "attending  this  commerce 
appear  to  be  such  as  to  render  it  of  greater  value  to  the 
United  States  in  proportion  to  its  volume  than  is  usual  with 
countries  similarl}-  situated  and  producing  sugar  as  a  staple. 
So  far  as  the  exchange  of  articles  is  concerned,  there  is  an 
equivalent  to  be  found  in  our  export  trade  for  the  value  of 
sugar  and  other  articles  imported.  Such  is  not  the  case 
with  most  of  the  tropical  islands  or  sugar-producing 
countries  of  either  hemisphere."^ 

'  Value  of  Hawaiian  trade  as  compared  with  other  sugar  countries  : 

Ha^vaii. 

Hawaiian  Islands  export  to  U.  S $1,139,725 

They  import  from  the  U.  S 836,000 

The  imports  are  over  75  per  cent,  of  their  exports. 

C/iina. 

China  exports  to  U.  S $26,353,291 

China  imports  from  U.  S 1,931,732 

Imports  about  "]%  per  cent,  of  the  exports. 


126  The  Treaty  zvifJi  Hawaii  in  iSyd. 

"The  trade  between  the  United  States  and  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  taken  for  five  years  shows  a  balance  in  favor  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands." 

U.  S.  imports  U.  S.  exports 

from  Hawaii.  to  Hawaii. 

1871  $1,153,154  $840,385 

1872  1,285,320  620,295 

1873  1,316,270  654,103 

1874  1,017,172  623,280 

1875  1,227,191  695,364' 

"The  amount  of  this  trade  is  inconsiderable,  and  is  chiefly 
in  tropical  and  semi-tropical  products  as  imported,  and  in 
miscellaneous  products  of  the  United  States  as  exported. 
This  reciprocal  trade  is  better  than  free  trade,  for  while  it 
increases  the  trade  of  the  contracting  parties,  and  concen- 
trates it  in  their  hands,  it  is  a  restraint  on  the  trade  of  other 
countries  because  they  have  duties  and  other  charges  to  pay 
from  which  the  parties  to  this  reciprocal  treaty  are  free.^ 

Dutch  East  Indies. 

Dutch  East  Indies  export  to  U.  S $7,556,954 

They  import  from  U.  S 255,134 

Imports  less  than  4  per  cent,  of  exports. 

Cuba. 

Cuba  exports  to  the  U.  S $77,469,826 

Cuba  imports  from  the  U.  S 1,397,729 

Imports  not  2  per  cent,  of  exports. 

British  East  Indies. 

British  East  Indies  export  to  U.  S $16,855,747 

They  import  from  U.  S 165,270 

Imports  not  r  per  cent,  of  exports. 

Spanish  Possessioits  other  than  Cuba. 

They  export  to  the  U.  S $6, 171,635 

They  import  from  the  U.  S i7,57o 

Imports  less  than  }^  oi  1  per  cent,  of  the  exports. 
Letter  from  Secretary  of  Treasury  on  Hawaiian  trade,  p.  1420,  C.  R., 
Vol.  4,  44  Cong.,  I  Sess. 

^  C.  R.,  p.  1420.     Letter  of  Secretary  of  Treasury.     Found  also  in  Com- 
merce and  Navigation  for  the  respective  years. 

'^  Secretary  of  Treasury,  p.  1420,  C.  R.,  Vol.  4,  44  C,  i  S. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Hawaii  in   i8j6.  127 

The  amount  of  goods  released  from  duty  to  the  United 
States  is  small,  $370,000  being  the  total  annual  revenue  from 
Hawaiian  imports."^ 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
did  not  attach  much  importance  to  the  loss  of  revenue  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  treaty.  "The  proposed  release  of  this  duty,"  he 
says  further,  "would  undoubtedly  increase  this  trade,  and  its 
increase  would  go  far  toward  compensating  for  the  loss  re- 
sulting from  the  release  of  sugar  from  duty." 

That  is  to  say,  that  with  the  duty  removed,  the  Hawaiians 
would  increase  their  production  of  sugar,  and  would  there- 
fore have  greater  means  with  which  to  purchase  in  return 
the  articles  manufactured  by  the  United  States.  In  the 
report  this  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is  made  to 
answer  for  an  argument  in  favor  of  the  treaty ;  this  finished, 
the  report  thus  continues  its  own  argument.  The  admis- 
sion of  Hawaiian  sugar  could  not  have  the  least  effect  on  the 
sugar  market  in  the  Atlantic  States,  for  it  is  imposible  that 
this  sugar  could  in  any  way  come  into  competition  with  it.- 
The  cost  of  transportation  would  be  too  great  to  make  it 

'  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  states  further : — 

"  The  effect  on  the  revenue  of  admitting  the  articles  named  in  the 
schedule  free  of  duty  is,  first,  to  remit  the  amount  levied  on  sugar,  the 
quantity  of  which  was  in  1873  (fiscal  year),  15,743,146  pounds,  on 
which  the  duty  at  two  cents  per  pound  is  $314,863  and  inclusive  of  a 
small  amount  of  other  saccharine  products  (molasses  and  mecado)  it 
amounts  to  $320,345  in  all  on  this  class  of  articles.  This  is  also  nearly 
the  average  for  three  years,  ending  1873.  The  duty  on  other  articles 
imported  and  included  in  the  schedule  of  articles  to  be  admitted  free 
is  small  in  amount  including  none  of  conspicuous  importance.  The 
aggregate  received  is  less  than  $50,000  per  year.  The  entire  release  of 
duty  proposed  by  the  treaty  therefore  would  be  nearly  $370,000  yearly." 

"  Should  the  sugar-product  so  released  increase  to  25,000,000  pounds 
yearly,"  he  continues,  "  the  export  trade  would  probably  equal  it  in 
value." — C.  R.,  p.  1420,  44  C,  i  S. 

-  Whole  importation  of  sugar  into  the  United  States  : 

From  Hawaii. 

1873  766,648  tons.  7.404 

1874  797.153  "  6,787 

1875  847,910  "  8,944 


128  The  Treaty  zvith  Haioaii  in  18/6. 

profitable,  and  further,  there  need  be  no  occasion  for  fear  in 
the  great  increase  in  the  production  of  this  sugar  in  view 
of  the  steadily  diminishing  population  of  the  Islands. 

The  report  then  takes  up  the  consideration  of  the  imme- 
diate occasion  for  a  treaty. 

'This  trade,'  it  says,  'is  being  diverted  into  another 
direction ;  already  a  large  proportion  of  it  has  been  attracted 
to  the  British  colonies  in  the  Pacific.  In  1873,  the  total 
export  of  sugar  from  the  Hawaiian  Islands  was  11,595 
tons,  of  which  4,191  tons  were  sent  to  British  colonies, 
and  of  the  imports  of  the  same  year  more  than  one-half  was 
from  other  countries  than  the  United  States.  At  the  present 
time,  a  great  number  of  British,  American,  and  Hawaiian 
vessels  annually  enter  Australia  and  New  Zealand  ports  with 
sugar  cargoes.  The  greater  part  of  these  enter  at  New  Castle 
and  Sidney,  thence  take  coal  freights  back  to  the  islands. 
The  United  States  will  lose  this  trade  and  its  $400,000  of 
revenue  if  the  trade  is  not  retained  by  the  adoption  of  the 
treaty.  If  the  exports  and  imports  were  equal,  as  they  prob- 
ably will  be,  it  would  be  an  equal  bargain.  .  .  .  But  sup- 
posing that  there  were  no  reciprocity  of  commerce  in  this 
treaty,  that  the  commerce  and  advantages  were  against  us, 
and  that  we  lose  even  $400,000  annual  revenue,  yet  there  are 
political  reasons  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  warrant  us  to 
make  it.  This  is  their  geographical  position  in  relation  to 
our  Pacific  coast,  and  to  the  countries  adjacent  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  This  group  is  the  key  to  the  Pacific  and  in  time  of 
war  the  power  that  possesses  them  controls  all  the  commerce 
of  the  Pacific  to  destroy  it  at  pleasure.'  The  discussion  of 
this  last  point  occupies  quite  half  of  the  majority  report. 

The  report  of  the  minority  is  by  far  the  abler  paper,  and 
shows  a  much  firmer  grasp  of  the  trade  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  the  results 
which  might  be  expected  from  the  operation  of  the  treaty. 
It  uses  many  of  the  facts  cited  by  the  majority  report  but 
draws  very  different  conclusions  from  them.  Its  argument, 
in  brief,  is  as  follows : 


The  Treaty  unth  Hai^'aii  in  18/6.  129 

The  United  States  imports  from  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
for  1875  were  $1,227,191,  from  which  the  United  States 
received  a  revenue  of  $456,777.  The  total  exports  of  United 
States  merchandise  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands  for  that  year 
were  $665,174,  not  one-third  in  excess  of  the  amount  of  the 
annual  revenue  received  by  the  United  States  by  their  com- 
merce with  the  Islands.  The  treaty  proposed  to  give  away 
this  sum  chiefly  to  the  sugar  interest  of  the  Islands.  That 
is,  giving  and  remitting  nearly  one  dollar  of  duty  to  the 
Islands  for  the  privilege  of  selling  goods  worth  a  like  sum. 

Of  the  commerce  with  the  Hawaiian  Islands  the  sugar 
product  is  of  chief  value,  the  quantity  sent  to  the  United 
States  being  $938,676  out  of  a  total  import  of  $1,227,191  ; 
more  than  three-fourths  of  the  whole.  The  production  of 
this  article  is  rapidly  increasing.  It  increased  from  1,444,- 
271  pounds  in  i860  to  28,000,000  pounds  in  1875. 

The  United  States  will  receive  their  entire  crop,  because 
by  remitting  the  duty  on  sugar  they  will  give  a  bounty  of 
two  and  two-fifths  cents  per  pound  to  the  producers  of  sugar. 
The  production  of  sugar  encouraged  by  this  bounty,  which 
is  about  fifty  per  cent,  ad  valorem  on  the  market  price,  will 
average  not  less  than  500,000,000  pounds  annually.  This 
is  the  quantity  at  which  the  Hawaiian  commissioners  fix  the 
sugar  production  of  the  Islands. 

The  supply  from  other  islands  in  the  Pacific  will  be  cut  off 
to  the  same  extent  as  the  United  States  are  so  supplied. 
Thus  the  government  will  suffer  a  diminution  of  revenue 
from  products  of  other  Pacific  islands,  which,  but  for  the 
supply  from  Hawaii  coming  in  free,  would  pay  a  duty  of 
two  and  two-fifths  cents  per  pound.  And  thus  it  is  that  by 
reason  of  this  treaty  admitting  Sandwich  Island  sugar  free, 
the  United  States  will  suffer  a  loss  of  $1,200,000  per  annum 
on  sugar  alone  ;  a  sum  nearly  equal  to  the  whole  trade  of  the 
Islands  with  all  foreign  countries,  which,  in  1873,  was  only 
$1,155,800. 

If  the  United  States  should  secure  the  whole  trade  of  the 
Islands  by  the  treaty,  it  would  be  at  the  cost  of  a  dollar  for 
the  privilege  of  selling  goods  of  the  value  of  another,  and 
9 


130  The  Treaty  zvith  Hawaii  in  18 yd. 

during  the  seven  years  continuance  of  the  treaty,  could  it 
be  ratified,  it  would  cost  at  least  $10,000,000.  Nor  would 
this  result  in  cheaper  sugar.  The  quantity  imported  is  only 
one  per  cent,  of  the  consumption  of  the  United  States,  nor 
could  it  exceed,  for  natural  causes,  five  or  six  per  cent,  of 
this  consumption ;  and  this  could  not  reduce  the  price  in 
the  American  market. 

Moreover  this  benefit  will  all  inure  to  the  sugar  planters, 
for  the  reason  that  this  treaty  artfully  provides  that  the  Sand- 
wich Islands  shall  lay  no  export  duty.  The  sugar  planters, 
therefore,  get  the  two  and  two-fifths  cents  per  pound  bounty, 
which  is  remitted,  and,  as  has  been  shown,  without  a  reduc- 
tion of  the  market  price. 

By  the  most  favored  nation  clause  in  treaties  already  in 
existence  with  other  sugar-growing  countries,  the  same  ex- 
emption from  duty  upon  sugars  grown  in  such  countries 
will  accrue  to  them  as  is  allowed  by  this  treaty  to  the  Ha- 
waiian Islands.  The  total  revenue  for  the  year  ending  June 
30,  1875,  upon  sugar  and  molasses  imported  into  the  United 
States  from  all  countries,  was  $38,000,000.  This  duty  will 
be  remitted  by  the  treaty. 

While  unrefined  sugars  of  the  growth  of  Louisiana  may 
not  be  exported  to  the  Pacific  coast,  refined  sugars  may  be, 
and  are.  Thus  the  sugar  refiner  on  the  Pacific  coast,  getting 
his  raw  sugar  free,  has  an  advantage  of  from  forty  to  sixty- 
five  per  cent,  over  the  sugar  refiner  of  the  Atlantic  coast,  who 
pays  duty  on  his  raw  sugar.^ 

The  list  of  free  goods  which  the  United  States  may  export 
to  the  Hawaiian  Islands  contains  bricks,  shrubs,  trees,  rice, 
sugar,  wool,  and  very  many  articles  which  the  people  of  the 
Islands  do  not  need  or  which  they  supply  themselves  ;-  while 

'  There  is  of  course  an  inconsistency  in  the  argument  here,  as  the 
sugars  of  other  countries  were  to  pay  no  taxes  under  "  the  most  favored 
nation  clause." 

^  The  report  here  overlooks  the  fact  that  under  the  treaty  there  will 
be  a  change  of  occupations.  Every  one  will  begin  to  raise  sugar  and 
rice,  and  this  in  return  will  make  them  more  dependent  on  the  United 
States  for  supplies. 


The  Treaty  zvith  Hazi'aii  in  iSyd.  131 

liquors  and  spirits  and  ready-made  clothing,  which  made  up 
one-seventh  of  American  exports  to  Hawaii,  are  omitted. 
Many  of  the  articles  to  be  admitted  without  duty  into  the 
Islands,  the  United  States  would  sell  to  them  at  any  rate. 
The  greater  proximity  of  the  United  States  to  the  Islands 
makes  them  safe  in  competition  with  other  producers  of  like 
articles,  and  a  large  number  of  important  articles  which  they 
could  supply,  are  not  admitted  free.^  The  duty  imposed 
upon  imports  under  the  Hawaiian  tariff  is  not  so  high  as  to 
operate  to  the  detriment  of  American  commerce.- 

The  minority  report  opposed  the  suggestion  of  annexation 
as  a  means  for  securing  the  political  end  urged  by  the 
majority  report.  For,  although  it  agrees  with  the  majority 
that  it  is  necessary  to  prevent  the  Islands  from  being 
occupied  by  a  foreign  power,  the  report  denies  that  the  pro- 
visions of  the  treaty  provide  for  such  necessity. 

In  spite  of  some  inconsistencies,  the  minority  report  pre- 
sents much  the  stronger  argument.  The  important  point 
to  be  noticed,  however,  is  that  both  reports  agree  as  to 
the  political  needs  of  the  situation,  as  it  was  upon  this 
political  question  almost  entirely  that  the  vote  was  taken. 
For,  quite  ignoring  the  very  valid  objections  offered  to  the 
commercial  side  of  the  treaty,  and  in  spite  of  the  well  sus- 
tained argument  that  the  United  States  was  bound  to  lose 
money  by  the  transaction,  the  House  voted  for  the  bill  to 
carry  the  treaty  into  effect. 

This  seems  to  me  to  indicate  that  by  the  treaty  the  United 
States  hoped  primarily  to  secure  political  control  of  the 
Islands,  and  that  they  expected  from  the  first  to  have  to  pay 
for  it  in  such  balance  of  trade  as  should  be  against  them  in 
this  commercial  deal  with  Hawaii.  The  speeches,  too,  upon 
the  bill  clearly  indicate  this  attitude  of  mind  on  the  part  of 
Congress.  And,  while  those  in  favor  of  the  bill  dwelt  on 
the  condition  of  the  Islands  at  that  time  as  a  menace  to  our 
national  safety,  those  opposed  to  it  demonstrated  that  a  great 

'  This  was  due  to  the  need  of  revenue  by  Hawaii. 
-  It  averaged  ten  per  cent. 


132  The  Treaty  with  Hawaii  in  i8y6. 

loss  of  revenue  to  the  government  could  not  be  avoided. 
Both  were  right,  but  the  final  vote  seems  to  show  that  in 
balancing  the  financial  loss  against  the  political  gain,  the 
latter  was  the  weightier  consideration.^ 

'"We  are  endeavoring  to  acquire  these  islands  for  strategic  pur- 
poses, not  for  agriculture,  not  for  commerce,  except  as  they  are  a 
resting  point  in  the  Pacific  ocean." — Senator  Norwood,  p.  5563  C.  R., 
44  C,  I  S. 

"  This  article  (IV)  is  the  soul  of  the  treaty.  The  commercial  regula- 
tions proposed  are  of  no  consequence  to  us  whatever  ;  they  are  of  no 
importance  to  any  section  of  our  country  or  any  portion  of  our  people 
except  those  of  the  Pacific  coast." — Senator  W.  P.  Banks,  Appendix 
C.  R.,  vol.  4,  pt.  6,  44  C,  I  S. 

"The  question  now  pending  before  this  committee  is  a  question  not 
so  much  between  the  United  States  and  the  Kingdom  of  Hawaii  as 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  ...  It  does  not 
admit  of  argument  that  Great  Britain  wants  possession  of  these  islands. 
She  is  now  negotiating  for  the  possession  of  them.  She  has  looked 
upon  them  for  years  and  coveted  them  and  the  onl)'^  reason  why  she 
has  not  had  possession  of  them  at  this  time  is  because  she  has  not  been 
able  to  get  possession  of  them." — Mr.  Leavenworth,  p.  1600  C.  R.,  44 
C.,  I  S. 

"  1  pass  that  (the  commercial  interest)  .  .  .  to  another  consider- 
ation which  is  overshadowing.  The  political  consideration  in  its  broad 
sense,  the  consideration  of  the  defense  of  our  Pacific  possessions,  the 
consideration  that  in  the  Pacific  ocean  there  is  an  outpost  in  the  shape 
of  an  inhabited  group  of  islands,  capable  of  great  defense,  of  being 
made  strong  like  Gibraltar,  capable  of  great  offense  against  our  com- 
merce in  the  Pacific  waters,  a  base  of  supplies  better  than  any  of  those 
that  were  used  b)'  the  cruiser  during  the  war  of  the  rebellion  under  the 
countenance  of  England  to  prey  upon  our  commerce,  an  outpost  that 
in  the  hands  of  an  unfriendly  power  would  be  a  continual  menace  to 
the  safety  of  our  Pacific  possessions  and  could  be  used  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  our  commerce." — Senator  Sargent,  p.  5485,  C.  R.,  34  C,  i  S. 

It  is  assumed  as  the  basis  and  origin  of  the  treaty  that  the 
Hawaiian  government  will  be  unable  to  maintain  its  separate  and  inde- 
pendent organization  upon  its  present  resources  for  any  great  length  of 
time.  They  will  be  compelled  to  make  arrangements  with  Germany, 
France  or  Russia  or  with  Polynesia,  and  receive  from  them  the  advan- 
tages of  trade  which  we  refuse  them,  with  loans  of  money  or  other 
advantages  indispensable  to  the  perpetuity  of  its  government,  sacrific- 
ing its  independence  and  our  security  therefore.  They  will  be  com- 
pelled to  merge  with  them  and  with  that  will  go  their  trade  as  well  as 


The  Treaty  zvith  Hawaii  in  i8y6.  133 

In  the  debate  which  followed  the  report  of  the  Ways  and 
Means  Committee  on  the  bill,  the  strictly  commercial  side 
of  the  treaty  did  not  come  in  for  so  much  discussion  as  the 
political  side  and  the  loss  to  the  government  in  revenue,  but 
the  opposition  did  not  fail  to  show  that  the  list  of  free  goods, 
although  it  was  long  and  imposing,  was  largely  padded  with 
articles  either   free  by  ordinary  laws,   or  having  little  ex- 

the  political  influence  and  territorial  possessions  of  that  government." 
— N.  P.  Banks,  p.  55,  Appendix  C.  R.,  24  C,  i  S. 

"  The  king  of  Hawaii  sees  and  all  his  people  see  the  time  is  coming 
when  the  autonom)'^  of  that  government  cannot  be  protected  and  con- 
tinued. The  time  is  coming  rapidly  when  they  will  have  to  lean  on 
some  power.  This  treaty  is  negotiated  with  reference  to  such  a  result. 
Now  the  question  is  whether  that  power  shall  be  the  United  States  or 
the  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain." — Mr.  Leavenworth,  p.  1600-1  C.  R., 
44  C,  I  S. 

"  Now  in  order  to  satisfy  myself  as  to  what  vote  I  should  give  upon 
this  measure  I  need  only  confine  my  attention  to  this  one  single  point 
and  I  will  cheerfully  vote  for  this  bill." 

"  If  we  don't  accept  this  treaty,  beyond  all  question  a  similar  treaty 
will  be  accepted  by  the  British  Government.  .  .  .  Such  treaty  as 
this  if  made  with  England  would  uot  exist  for  thirty  days  before  the 
harbor  of  these  islands  would  be  entered  by  English  war  vessels  for 
the  purpose  of  protecting  English  commerce." — Mr.  Dunning,  p.  1604 
C.  R.,  44  C.,  I  S. 

"It  is  the  simple  logical  result  of  the  rejection  of  this  treaty  that 
before  many  months  these  islands  will  be  taken,  controlled  and  domi- 
nated either  by  England  or  by  France,  and  it  is  for  us  to  say  whether 
we  shall  consent  to  that  alien  union  by  rejecting  this  offer,  or  by  closing 
with  it  ourselves  make  that  other  union  impossible." — Mr.  Garfield,  p. 
2273  C.  R.,  44  C.,  I  S. 

"These  islands  in  the  North  Pacific  are  the  outposts  of  the  Western 
Coast  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  in  time  of  war  they  are  like 
the  hill  or  the  stream  of  water  that  I  have  described,  to  the  United 
States  of  America  ;  and  there  the  battle  would  occur  for  the  possession 
of  the  islands  as  a  coaling  station,  and  every  man  who  has  thought  on 
this  knows  it  to  be  a  fact. 

.  .  .  If  we  do  not  ratify  the  treaty  and  pass  a  law  carrying  out  the 
existing  stipulations  of  the  treaty  and  by  that  means  have  the  friendly 
relations  existing  between  that  government  and  ours  that  would  natur- 
ally give  us  that  right  ...  we  are  prevented  from  getting  posses- 
sion of  that  which  is  desirable  to  this  country." — Senator  Logan,  p.  5570 
C.  R.,  44  C.,  I  S. 


134  '^^'^  Treaty  ivith  Hazvaii  in  18/6. 

change  value. ^  Attention  was  called  to  the  fact  that  ready- 
made  clothing,  which  made  one-eleventh,  and  wines  and 
liquors,  which  made  one-twentieth  of  the  exports  of  the 
United  States  to  Hawaii,  did  not  appear  on  the  free  list. 

"  If  we  do  not  secure  this  trade  Great  Britain  will,  and  we  will  not 
only  lose  $450,000  revenue  but  the  entire  trade  itself." — Mr.  Wood,  p. 
1425  C.  R.,  44  C,  I  S. 

"  Reject  this  treaty  and  its  friendly  offers,  and  the  islands  must  inev- 
itably pass  under  British  policy  and  British  control." — Mr.  Jacobs,  p. 
1465  C.  R.,  44  C,  I  S. 

"  Further  in  case  of  war  it  would  be  exceedingly  important  . 
that  the  right  to  occupy  any  portion  of  these  islands  by  foreign  nations 
should  be  prohibited.  I  would  prefer  .  .  .  that  there  had  been  in 
this  treaty  a  direct  concession  of  a  port,  for  instance,  the  port  on  Pearl 
River,  .  .  .  Practically,  however,  it  will  secure  this  advantage." — 
Mr.  Burchard,  C.  R.,  p.  1494,  44  C,  i  S. 

"...  for  it  is  asserted  now  and  it  is  true  as  it  has  been  when- 
ever the  making  of  such  a  treaty  has  been  attempted,  that  the  treaty  is 
but  a  preliminary  step  to  the  acquisition  of  these  islands — and  a  greater 
calamity  could  not  well  befall  us  than  that  same  acquisition. — Mr.  Kelley, 
p.  1495  C.  R.,  44  C,  I  S. 

"The  Hawaiian  treaty  was  negotiated  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
political  control  of  those  islands,  making  them  industrially  and  com- 
mercially a  part  of  the  United  States,  and  preventing  any  other  great 
power  from  acquiring  a  foothold  there,  which  might  be  adverse  to  the 
welfare  and  safety  of  our  Pacific  coast  in  time  of  war." — Senator  Mor- 
gan in  Sen.  Rept.,  Vol.  2,  p.  103,  53  C,  2  S. 

"  .  .  .  for  the  mere  sake  of  creating  an  abstention  on  the  part 
of  other  powers  that  they  will  not  take  possession  of  those  islands,  you 
will  have  paid  out  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  at  the  very 
lowest  limit  $14,000,000. 

"  I  recognize  the  importance  of  making  these  islands  an  inherent 
part  of  our  republic.  I  understand  that,  and  I  sa)'  that  in  my  opinion 
now  is  the  right  time  to  strike,  now  is  the  fit  time  when  trembling  in 
the  balance  they  see  their  sovereignty  about  to  depart  from  them,  we 
can,  with  less  money  than  is  required  to  be  granted  jo  them  as  a  sub- 
sidy, buy  the  islands  out  and  out,  and  be  the  undisputed  sovereign  of 
the  country." — Senator  West,  p.  5491  C.  R.,  44  C,  i  S. 

"What  is  it  pretended  that  the  islands  can  give  us  in  return?  Their 
trade.  But  it  has  been  shown  that  it  does  not  amount  to  anything  and 
never  can  of  importance,  not  as  much  as  the  trade  of  one  good  count)' 
or  fourth-rate  city." — Mr.  Morrison,  p.  1491  C.  R.,  44  C,  i  S. 

'  Mr.   Morrison,  p.  1491,  C.  R.,  44  C,  i  S. 


The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  in  i8y6.  135 

This  was  explained  by  Mr.  Money/  that  as  the  universal 
import  duty  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  was  ten  per  cent,  and 
as  we  had  a  protective  tariff  of  from  forty  to  two  hundred 
and  forty  per  cent,  on  clothing  and  cloths  used  in  manufac- 
turing clothing,  we  could  not  hope  to  compete  with  England 
in  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  that  the  free  admission  of 
spirits  was  objected  to  by  the  Hawaiian  authorities,  not  upon 
commercial  but  upon  moral  considerations.  The  list  of  free 
goods  was  further  objected  to  because  many  of  the  articles 
enumerated  were  admitted  free  into  both  countries  whether 
there  was  reciprocity  or  not.^  The  explanation  for  this  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  unless  there  was  some  special  reason 
for  objection  on  the  part  of  one  government  or  the  other, 
an  article  admitted  free  to  one  country  was  to  be  admitted 
reciprocally  free  to  the  other.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  some 
articles  are  often  found  in  both  lists. 

Hawaii  could  not  give  the  United  States  absolute  free 
trade,  as  she  depended  largely  upon  her  import  duties  for 
revenue  to  meet  the  government  expenses.  It  was  because 
of  the  revenue  which  Hawaii  was  thus  remitting  that  the 
United  States  placed  no  conditions  in  the  treaty  that  Hawaii 
should  not  increase  the  tariff  on  her  remaining  imports.  But 
Hawaii  did  agree  not  to  lay  any  export  duties  on  the  articles 
admitted  free  to  the  United  States.  Thus  it  was  hoped  that 
Hawaiian  exports  to  the  United  States  and  United  States 
exports  to  Hawaii  would  be  cheaper  under  the  treaty  than 
before.     If  this  result  was  actually  obtained,  and  lower  prices 

'  C.  R.,  44  C,  I  S.,  p.  2271. 

^  Of  the  articles  admitted  free  to  Hawaiian  ports  the  followin?  were 
admitted  free  of  duty  from  all  countries  :  animals,  coal,  sheathing,  and 
all  descriptions  of  sheathing  metals,  pig  iron,  plate  iron,  )4  of  an  inch 
thickness  and  upwards,  books  printed  in  Hawaiian  language  and  plants 
and  seeds  not  for  sale. — H.  Rep.,  No.  1759,  p.  6,  Vol.  6,  49  C,  i  S. 

Of  the  articles  admitted  free  into  U.  S.  ports,  the  following  were 
admitted  free  from  all  countries:  plants,  tropical  and  semi-tropical, 
for  the  purpose  of  propagation  or  cultivation  ;  hides  and  skins, 
undressed  seeds  (specified). — H.  Rep.,  No.  1759,  p.  5,  Vol.  6,  49  C, 
T  S. 


136  The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  in  i8y6. 

followed,  then  it  could  be  properly  argued^  that  the  govern- 
ment revenue  remitted  by  the  treaty,  instead  of  being  lost, 
or  given  away,  remained  where  it  properly  belonged,  in  the 
pockets  of  the  people ;  but  if  the  price  did  not  become  lower, 
and  neither  government  obtained  a  revenue,  then  the  remis- 
sion of  the  duty  became  purely  a  bonus  or  subsidy  to  those 
who  profited  by  the  treaty. 

It  was  expected  that  the  effect  of  the  treaty  as  a  stimulus 
to  trade  would  be  local.  The  bankers,  commission  men, 
shippers,  and  sugar  refiners  in  California  would  be  most 
benefited,  it  was  thought,  and,  as  Hawaii  used  considerable 
timber  and  lumber,  it  was  expected  that  the  mills  of  Oregon 
and  Washington  Territory  would  monopolize  this  trade,  and 
shut  out  British  Columbia  from  competition.^ 

In  answer  to  the  objection  that  under  the  most  favored 
nation  clause  every  sugar-growing  country  with  whom  we 
had  such  treaties  could  claim  free  admission  for  the  same 
products  that  the  treaty  admitted  free  from  Hawaii,^  Mr. 
Wood  of  New  York*  showed,  by  quoting  from  examples  of 
such  treaties,  that  this  privilege  could  be  claimed  only  when 
the  concession  was  made  gratituously,  without  an  equivalent, 
"or  in  return  for  a  compensation  as  nearly  as  possible  of  pro- 
portionate value  and  effect  to  be  adjusted  by  mutual  agree- 
ment, if  the  concessions  have  been  conditional."  He  did  not 
show,  however,  that  these  countries  could  make  like  conces- 
sions, and  really  force  an  unequal  exchange  upon  the  United 
States  without  the  compensating  political  benefit  contained 
in  the  Hawaiian  treaty. 

The  value  of  all  these  arguments  can  be  accurately  gauged 
by  the  subsequent  history  of  the  treaty.  But  there  was  a 
final  objection  to  this  reciprocity  treaty  which  has  come  up 
in  connection   with  every  treaty  of  this   kind   with  which 

'  W.  C.  Bryant,  N.  Y.  Post. 

*  Mr.  Jacobs,  Delegate  from  Washington  Territory;  p.  1456,  C.  R., 
44  C,  I  S. 

^  See  Minority  Report. 

•»  Mr.  Wood  ;  p.  1425,  C.  R.,  44  C,  i  S. 


The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  in  iSyd. 


137 


Congress  has  had  to  deal.     This  is  the  constitutional  objec- 
tion which  is  discussed  in  a  subsequent  chapter.^ 

When  tlie  bill  was  finally  voted  on  in  the  Senate  August 
14,  1876,  after  having  been  previously  passed  by  the  House 
of  Representatives,  it  was  carried  by  a  vote  of  twenty-nine 
yeas  to  twelve  nays.- 


^  See  Chapter 
sentatives." 


The  Treaty-making   Power  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
•^H.  R.  Bill,  No.  612  ;  Senate. 


Bogy  (D),  Missouri. 
Cooper  (D),  Tennessee. 
Key  (D),  Tennessee. 
Davis  (D).  West  Virginia. 
Jones  (D),  Florida. 
Cockrell  (D),  Missouri. 


Allison  (R),  Iowa. 
Burnside  (R),  Rhode  Island. 
Christiancy  (R),  Michigan. 
Eaton  (D),  Connecticut. 
Harvey  (R),  Kansas. 
Kernan  (D),  New  York. 
McMillan  (R),  Minnesota. 
Oglesby  (R),  Illinois. 
Sargent  (R),  California. 
Stevenson  (D),  Kentucky. 
Anthony  (R),  Rhode  Island. 
Boutwell  (R),  Massachusetts. 
Cameron  (R),  Wisconsin. 
Cragin  (R),  New  Hampshire. 
Ferry  (R),  Michigan. 


Nays. 

Whyte  (D),  Maryland. 
Norwood  (D),  Georgia. 
Patterson  (R),  South  Carolina. 
Morrill  (R),  Vermont. 
West  (R),  Louisiana. 
Booth  (Ind),  California. 

Yeas. 
Jones  (R),  Nevada. 
Logan  (R),  Illinois. 
Mitchell  (R),  Oregon. 
Paddock  (R),  Nebraska. 
Saulsbury  (R),  Delaware. 
Wadleigh  (R),  New  Hampshire. 
Dawes  (R),  Massachusetts. 
Freylinghuysen  (R),  New  Jersey. 
Kelly  (D),  Oregon. 
McDonald  (D),  Indiana. 
Morton  (R),  Indiana. 
Randolph  (R),  New  Jersey. 
Spencer  (R),  Alabama. 
Windom  (R),  Minnesota. 


Full  Senate,  74;  Rep.  42,  Dem.  29;  Ind.  2. 

H.  R.  Bill,  No.  612;  Senate. 
Faired. 


Yeas. 
Clayton  (R),  Arkansas. 
Wright  (R),  Iowa. 
Barnum  (R),  Connecticut. 


Nays. 
Withers  (R),  Virginia. 
McCreary  (D),  Kentucky. 
Gordon  (R),  Georgia. 


138  The  Treaty  zvith  Hawaii  in  iSyd. 

The  vote  cast  was  mainly  a  party  vote.  Of  twelve  nays, 
eight  were  cast  by  Democratic  senators ;  and  of  the  twenty- 
nine  yeas,  tvv^enty-four  were  cast  by  Republican  senators. 
Geographically  the  line  was  not  so  sharp,  although  the  vote 
against  the  treaty  was  naturally  from  the  southern  states. 

The  treaty  having  been  proclaimed,  it  was  put  into  opera- 
tion September  9,  1876,  and  would  have  seven  years  to  run 
before  notice  could  be  given  for  its  termination.  The  results 
of  these  years  will  show  how  far  the  treaty  fulfilled  expecta- 
tions ;  but  before  considering  the  results  of  the  operation  of 
the  treaty,  as  to  whether  it  was  a  success  or  a  failure,  it  will 
be  well  to  review  the  arguments  that  were  used  for  and 
against  the  treaty,  when  it  was  being  debated  in  Congress. 

The  main  arguments  in  favor  of  the  treaty  were  these ; 

1.  The  treaty  would  protect  the  United  States  by  shut- 
ting out  other  nations. 

2.  The  trade  of  the  Islands  would  otherwise  go  to  Great 
Britain,  and  Great  Britain  would  finally  control  them. 

3.  The  exports  and  imports  would  be  equal  under  the 
operation  of  the  treaty. 

4.  There  would  be  a  great  increase  of  trade  between  the 
two  countries. 

H.  R.  Bill,  No.  612  ;  Senate. 
Adseni. 
Dennis  (D),  Maryland.  Sherman  (R),  Ohio. 

Goldthwaite  (D),  Alabama.  Conkling  (R),  New  York. 

Johnston  (D),  Virginia.  Dorsey  (R),  Arkansas. 

Ransom  (D),  North  Carolina.  Hamilton  (R),  Texas. 

Bayard  (D),  Delaware.  Howe  (R),  Wisconsin. 

Maxcy  (D),  Texas.  Robertson  (R),  South  Carolina. 

Thurman  (D),  Ohio.  Bruce  (R),  Mississippi. 

Merriman  (D),  North  Carolina.         Conover  (R),  Florida. 
Wallace  (D),  Pennsylvania.  Edmunds  (R),  Vermont. 

Hitchcock  (R),  Nebraska.  Hamlin  (R),  Maine. 

Alearn  (R),  Mississippi.  Ingalls  (R),  Kansas. 

Cameron  (R),  Pennsylvania.  Sharon  (R), 

24  absent  or  not  voting. 


The  Treaty  z^'ifh  Hcnvaii  in   i8y6.  139 

5.  The  shipping-  interests  on  the  Pacific,  the  bankers, 
merchants,  commission  and  insvirance  men  of  the  Pacific 
coast  would  get  the  benefit  of  the  increased  trade. 

6.  The  output  of  sugar  would  not  be  increased  to  the 
detriment  of  sugar  interests  in  the  United  States,  because 
of  the  natural  limitations  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  be- 
cause the  population  was  rapidly  decreasing. 

7.  The  sugar  admitted  would  not  compete  with  Louisi- 
ana sugar  because  California  consumed  all  that  was  sent 
from  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  the  cost  of  transportation 
was  too  g-reat  to  send  sugar  from  the  south  or  west. 

8.  The  loss  in  revenue  to  the  United  States  would  be 
inconsiderable. 

The  chief  arguments  against  the  treaty  were  as  follows : 

1.  The  treaty  does  not  secure  for  the  United  States  any 
political  hold  upon  the  Islands. 

2.  The  duty  remitted  by  the  treaty  would  be  a  bonus  to 
encourage  the  production  of  sugar  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

3.  The  imports  and  exports  would  not  be  equal,  for 
the  importation  of  sugar  would  be  greatly  increased  by  this 
bonus  without  any  corresponding  increase  in  the  exports. 

4.  The  United  States,  by  giving  up  the  revenue  on  the 
articles  admitted  free  by  the  treaty,  would  pay  one  dollar  for 
the  privilege  of  trading  to  the  value  of  another  dollar. 

5.  The  loss  in  revenue  to  the  United  States  would  be 
very  great,  and  would  become  greater  as  the  value  of  the 
imports  increased. 

6.  The  treaty  secured  to  the  United  States  no  trade 
which  it  did  not  already  hold. 

7.  The  list  of  articles  admitted  free  by  the  Hawaiian 
government  was  of  little  importance  to  the  United  States, 
because  some  of  them  were  free  of  duty  by  law,  and  the  rest 
would  be  bought  of  the  United  States  regardless  of  a  treaty. 

8.  The  price  of  sugar  would  not  be  reduced  by  the  treaty. 

9.  It  would  in  time  come  into  competition  with  the 
United  States  sugar. 


I40  The  Treaty  zvitJi  Hazvaii  in  i8y6. 

10.  There  was  no  guarantee  against  fraud  on  the  part  of 
sugar  importers. 

From  1876  to  1883,  no  unusual  conditions  presented  them- 
selves, as  in  the  Canadian  treaty,  to  hamper  or  to  stimulate 
this  trade.  There  was  a  growth  of  population  in  the  Pacific 
states  and  the  mileage  of  western  railroads  increased,  but 
on  the  whole,  conditions  were  normal,  and  the  treaty  had  a 
fair  chance.  Yet  as  a  commercial  arrangement  with  an 
independent  foreign  power,  the  treaty  cannot  be  said  to 
have  been  a  success  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  United 
States. 

The  benefits  to  Hawaii  are  undoubted.  It  developed  the 
resources  and  enhanced  the  importance  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  in  a  wonderful  manner.  Out  of  a  condition  of 
poverty  and  bankruptcy,  the  treaty  created  a  condition  of 
opulence  and  prosperity.  If  Hawaii  at  this  time  is  to  be 
considered  as  distinct  and  separate  from  the  United  States 
and  likely  to  remain  so,  then  the  effort  and  energy  of  the 
United  States  government  had  been  expended  in  developing 
the  resources  of  a  foreign  power,  with  little  return  to  her 
own  people,  and  at  a  great  loss  of  revenue.  But  if  we 
assume,  what  was  the  actual  condition,  that  the  reciprocity 
treaty  of  1876  established  a  virtual  protectorate  over  Hawaii, 
and  that  with  the  increase  of  American  population  and 
American  capital,  Hawaii  was  becoming  more  and  more  an 
American  colony,  then  the  treaty,  as  a  long  step  toward  the 
acquisition  of  the  Islands  by  the  United  States,  was  a  great 
success,  and  the  United  States  had  developed  wealth  and 
industry  that  of  necessity  must  be  retained,  and  needed  only 
a  fitting  occasion  to  be  formally  taken  possession  of. 


Chapter  HI. 

The  Operation  of  the  Treaty ;  the  Extension  of  its  Provisions, 
and  its  Renewal. 

When  the  Forty-seventh  Congress  opened  in  1882,  there 
came  from  various  parts  of  the  country,  chiefly  from  the 
sugar-raising  sections,  a  long  Hst  of  petitions^  to  abrogate 
the  treaty  with  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  These  were  presented 
to  Congress  and  were  followed  by  a  number  of  bills  intro- 
duced with  the  same  object  in  view.  They  were  referred 
to  the  proper  committees,  who,  after  carefully  investigating 
the  facts,  brought  in  their  reports  for  or  against  the  treaty. 
As  there  was  very  little  debate  on  the  subject,  it  is  in  these 
reports  that  we  find  the  facts  concerning  its  operation,  and 
the  contemporary  estimate  of  the  treaty  in  Congress. 

The  first  report  to  be  considered  is  the  report  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  submitted  by  Mr.  Kasson, 
January  16,  1883,  for  the  majority  of  the  committee.  This 
report  of  the  majority  indicated  what  had  been  plain  in  the 
debates  in  1876,  that  the  political  gain  was  the  consideration 

'  Petitions  for  abrogating  the  reciprocity  treat}'  with  Hawaii  presented 
by 

Citizens  of  Georgia. 

Citizens  of  Louisiana. 

Citizens  of  North  Carolina. 

Citizens  of  South  Carolina. 

New  Orleans  Chamber  of  Commerce. 

New  Orleans  Cotton  Exchange. 

New  Orleans  Mechanics  and  Traders  Exchange. 

New  Orleans  Produce  Exchange. 

Louisiana  Sugar  Planters'  Association. 

Baltimore  Chemical  and  Fertilizer  Exchange. 

Citizens  of  New  Jersey. 

Citizens  of  New  York. 

New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce. 

Citizens  of  Pennsylvania. 

Philadelphia  Board  of  Trade. 

Board  of  Trade  of  Providence,  Rhode  Island. 

List  found  in  index  to  the  Cong.  Globe,  p.  118,  Vol.  13,  47  C,  i  S. 


142  TJie  Treaty  zvith  Hazvaii  in  i8y6. 

which  balanced  the  economic  loss,  and  thus  kept  the  treaty 
in  force,  but,  the  report  held,  this  balance  had  been  disturbed 
by  the  operation  of  the  treaty.  The  committee  stated  that 
the  relative  advantages  to  the  people  of  the  two  countries 
appeared  to  have  essentially  changed  since  the  treaty  went 
into  effect.  The  change  of  these  relations  had  been  chiefly 
due  to  the  very  large  increase  in  the  production  of  sugar 
and  other  products  of  sugar  cane  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
and  which  had  been  exported  to  the  United  States  under  the 
treaty.  The  treaty,  however,  it  declared,  contained  other 
stipulations  in  favor  of  the  United  States,  the  retention  of 
which  was  believed  to  be  of  essential  importance  to  the 
United  States.  These  were,  that  the  effect  of  the  treaty 
had  already  been  to  give  to  this  government  the  benefit  of 
a  satisfactory  political  influence  with  the  government  of 
the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  it  was  desirable  to  retain  this  con- 
dition as  well  with  reference  to  future  as  to  present  national 
interests.  The  committee  believed  that  extraordinary  meas- 
ures on  the  part  of  our  own  government  to  prevent  foreign 
domination  mig-ht  justly  be  taken.  For  the  treaty  in  ques- 
tion was  made,  the  report  continues,  with  a  view  to  the  main- 
tenance of  our  influence  there,  and  to  the  naval  as  well  as 
the  commercial  security  of  our  interests  in  the  Pacific* 

Dissenting  from  the  position  taken  by  the  majority  of 
this  committee,  the  minority  brought  in  a  report  which 
expressed  the  general  dissatisfaction  felt  throughout  the 
country  because  of  the  economic  results  of  the  treaty,  and 
on  account  of  the  supposed  frauds  in  the  entry  of  refined 
sugar  as  raw  sugar,  free  under  the  treaty.  It  declared  that 
if  the  allegations  made  respecting-  the  practical  workings  of 
the  Hawaiian  treaty  should  turn  out  to  be  true,  there  had 
been  carried  on  one  of  the  greatest  frauds  which  had  ever 
been  committed  against  the  revenue  of  the  United  States. - 

The  report,  Feb.  27,  1883,  of  Senator  Morrill,  Chairman  of 
the  Senate  Finance  Committee,  which  next  appears,^  shows 

1  H.  Rep.,  No.  i860,  p.  2  ;  47  C,  2  S. 

'^  H.  Rep.,  No.  i860  ;  Min.  Rept.,  p.  3,  4  ;  47  C,  2  S. 

2  Sen.  Repts.  1013,  Vol.  2,  1882-3,  47  C.,  2  S. 


The  Treaty  zvitJi  Hazvaii  in  i8y6.  143 

how  plainly  the  objections  to  the  treaty  in  1876  had  been 
foreseen.  He  had  opposed  the  treaty  in  1876,  and  reported 
some  of  the  objections  then  urged  against  it,  and  which  were 
still  valid  in  1883.  These  were  the  loss  of  revenue  to  the 
United  States ;  the  fraudulent  entry  at  the  customs  house  as 
free  sugar  of  sugars  above  the  grades  specified  as  free  in 
the  treaty,  and  which  were  properly  subjected  to  duty;  the 
fraudulent  entry  of  sugars  of  China  and  India  as  of  native 
Hawaiian  growth;  the  constitutional  objection  to  the  treaty; 
and  the  danger  of  complications  from  the  most  favored 
nation  clause.  He  represents  so  well  the  party  opposed  to 
the  treaty  that  somewhat  extended  extracts  from  his  very 
able  report  are  given. ^ 

The  treaty  had  admitted  free  of  duty  into  the  United 
States  ports  ''muscovado,  brown  and  all  other  unrefined 
sugar,  n  I  caning  thereby  the  grades  of  sugar  heretofore  com- 
monly imported  from  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  nozv  knozvn 
in  the  markets  of  San  Francisco  and  Portland  as  Sandwich 
Island  sugary  By  this  phraseology,  the  treaty  intended  to 
indicate  certain  definite  grades  of  sugar  known  to  commerce 
by  these  terms.  This  sugar  was  of  a  low  saccharine  inten- 
sity, and  did  not  then  compete  with  higher  grades  of  sugar 
produced  in  the  United  States.  Nor  was  it  intended  to 
admit  refined  sugars  free  under  the  treaty.  The  Hawaiian 
sugar  to  be  admitted  was  the  raw  product  demanded  by  the 
California  sugar  refineries,  and  manufactured  by  them  into 
refined  sugar  on  which  there  was  a  high  protective  tariff. 

The  market  value  of  sugar  is  determined  largely  by  its 
saccharine  strength,  but  for  convenience,  the  various  grades 
of  sugar  and  the  duty  on  them  were  defined  by  law,  and 
determined  at  the  custom  house  by  the  color  of  the  sugar, 
the  duty  increasing  as  the  sugar  grew  lighter  in  color.  This 
method  of  determining  the  grade  of  sugar  by  its  color,  and 
of  levying  the  duty  that  corresponded  to  that  color  of  sugar, 
was  a  safe  and  comparatively  accurate  method  until  the 
reciprocity  treaty  presented  an  inducement  to  fraud.     For 

^  Appendix  C. 


144  The  Treaty  zvith  Hazvaii  in  i8y6. 

it  is  apparent  that  if  a  high  grade  dutiable  sugar  could  be  so 
colored  as  to  look  like  low  grade  free  sugar,  it  would  pass 
the  custom  house  without  challenge,  and  the  importer  would 
add  to  his  profit  the  duty  he  had  evaded.  This  was  the 
fraud  charged  upon  the  treaty  by  its  opponents.  The  enor- 
mous shipments  of  sugar,  they  said,  were  not  of  the  grade 
specified  in  the  treaty,  and  by  artificial  coloring,  with  fraud- 
ulent entries,  refined  dutiable  sugar  was  coming  into  the 
United  States  free  of  duty,  to  the  great  detriment  of  Ameri- 
can sugar  interests,  and  of  the  government  revenue. 

The  railroads  were  carrying  a  great  deal  more  freight 
toward  California  at  this  time  than  they  were  taking  away, 
and  rather  than  run  empty  cars  eastward  they  were  willing 
to  carry  California  svtgar  to  the  Mississippi  at  a  much  lower 
rate  than  they  would  give  to  merchandise  traveling  west- 
ward. This  brought  Hawaiian  sugar,  refined  in  California, 
into  competition  with  the  eastern  and  southern  productions, 
and,  as  it  was  claimed,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  latter, 
because  refined  sugar  was  being  fraudulently  admitted  free 
under  the  treaty. 

An  official  investigation,  however,  was  not  able  to  deter- 
mine that  these  charges  of  fraud  were  well  founded.  There 
is  indeed  the  probability  that,  under  the  temptation  of  gain 
thus  offered,  certain  grades  of  dutiable  sugar  were  entered 
free,  but  in  any  case  the  remedy  obviously  lay  in  a  revision 
of  the  method  of  determining  the  different  grades  of  sugar. 
This  remedy  was  applied  in  the  Act  of  March  3,  1883,  by 
which  the  polariscopic  test  was  made  the  test  of  sugars  cor- 
responding to  those  admitted  free  by  the  treaty,  and  the  color 
test  remained  for  the  higher  grades.^ 

To  discourage  any  attempts  at  fraud  by  artificial  coloring, 
the  same  act  provided  that  sugars  after  being  refined,  when 

'  All  sugars  not  above  number  13  Dutch  standard  in  color  shall  pay 
duty  on  their  polariscopic  test.   .   .   . 

All  sugars  above  number  13  Dutch  standard  in  color  shall  be  classi- 
fied by  the  Dutch  standard  of  color. — U.  S.  Stat.  47  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  ch. 
121,  Act  of  Mar.  3,  1883. 


The  Treaty  ivith  Hazvaii  in  i8j6.  145 

tinctured,  colored,  or  in  any  way  adulterated,  valued  at 
thirty  cents  per  pound,  or  less,  should  pay  a  duty  of  ten 
cents  per  pound.  As  the  highest  grade  of  refined  sugars 
paid  only  three  and  one-half  cents  per  pound  duty,  this 
means  was  efficient  in  preventing  further  frauds/ 

The  Act  of  March  3,  1883,  had  also  materially  reduced  the 
duty  paid  on  all  kinds  of  sugar.  This,  of  course,  diminished 
the  estimated  revenues  that  the  government  was  remitting 
by  the  treaty,  and  made  the  margin  of  profit  less  to  the 
importer  of  Hawaiian  sugar. 

But  the  price  of  sugar  had  not  been  reduced  on  the  Pacific 
coast  as  a  result  of  the  treaty,  and  this  fact  was  made 
the  point  of  attack.  The  reason  why  the  price  did  not  fall 
is  not  hard  to  find,  inasmuch  as  the  price  of  Hawaiian  sugar 
was  determined  by  the  lowest  price  at  which  the  same  kind 
of  sugar  from  Cuba  or  Manila  could  be  laid  down  in  San 
Francisco  after  having  paid  the  duty  and  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation. The  Hawaiian  sugar  planters  naturally  got  all 
they  could  for  their  sugar,  and  the  price  of  Manila  or  Cuban 
sugar  represented  the  limit  above  which  it  was  not  safe  for 
the  Hawaiian  sugars  to  rise.  As  Hawaii  had  been  selling 
sugar  in  San  Francisco  at  a  profit  before  the  treaty,  and 
as  the  price  of  sugar  did  not  fall  after  the  treaty  went  into 
operation,  the  remitted  duty  must  have  represented  just  so 
much  additional  profit  to  the  producer  of  sugar,  inasmuch 
as  the  cost  of  production  was  no  greater. 

It  seems  difficult  to  escape  this  conclusion,  although  Sena- 
tor Morgan  in  his  report'  made  January  24,  1884,  from 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  claimed  that  the  profits 
of  the  sugar  trade  did  not  go  so  much  to  enrich  the  sugar 
planter  as  to  the  profit  of  the  American  shippers  and  mer- 
chants who  handled  the  sugar.  His  position  will  be  made 
clearer  in  a  later  report,^  but  here  his  contention  is  that 
the  greater  part  of  the  profit  of  this  trade  remained  in  the 

'  U.  S.  Stat.  47  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  chapter  121. 
2  Senate  Report,  No.  76,  48  C,  i  S.,  Vol.  i,  1883-84. 
^  Senator  Morgan,  S.  Docs.,  No.  231  ;  pt.  8,  p.  233,  56  C,  2  S.,  1900-01. 
10 


146  The  Treaty  ivith  Hawaii  in  i8y6. 

hands  of  our  own  people,  and  did  not  leave  the  country. 
That  is  the  reason,  he  says,  while  we  pay  for  sugar  from 
Cuba  to  the  extent  of  more  than  $50,000,000  in  money,  that 
being  the  excess  of  our  imports  over  our  exports,  and  while 
we  send  money  in  the  same  proportion  to  all  other  sugar-pro- 
ducing countries,  we  do  not  have  to  ship  coin  to  Hawaii, 
although  there  is  an  apparent  annual  balance  against  us  of 
$4,000,000.  This  condition  is  illustrated  by  our  trade  with 
England,  where  the  reverse  is  true.  The  apparent  difference 
during  the  last  fiscal  year  between  the  values  of  our  exports 
and  imports  to  England  had  been  $195,000,000  in  our  favor. 
But  England  transported  eighty-five  per  cent,  of  our  com- 
merce, and  the  freights,  insurance  and  other  charges  which 
we  paid  to  her  people  reduced  the  actual  balance  of  trade  in 
our  favor  to  less  than  $100,000,000.^ 

As  to  the  loss  of  revenue,  all  our  exports  must  come  back 
to  us  in  some  form  or  other,  and  as  Hawaii  does  not  ship 
us  gold  or  silver  these  exports  must  come  to  us  in  the  form 
of  Hawaiian  produce,  which  is  free  of  duty.  There  is  here 
a  loss  of  revenue  under  the  treaty,  he  says,  because  otherwise 
our  exports  would  purchase  articles  which  would  yield  a 
revenue  to  the  government. 

An  objection  to  accepting  this  explanation  of  Senator 
Morgan's  as  being  altogether  satisfactory  is  this :  it  does 
not  take  into  account  the  fact  that  with  the  Hawaiian  trade 
not  only  is  the  balance  of  exports  and  imports  against  the 
United  States,  but  that  in  addition  to  this  adverse  balance, 
there  is  the  annual  loss  of  revenue  to  the  United  States 
government  on  these  imports,  which  is  more  than  equal  to 
the  entire  annual  exports. 

Senator  Sherman  not  being  able  to  agree  with  this  position 
taken  in  Senator  Morgan's  report,  brought  in  a  minority 
report.  The  view  of  the  minority  had  been  expressed 
previously  in  the  report  already  given,  submitted  by  Sena- 
tor Morrill   for  the  Committee  on  Finance,  February  27, 

'  Senator  Morgan,  Sec.  Docs.,  No.  231,  pt.  8,  p.  233;  5S  C,  2  S., 
1900-01. 


TJie  Treaty  ivith  Hazvaii  in  iS/6.  147 

1883.  This  report  is  embodied  entire  in  the  minority  report 
of  Senator  Sherman.  His  objection  was  the  one  already 
mentioned,  which  was  continually  being  urged  against  the 
treaty,  and  which  had  been  only  partly  met.  This  objection 
was  that  the  entire  amount  of  our  annual  exports  to  the 
Islands  was  less  than  the  amount  of  revenue  remitted  by  the 
treaty.  In  1883  this  revenue  would  have  been  about  $4,000,- 
000,  while  the  entire  value  of  exports  of  domestic  merchan- 
dise to  the  Hawaiian  Islands  in  that  year  was  $3,683,460. 
Senator  Sherman  reported  for  the  minority  that  the  loss  of 
revenue  entailed  by  the  treaty  seemed  far  greater  than  any 
benefit  derived  from  it,  and  he  favored  a  termination  of  the 
treaty  with  a  view  to  enter  into  such  commercial  relations 
with  the  Sandwich  Islands  as  would  be  more  nearly  recipro- 
cal than  the  provisions  of  the  existing  treaty. 

His  objection  can  be  met  in  only  one  way;  the  price  paid 
by  the  United  States  for  her  political  suzerainty  in  the 
Hawaiian  Islands  is  equal  to  the  financial  loss  sustained  by 
the  American  government  in  the  unequal  operation  of  the 
treaty,  and  if  the  price  thus  paid  seemed  excessive,  then  the 
United  States  should  demand  more  in  return  if  the  treaty 
was  to  be  continued. 

In  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  in 
the  House,  made  April  20,  1886,  we  find  an  exhaustive 
treatment  of  the  trade  conditions  from  1877  to  1885.  This 
report  is  unfavorable  to  the  treaty,  and  it  is  interesting 
because  it  indicates  quite  as  distinctly  as  was  shown  in 
1876,  that  the  commercial  side  of  the  treaty  was  a  poor 
bargain  which  would  have  to  be  made  up  to  the  United 
States  in  some  other  way.  The  report  shows  in  other  ways 
that  the  treaty  had  not  been  commercially  successful.  The 
Hawaiians  could  not  obtain  their  lumber  or  bread  stuffs, 
or  iron  and  steel,  or  cotton  and  woolen  goods  as  cheaply  in 
England  or  other  European  countries  as  they  could  here. 
It  argues,  therefore,  that  with  a  treaty  or  without,  they  must 
continue  to  import  these  articles  from  us  and  pay  for  them 
with  their  sugar,  rice,  wool  and  hides.  The  bounty  given 
by    our    government    out    of    the    public    treasury    to    the 


148  The  Treaty  ivith  Hazvaii  in  18 y 6. 

Hawaiian  planters  has  stimulated  very  greatly  the  growth 
of  population  and  wealth  in  the  Islands,  and  it  has  cor- 
respondingly enhanced  the  growth  of  our  export  trade. 
But  since  the  treaty  began,  the  government  has  remitted 
revenue  to  the  amount  of  more  than  $23,000,000^,  while 
during  the  same  period  our  exports  to  the  Islands  have 
amounted  to  little  over  $22,000,000.  It  would  seem  from 
this,  the  report  continues,  that  we  have  paid  rather  dearly  for 
our  bargain.-  In  reviewing  the  trade  conditions  of  the  seven 
years  of  the  treaty  to  be  sure,  there  are  no  new  arguments 
brought  against  the  treaty,  but  the  report  shows  in  an  inter- 
esting way  that  the  prophecies  of  those  who  opposed  the 
treaty  in  1876  have  been  to  a  large  degree  fulfilled. 

The  minority  report  of  this  committee^  add  their  testimony 
as  to  the  only  reason  why  the  treaty  should  be  kept  in  force. 
This  reason  is  the  political  reason.  They  are  not  pre- 
pared to  say  that  the  treaty  has  been  a  good  bargain  com- 
mercially, and  they  would  be  glad  to  see  it  modified,  but 
for  other  reasons  they  defend  it.  For  geographical  and 
international  reasons  which  are  conclusive  with  them  they 
are  convinced  that  the  treaty  should  not  be  abrogated. 
They  are  not  willing  to  surrender  any  advantage  that  may 
be  given  by  the  treaty  to  the  United  States  for  the  possi- 
ble future  control  of  those  Islands.  They  think  that  the 
peculiar  relations  which  the  United  States  necessarily  bears 
to  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  to  the  people  bordering  upon  it, 
'  Estimated  amounts  of  duty  remitted  under  the  treaty  : 

1877 1,064,225 

1878  1,029,854 

1S79 1,387,380 

1880 2,009,060 

1881  2,604,776 

i382  3,539.293 

1883 4,279,975 

1884  3,307,270 

1885 4,103,775 

'^  Mr.   Mills,  Ways  and   Means  Committee,  H.  Rep.,  No.  1759,  Vol. 
6,  p.  I,  49  C,  I  S.,  Apr.  20,  1886. 
•'*  No.  1759. 


The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  i}i  18/6.  149 

or  owning  colonies  in  it,  would  make  it  unwise  to  take 
any  step  there  which  might  weaken  our  position  or  possibly 
strengthen  that  of  any  other  government.  They  fear  that 
new  and  vexatious  complications  with  European  and  Asiatic 
nations  might  arise  if  the  question  of  the  relation  and  control 
of  these  Islands  be  reopened,  and  they  are  therefore  not 
willing  to  reopen  it.^ 

Senator  Morgan,  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Ways  and  Means,  submits  the  only  report  which  I  have 
found  that  gives  a  view  favorable  to  the  commercial  side 
of  the  treaty.  His  analysis  of  the  trade  conditions  is  very 
interesting,  and  would  be  convincing  could  we  believe  that 
it  was  anything  more  than  an  estimate  and  a  hope,  rather 
than  argument  backed  up  by  statistics.  This  weakness  has 
been  very  properly  pointed  out  in  a  recent  book  on  reciproc- 
ity by  Professors  Laughlin  and  Willis.-  The  tabular  state- 
ment given  in  his  report  is  reproduced  here  because  it 
represents  the  only  defense  which  the  commercial  results  due 
to  the  treaty  have  received  officially,  so  far  as  I  know. 

Values  delivered  by  the  United  States  to  the  Haivaiian 
Islands  for  nine  years,  1876- 1885. 

Invoice  value  of  U.  S.  exports  to  Hawaii $23,686,328 

Bills  of  exchange   to  pay  for  all    Hawaiian   imports   from 

third  countries 9,868,674 

Difference   between  coin   exported   to   and    received    from 

Hawaii 2,222,181 

Outstanding  liabilities  of  U.  S.  to  Hawaii  not  known 

Total  values  paid  by  the  United  States $35,777. 183 

To  balance  the  account  : 

Profits  already  realized  on  merchandise  account $18,414,766 

Cash    debts    payable  to  United    States    at    maturity  out  of 

future  shipments 6, 500,000 

Increased  values  of  productive  properties   in   the   islands 

owned  by  Americans 11,680,164 

$72,372,113 

^  Minority  Report,  H.  Rept.,  No.  1759,  p.  37,  Vol.  6,  49  C,  i  S.,  Apr. 
20,  1886. 
*  Reciprocity,  p.  93,  Laughlin  and  Willis. 


150  The  Treaty  ivith  Hmuaii  in  18 y6. 

Values  received  and  receivable  by  the  United  States  from 
Hawaiian  Islands  for  nine  years,  18/6  to  188 §. 

Invoice  value  of  Hawaiian  exports  to  U.  S $51,294,764 

Add  freight  and  insurance  to  obtain  value  in  United  States 

ports 2,897,185 

Value  of  merchandise  received $54,191,949 

Liabilities  of  the  Islands  to  the  United  States  for  advances 

on  crops 3,000,000 

Bonded  debts  payable  in  the  United  States  and  secured  on 

Island  property 2,500,000 

Haw^aiian  Government  bonds  paid  for  in  silver,  coined  on 

Hawaiian  account 1,000,000 

Total  liabilities  to  the  United  States $6,500,000 

Increased  value  of  plantation  properties  owned   by  United 

States  citizens  as  assessed  in  1883 10,180,164 

Value  of  other  produce  properties 1,500,000 

Total $11,680,164 

Merchandise  received 54,191,949 

Total  liabilities  to  United  States 8,500,000 

Total  values  received  and  receivable $72,372,113 

General  distribution  of  Profits. 
To  American  shipping : 

Freights  and  insurance  on  imports  from  the  Islands $2,897,185 

Freights  and  insurance  on  exports 5,127,964 

Passenger  receipts 1,325,000 

$9,350,149 

Commission  on  purchases  for  exports  to  the  Islands $    592,158 

Commission  on  sales  of  Island  produce 2,209,463 

$2,801,621 

Premium  on  exchange $    812,839 

Interest  on  loans  and  advances 2, 160,000 

Dividends  and  miscellaneous  profits 3,290,157 

$6,262,996 

Total  profits  already  realized $18,414,766 

Debts  receivable  held  chiefly  by  the  San  Francisco  banks.        6,500,000 
Increased  values  of  productive  properties  owned  by  Ameri- 
cans        11,235,464 

Total  gross  profits $36,650,230' 

'  S.  R.,  p.  105,  53  C,  I  S. 


The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  in  i8y6.  151 

Granting  that  the  estimates  given  in  Senator  Morgan's 
report  are  all  correct,  there  are  even  then  objections  to 
accepting  his  conclusion  that  the  treaty  has  been  a  great 
success  commercially. 

The  report  assumes  that  by  developing  the  property  of 
Americans  living  in  Hawaii  the  treaty  has  conferred  a 
national  benefit  on  the  United  States.  This  is  a  perfectly 
just  view  if  Hawaii  is  to  become  a  part  of  the  United 
States,  and  this  is  apparently  the  assumption,  but  as  resi- 
dents in  Hawaii  these  planters  have  ceased  to  be  American 
citizens,^  and  it  is  really  no  more  to  the  United  States  that 
their  properties  are  increased  in  value  than  that  those  of 
any  Hawaiian  planter  have  appreciated  in  the  same  way.  In 
estimating  the  loss  of  revenue  it  seems  to  me  the  report 
makes  the  probable  loss  too  small,  and  it  quite  overlooks 
the  fact  that,  as  the  population  of  the  Pacific  coast  had  nearly 
doubled  since  the  treaty  went  into  operation,  the  demand 
for  sugar  would  have  been  at  least  twice  as  great  as  it 
was  in  1876  without  any  treaty  whatever. - 

If  a  large  part  of  the  profits  made  on  sugar  by  keeping 
the  price  up  to  where  it  was  before  the  treaty  went  into 
effect,  instead  of  going  into  the  pockets  of  the  planter  was 
diverted  to  build  up  $20,000,000  worth  of  American  shipping 
interest,  then  the  money  formerly  paid  into  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States  as  duty  on  sugar  is  now  paid  in  part  as  a 
bonus  to  increase  the  sugar  output  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 

^  Mr.  Webster  to  Mr.  Severance,  July  14,  1851,  Vol.  27,  p.  343. 
"  You  inform  us  that  many  American  citizens  have  gone  to  settle  in 
the  Islands,  if  so  they  have  ceased  to  be  American  citizens.  The 
government  of  the  U.  S.  must,  of  course,  feel  an  interest  in  them  not 
extended  to  foreigners,  but  by  the  law  of  nations  they  have  no  right 
further  to  demand  the  protection  of  this  government." 
-'  Population  in  Census. 

1870  iSSo 

Of  California 560,247  8(14,694 

Oregon 90,923  174,768 

Washington  Territory  .. .  23,955  75, 116 

675,125  1,114,578 


152  TJie  Treaty  with  Hawaii  in  18/6. 

and  in  part  as  a  subsidy  to  shipbuilding  on  the  Pacific  coast 
that  the  Hawaiian  sugar  and  rice  growers  may  better  secure 
that  bonus.  Had  there  not  been  the  poHtical  return  to  the 
United  States  for  the  treaty  privileges  to  Hawaii,  that  sub- 
sidy had  been  better  granted  outright  to  the  shipbuilders 
without  the  additional  bonus  to  the  sugar  industry.  For, 
however  we  figure  the  results,  it  must  be  evident  that  we 
were  paying  a  very  large  price  for  the  privilege  of  keeping 
other  nations  out  of  Hawaii. 

Yet  the  political  returns  that  the  United  States  was  get- 
ting from  the  treaty  had  been  quite  satisfactory  since  the 
treaty  began.  The  treaty  had  secured  to  the  United  States 
a  supremacy  as  unquestioned  as  if  an  actual  protectorate  had 
been  declared.  Yet  it  was  thought,  in  view  of  the  great 
benefits  that  Hawaii  would  receive  by  having  the  time  of  the 
treaty  extended,  that  a  further  concession  of  a  coaling  sta- 
tion as  a  naval  base  would  be  a  fair  equivalent  to  the  United 
States  if  the  treaty  should  be  continued. 

Convinced  that  the  existing  treaty  was  not  conferring 
reciprocal  advantages,  the  Senate  was  undecided  whether 
it  was  wiser  to  prolong  the  old  treaty  with  some  changes, 
or  to  abrogate  it  altogether,  and  to  negotiate  a  new  one  that 
would  be  more  satisfactory.  The  matter  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  and  although  the 
debates  on  their  report  are  not  accessible,  we  have  a  com- 
munication from  Mr.  Freylinghuysen,  Secretary  of  State, 
sent  to  Mr.  Miller,  Chairman  of  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Aflfairs.  This  communication  indicates  not  only  the 
considerations  which  had  weight  with  the  State  Department, 
but  at  the  same  time  indicates  the  questions  that  had  arisen 
in  the  Senate  as  to  what  changes  were  advisable.^ 

'  Communication  frotn  the  Secretary  of  State  to  Chairman  of  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  relative  to  the  proposed  extension  of  the  existitig 
Harvaiian  Reciprocity  Treaty. 

"Sir:—     .     .     .'  . 

Your  principal  points  of  inquiry  were  : — 

(i)  Whether  the  schedule  of  articles  of  the  production  of  the 
United  States  admitted  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands  free  of  duty  may  not 
be  enlarged,  and  if  so,  what  productions  should  be  added  thereto. 


The  Treaty  zdth  Hazvaii  in  i8y6.  153 

And  it  is  further  interesting  because  it  indicated  a  line  of 
action  which  was  later  followed  by  the  Senate.  This  was  to 
make  the  concession  of  a  coaling  station  in  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  to  the  United  States  the  condition  upon  which  the 
treaty  would  be  prolonged. 

On  June  19,  1884,  Mr.  Miller  of  California,  Chairman  of 
the  Committee  to  which  had  been  referred  the  proposal  of 
the  King  of  Hawaii  for  the  extension  of  the  duration  of 
the  treaty,  reported  a  resolution,  that  the  proposition  to 
extend  the  treaty  for  seven  years  be  acceded  to  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States,  and  that  it  was  advisable  that  the  Presi- 
dent secure  by  negotiation  with  the  government  of  Hawaii 
the  privilege  of  establishing  permanently  a  proper  naval 
station  for  the  United  States  in  the  vicinity  of  Honolulu,  and 
also  a  revision  and  farther  extension  of  the  schedule  of 
articles  to  be  admitted  free  of  duty  from  the  United  States 
into  the  Hawaiian  kingdom.^  After  some  amendments  by 
the  Senate  the  extension  of  the  schedule  was  dropped  out, 

(2)  Whether  a  supplementary  provision  by  an  additional  article  or 
separate  convention  for  the  establishment  by  the  United  States  of  a 
convenient  coaling  station  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  would  not  be 
expedient. 

As  to  your  first  point,  the  schedule  found  in  Article  2  of  the  existing 
treaty  is  so  full  and  general  as  to  leave  few  standard  exports  of  the 
United  States  unprovided  for.  ...  To  introduce  changes  in  the 
text  of  the  present  treaty  as  a  condition  of  its  extension  would  be  in 
fact  to  negotiate  a  new  treaty,  which  might  call  forth  opposition  both 
here  and  in  Honolulu  and  so  imperil  the  interests  concerned  more 
than  if  the  question  were  confined,  as  now,  to  the  mere  assignment  of 
a  fresh  term  of  years  for  the  existing  convention. 

As  to  the  second  point  I  am  disposed  to  favor  an  arrangement  for 
establishing  a  coal  station  or  even  a  naval  and  repair  station  under  the 
flag  of  the  government  at  some  suitable  harbor  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 
*  *  *  * 

The  accomplishment  of  both  these  measures — the  revision  of  the 
free  list  and  the  establishment  of  a  station  could  by  the  President,  as 
he  saw  best,  be  made  the  condition  of  acceding  to  the  Hawaiian  pro- 
posal to  extend  the  treaty  seven  years. 

F.  T.  Freylinghuysen." 
■  Sen.  Docs.,  No.  231,  p.  242,  Vol.  8,  56  C,  2  8. 


154  The  Treaty  with  Hazvaii  in  18/6. 

and  the  final  arrangement  with  the  Hawaiian  government 
was  concluded  December  6,  1884.  Its  ratification  was  advised 
by  the  Senate  January  20,  1887,  and  was  proclaimed  Novem- 
ber 9,  1887.^  Under  this  form,  unaffected  by  the  political 
changes  that  took  place  in  the  Islands,  the  treaty  continued 
in  operation  until  April  30,  1900. 

It  will  be  easiest  to  sum  up  the  results  of  the  treaty  from 
1876  to  1900  by  considering  the  accompanying  diagram. 
The  entire  importations  to  the  United  States  from  Hawaii 
are  represented  by  the  upper  solid  line ;  the  importations  of 
free  sugar  to  the  United  States  from  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
by  the  dotted  line ;  the  total  importations  into  Hawaii  from 
all  countries,  including  the  United  States  by  the  broken  line 
and  the  exports  from  the  United  States  to  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  by  the  lower  solid  line.^ 

The  diagram  requires  little  explanation.  Before  the 
treaty  went  into  effect,  from  1871  to  1876,  the  trade  is 
insignificant  in  amount,  and  the  imports  and  exports  remain 
relatively  the  same  for  those  years.  After  the  treaty  was 
put  into  operation,  from  1876  to  1879,  there  is  a  marked 
increase  in  both  exports  and  imports.  The  exports  to 
Hawaii  rose  from  $700,000  in  1876,  to  $2,200,000  in  1879, 
and  the  imports  from  Hawaii  in  the  same  time  rose  from 
$1,400,000  to  $3,200,000.  In  three  years  the  exports  had 
more  than  trebled ;  the  imports  had  more  than  doubled.  It 
will  be  seen  that  sugar  makes  up  nearly  the  entire  amount 
of  imports  from  Hawaii  for  the  whole  period  of  the  treaty. 
The  rest  is  made  up  of  rice  and  molasses.  The  introduc- 
tion of  the  vacuum  pan  and  the  centrifugal  machine  into 
the  manufacture  of  sugar  helped  to  destroy  any  proportion 
that  may  have  existed  up  to  that  time  between  the  exports 
and  the  imports.  For  in  1883,  the  imports  from  Hawaii 
are  $8,200,000,  and  the  exports  to  Hawaii  are  $3,600,000 ; 

'  Statute  at  large,  Vol.  25,  p.  1399.     See  Appendix  D. 

^  This  diagram  is  made  up  from  the  figures  given  in  Commerce  and 
Navigation,  for  the  respective  years,  from  H.  Rept.,  No.  1759,  Vol.  6, 
49  C,  I  S.,  and  from  the  Statesman's  Year  Book,  1876-1900. 


The  Treaty  zcith  Hawaii  in  iSy6.  155 

of  the  entire  trade  the  exports  are  thirty  per  cent.  In  1889, 
the  imports  have  increased  to  $12,800,000,  while  the  exports 
have  fallen  to  $3,300,000 ;  of  the  entire  trade,  the  exports 
are  now  twenty  per  cent.  In  1891  the  imports  are  $13,800,- 
000,  the  exports  are  $5,100,000;  exports  twenty-nine  per 
cent,  of  the  whole  trade. 

The  next  year,  1892,  the  imports  have  fallen  to  $8,000,- 
000 ;  a  decline  of  $5,800,000  in  one  year. 

This  great  decrease  was  due  to  the  operation  of  the 
McKinley  Tariff  Act  of  October  i,  1890,  which  went  into 
effect  in  1891.^  By  this  act  the  duty  on  all  sugars  above 
number  16  Dutch  standard  in  color,  was  reduced  to  one-half 
cent  per  pound,  and  all  sugars  not  above  number  16  Dutch 
standard,  after  April  i,  1891,  were  to  be  free  of  duty.  This, 
of  course,  admitted  free  of  duty  all  sugars  of  the  grade 
of  Hawaiian  sugars  which  were  free  by  the  treaty,  and 
as  it  enabled  sugar  from  all  parts  of  the  world  to  com- 
pete in  our  markets  with  Hawaiian  sugar,  there  resulted 
this  marked  falling  off  in  United  States  imports  from 
Hawaii.  A  reference  to  the  sugar  trade  of  Cuba  with 
the  United  States  from  1891  to  1896,-  shows  in  a  striking 
manner  the  result  of  the  Act  of  1890  on  sugar  importations 
from  countries  other  than  Hawaii.  The  importations  to  the 
United  States  of  Cuban  sugar  free  under  this  act  was  in 
round  numbers,  in  1891,  $21,000,000  in  value;  in  1892  it 
rose  to  $60,000,000,  an  enormous  increase  of  nearly  $40,000,- 
000  in  one  year.  In  1894,  the  free  sugar  importation 
reached  $63,000,000.  In  1895,  following  the  termination  of 
the  McKinley  Act,  the  same  imports  had  dropped  to  $15,- 
000,000,  a  decline  of  nearly  $48,000,000  in  one  year.  This 
amount  of  sugar  would  not  have  entered  the  United  States 
as  dutiable  sugar  because  the  total  imports  from  Cuba  do 
not  show  this  change  after  the  act  of  1890  had  ceased  to  be 
operate,  the  year  1896  showing  a  total  importation  of  Cuban 
sugar,  $24,000,000. 

'  U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large,  Vol.  26,  51  Con.,  i  S.,  ch.  1244,  p.  612. 
^  Commerce  and  Navigation,  1899,  Vol.  2,  p.  1113. 


156  The  Treaty  zvith  Haivaii  in  18/6. 

The  repeal  of  this  act  is  at  once  apparent  in  its  effect 
upon  the  importations  to  the  United  States  of  Hawaiian 
free  sugar.  Its  provisions  ceased  August  27,  1894,  when 
the  Wilson  Tariff  Act  was  passed.  Freed  now  from  com- 
petition, the  imports  of  sugar  from  Hawaii  at  once  rose 
from  1895  to  1897  from  $7,800,000  to  $13,600,000,  or  very 
nearly  to  where  they  were  in  1891.  The  exports,  lower 
solid  line,  reflect  to  a  certain  degree  the  fluctuations  of  the 
imports.  In  1891,  they  were  $5,100,000;  in  1893,  $2,800,- 
000  and  in  1897,  $4,600,000. 

The  annexation  of  the  Islands  in  1898  makes  it  neces- 
sary to  disregard  the  years  1898- 1900  in  our  consideration  of 
the  effects  of  the  treaty  on  trade,  but  it  is  interesting  to 
notice  on  the  diagram  what  a  great  stimulus  that  event 
gave  to  both  the  exports  and  the  imports. 

The  total  importations  into  Hawaii  from  all  countries, 
including  the  United  States  (indicated  on  the  diagram  by 
the  broken  line),  when  compared  with  the  line  showing  the 
importations  into  Hawaii  from  the  United  States  (lower 
solid  line),  indicates  that  while  Hawaii  sent  practically  all 
her  products  to  the  United  States,  she  took  at  least  a  third  of 
her  supplies  from  countries  other  than  the  United  States. 

Thus  it  is  evident  that  there  has  never  been  anything  like 
an  equal  exchange  of  commodities  under  the  treaty.  Com- 
mercially it  was  a  failure. 

The  treaty  gave  us,  however,  for  more  than  twenty  years, 
undisturbed  political  control  in  the  Islands,  and  the  recipro- 
cal relations  established  by  the  treaty  were  by  far  the  larg- 
est factor  in  bringing  about  our  ultimate  possession  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands  in  1898.  Diplomatically,  therefore,  it 
may  be  said  to  have  been  successful,  for  it  created  and 
maintained  for  twenty-two  years  the  political  status  which  it 
was  designed  to  bring  about. 


Bibliography  of  the  Hawaiian  Reciprocity  Treaty 


A  List  of  References  oti  Reciprocity.  Books,  articles  in  Periodicals,  Con- 
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C.  Griffin,  Chief  of  Division  of  Bibliography.  Government  Print- 
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Reciprocity  Treaties  and  Agreements  between  the  United  States  and  For- 
eign Cottntries  since  1850.  O.  P.  Austin,  Chief  of  Bureau.  Treas- 
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Finance  and  Commerce,  Sept.,  igoi.) 

Monthly  Summary  of  Cojnmerce  and  Finajtce,  for  September,  igor, 
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1867.  Senate  Executive  Documents,  3gth  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  No.  20,  pp.  5. 
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procity with  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  Feb.  4,  1867. 

Senate  Documents,  No.  231,  Vol.  8,  part  8,  pp.  145-160,  56th  Cong.,  2d 
Sess.,  igoo-igoi.  Report  by  Mr.  Sumner,  from  the  Committee  on 
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vols,  (mostl)'  concerning  H.  of  R.  No.  612),  p.  300,  44g,  1268, 
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1876.  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  44th  Cong.,  1876-77.  House 
Resolution  No.  612,  Vol.  ig,  p.  200,  625,  666-7. 

1877.  Commercial  Relations,  1877,  P-  622.  Consular  Report  on  opera- 
tion of  treaty. 

1878.  Executive  Documents,  45th  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  i87S-7g,  Vol.  i.  No. 
249.  Diplomatic  correspondence  with  reference  to  English  claim 
on  Hawaii  under  most  favored  nation  clause. 

1883.      Congressional  Record,  47th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  Vol.  13. 

Hotise  Reports,  No.  i860,  47th  Cong.,   2d  Sess.,  Vol.  i,  1882-3.     Mr. 

Kasson.  Committee  Foreign  Affairs,  Jan.  16,  1883,  to  accompany 

H.  R.  No.  318.     (Sugar  Frauds.) 
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Morrill's  report  from  Committee  on  Finance,  Feb.  27,  1883. 


158  The  Treaty  zvith  Hazvaii  in  i8y6. 

House  Miscellaneous  Documents,  47th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  Vol.  4,  1882-83, 
pp.  550-562.  Hawaiian  Tariff,  1878,  Consular  Report. 
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1884. 
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tions, to  accompany  Senate  Resolution  No.  27. 

1886.  Senate  Miscellaneous  Documents,  Vol.  9,  49th  Cong.,  ist  Sess. 
Wharton's  Digest,  Vol.  I,  pp.  417-436,  contains  abstracts  of  State 
papers  indicating  the  attitude  of  the  U.  S.  Government  toward 
Hawaii. 

House  Reports,  No.  1759,  49th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  Vol.  6,  1885-6.  Mr. 
Mills,  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means,  April  20,  1886.  (Unfavor- 
able to  treaty.) 

Senate  Reports,  No.  227,  53d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  Vol.  2,  1893-4,  entire 
volume  Hawaiian  Islands.  (Senator  Morgan's  review  of  the  treaty 
with  table.) 

1887.  House  Executive  Documents,  49th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  Vol.  23, 
1886-87,  No.  130.  Message  from  the  President  and  Resolution 
of  House  questioning  the  constitutionality  of  treaty  without  law 
of  Congress.     Referred  to  Judiciary.     Mr.  Tucker. 

1888.  Senate  Miscella?ieozis  Documeiits,  No.  64,  50th  Cong.,  ist  Sess., 
Vol.  I,  1887-88.     Feb.  24,  1888. 

Senate  Miscellaneous  Documents,  No.  64,  50th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  Vol. 
I,  1887-8.  Official  correspondence  concerning  amendment  to 
treaty  of  1876. 

1889.  House  Miscellatteous  Documents,  p.  208,  51st  Cong.,  ist  Sess., 
Vol.  39,  1889-90.  Commerce  and  Industry  of  Hawaiian  Islands. 
Consul  Severance's  report  (not  valuable). 

1892.  Senate  Executive  Doctiments,  No.  119,  52d  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  Vol. 
6,  1891-92.  Commercial  agreements  with  other  sugar-growing 
countries. 

Senate  Executive  Doctiments,  52d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1892-93,  Vol.  8, 
No.  77,  pp.  1-192.  A.  H.  Allen's  Report,  with  bibliography  and 
early  diplomatic  correspondence.     (Valuable.) 

1893.  House  Executive  Documents,  No.  48,  53d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  Vol. 
27,  1893-94. 

House  Executive  Documents  (same  as  No.  77),    53d  Cong.,  2d  Sess., 
Vol.  27,  1893-1894,  Bibliog.  pp.  271-75.     Entire  volume  Hawaiian 
Islands,  full  diplomatic  correspondence  and  treaties. 
A    Voyage  of  Discovery  to  the  North  Pacific  Ocean  and  Around  the  World. 
Captain  George  Vancouver.     3  vols.     London,  1798.     Vol.  III. 


The  Treaty  zuitli  Hazvaii  in  18/6.  159 

A  General  History  and  Collection  of  Voyages  and  Travels.  Discovery  by 
Land  and  Sea,  from  Earliest  Times  to  the  Present  fiSijJ.  By  Robt. 
Kerr  and  F.  A.  S.  Edin.  Edinburgh,  1815.  16  vols.  Vol.  XVI 
sec.  xi  and  xii  (Capt.  Cook's  diary). 

Polynesian  Researches  during  a  Residence  of  nearly  eight  years  in  the 
Society  'and  Sandwich  Islattds.  William  Ellis.  4  vols.  London, 
1831.     Vol.  IV  (valuable). 

History  of  the  Sandrvich  Islands  {very  valuable).  James  Jackson  Jarves. 
Boston,  1843. 

A  Residence  of  Twenty-one  Years  in  the  Sandwich  Islands,  pp.  616. 
Hiram  Bingham.  Hartford,  i  vol.,  1847.  (Valuable,  giving  the 
missionary  point  of  view.) 

Hawaii,  The  Past,  Present  and  Future  of  its  Island  Kingdotn.  By 
Manley  Hopkins,  Hawaiian  Consul-general.  London,  1866.  (Val- 
uable.) 

Northern  California,  Oregon,  and  the  Sandwich  Islands.  Charles  Nord- 
hoft".     Harpers,  1874.     i  vol. 

A  Brief  History  of  the  Hawaiian  People.  By  W.  D.  Alexander  (best 
short  history).     American  Book  Co.,  1891. 

Die  Sandwich  Iseln  von  Graf  Reinhold  Anrep-Elmpt.     Leipzig,  1885. 

The  making  of  Hawaii,  a  Study  in  Social  Evolution.  By  W.  S.  Black- 
man.     Macmillan,  New  York,  1899. 

Papers  of  the  Hawaiian  Historical  Society.  Especially  No.  9.  The 
Uncompleted  Treaty  of  Annexation  of  1854.     W.  D.  Alexander. 

Hawaiian  Almanac  and  Year  Book,  1875— 1882. 

Reciprocity.  By  J.  Laurence  Laughlin,  Ph.D.,  and  H.  Parker  Willis, 
Ph.D.     The  Baker  &  Taylor  Co.,  New  York,  1903. 

A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy  ;  being  a  brief  review  of  the  Foreign 
Relations  of  the  United  States,  iT]b-iig6.  J.  W.  Foster.  Houghton, 
Mifflin  &  Co.     XIII  pp.  497  pp. 

A  History  of  United  States  Influence  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  By 
Edmund  Jones  Carpenter  (popular).     Boston,  1899. 

Picturesque  Hawaii.  Hon.  J.  L.  Stevens,  Ex-U.  S.  Minister,  and  W. 
B.  Alison,  15  years  President  of  Kahemahema  College.  Phila. 
1894.  (A  good  historical"  narrative  without  citing  many  author- 
ities.) 

Bound  volume  of  Hawaiian  Pamphlets  in  Yale  Library,  a)  A  Hand- 
book on  the  Annexation  of  Hawaii.  Lorin  A.  Thurston,  pp.  1-77. 
b)  Hawaiian  Annexation  Scheme  ;  a  sugar  trust  plot  exposed  by 
General  Schofield. 

A  Voyage  Round  the  World.  Chapter  XLII.  (Sketches  in  the  Sand- 
wich Islands,  1836.)  W.  S.  W.  Ruschenberger,  M.D.  Phila., 
1838.     (Not  valuable.) 


i6o  The  Treaty  zvith  Hawaii  in  i8y6. 

Incidents  of  a   Whaling  Voyage,  Manners,  Customs,  etc.,  of  the  Sandwich 

and  Society   Islands.      Chaps.    XV-XX.     F.    A.    Omstead.      New 

York,  1841.     (Not  valuable.) 
Life  in  the  Sandwich  Islands.     Rev.  H.  T.  Cheever.     New  York,  185 1. 

Very  religious  in  part ;  from  missionary  point  of  view. 
The  Past  and  Present  of  the  Sandwich  Islands.     A  series  of  lectures. 

Rev.  T.  D.   Hunt.     San  Francisco,   1853.     (Four  years  residence. 

Rhetorical.) 
The  Sandwich  Islands.   By  Alexander  Simpson,  Esq.,  late  acting  Consul 

for  Great  Britain.     London,  1843.     Smith,  Elder  &  Co. 


PART    III 

THE  TREATY-MAKING  POWER  OF  THE 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 


Part  III 

The  Treaty-Making  Power  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives/ 

There  is  a  very  interesting  as  well  as  a  very  old  consti- 
tutional question  attaching  to  the  action  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  on  the  Cuban  reciprocity  treaty,  when  that 
treaty  shall  come  up  for  consideration  at  the  next  session  of 
Congress.^ 

This  question  is :  Has  the  House  of  Representatives  the 
right  to  withhold  its  consent  to  a  bill  for  putting  a  treaty 
into  effect,  and  thereby  to  defeat  it?  Or,  in  another  form. 
What  is  the  nature  of  the  obligation  which  rests  on  the 
House  of  Representatives  to  give  validity  to  a  treaty  which 
has  been  formally  entered  into  with  a  foreign  nation  by  the 
President,  and  properly  ratified  by  the  Senate  ? 

The  question  is  one  that  has  come  up  in  connection  with 
every  important  treaty  that  the  United  States  has  negotiated. 
Not  alone  in  connection  with  commercial  treaties,  but  when- 
ever a  treaty  provides  for  the  payment  of  money  there  has 
arisen  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  how  far  the  action  of  the 
Senate  and  the  President  engages  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives to  pass  laws,  or  to  make  appropriations. 

The  reciprocity  treaty  with  Cuba,  which  has  been  passed 
by  the  Senate,  has  already  been  ratified  by  both  governments, 
but  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  Congress  will  pass  a  law  at 
its  next  session  to  put  this  treaty  into  operation,  or  whether  it 
will  remain  a  dead  letter  like  a  similar  reciprocity  treaty  with 
Mexico,  in  1883,  which  had  reached  the  same  point  only  to 
fail  because  the  House  of  Representatives  refused  to  pass  a 
law  to  carry  its  provisions  into  effect.  This  refusal  of  the 
House,  in  the  case  of  the  Mexican  treaty,  to  execute  a  treaty 
signed  by  the  President  and  ratified  by  the  Senate,  is  I 
^  (Reprinted  from  The  Yale  Revieiv,  August,  1903.) 


164         The   Treaty-Making  Power  of  the  House. 

believe,  unique  in  our  diplomatic  history.  By  refusing  to 
sanction  the  Mexican  treaty  the  House  exercised  what  it 
held  to  be  its  prerogative  in  matters  relating  to  the  revenues. 
It  claimed  the  right  to  review  the  action  of  the  Senate  and, 
if  that  action  was  not  satisfactory,  to  refuse  to  pass  a  law 
necessary  to  give  it  vitality.  The  House  had  asserted  since 
Washington's  time  its  right  to  defeat  a  treaty  in  this  way, 
but  up  to  this  time  the  right  had  never  been  exercised. 

Since  the  Mexican  treaty  there  has  been  no  opportunity  to 
bring  up  this  issue  in  connection  with  reciprocity  treaties,  for 
the  intervening  treaties  have  been  provided  for  in  advance  by 
tariff  legislation,  but  we  may  expect  to  have  the  question 
debated  again  upon  the  bill  that  will  be  necessary  to  carry 
the  Cuban  treaty  into  effect. 

As  the  question  has  been  so  thoroughly  threshed  over 
during  more  than  a  hundred  years  of  debates,  it  is  not 
probable  that  the  Cuban  treaty  will  produce  any  new  consti- 
tutional arguments.  It  may  be  interesting,  however,  to 
review  the  history  of  this  question,  and  the  arguments  that 
have  been  arrayed  in  the  past  on  opposite  sides. 

The  position  of  the  two  sides  has  been  this.  On  the  one 
hand  it  was  held  that  a  treaty  made  by  the  President  and 
the  Senate  as  the  Constitution  provides,  became  at  once  a 
supreme  law,  as  obligatory  on  Congress  as  it  was  on  the 
courts,  and  it  was  the  duty,  therefore,  of  Congress  to  pass 
laws  which  were  necessary  to  execute  it ;  that,  as  the  House  of 
Representatives  could  not  alter  the  treaty  in  the  least  particu- 
lar, nothing  that  they  could  do  would  give  it  greater  validity 
as  a  compact  binding  on  the  honor  of  the  nation.  It  was 
further  maintained  that  "a  treaty  when  made  by  the  Presi- 
dent with  the  concurrence  of  two-thirds  of  the  Senators  pres- 
ent, and  duly  ratified  and  proclaimed,  became  eo  instanti  the 
supreme  law  of  the  land ;  supreme  alike  over  the  several 
States  of  the  Union  and  over  each  other,  and  all  of  the 
coordinate  departments  of  the  government ;  that,  as  between 
the  parties  to  the  compact  it  operated  proprio  vigor e,  as  a 
repeal  of  existing  laws  in  conflict  with,  or  repugnant  to,  its 


The   Treaty-Making  Poiver  of  the  House.  165 

stipulations ;  that,  so  far  as  the  contracting"  powers  were  con- 
cerned, it  required  no  legislative  aid  to  impart  vitality  to  its 
provisions ;  that  the  sole  object  of  congressional  legislation 
in  aid  of  a  treaty  was  to  confer  authority  upon  the  domestic 
officers  charged  with  the  execution  of  the  laws  with  which 
it  conflicts  in  order  to  give  effect  to  its  provisions,  and  that 
when  Congress  engaged  in  such  legislation,  it  did  so  under  a 
moral  obligation  which  divested  it  of  all  legislative  discretion, 
and  admitted  of  no  escape  from  the  performance  of  an  im- 
perative and  paramount  constitutional  duty."  These  were 
the  words  of  the  Hon.  P.  F.  Thomas  of  Maryland,  May 
8,  1876,  in  the  debate  in  Congress  on  the  Hawaiian  Treaty 
of  1876,  and  he  sums  up  very  satisfactorily  the  arguments 
of  the  extreme  position  of  the  Senate  party. 

Opposed  to  this,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  held  that,  if  any 
legislation  were  required  upon  subjects  over  which  the  Con- 
stitution gave  to  Congress  exclusive  jurisdiction,  the  House 
would  have  the  same  right  to  withhold  assent  in  the  case  of  a 
treaty  as  with  any  other  subject  of  legislation.  And  it  would 
have  the  right  to  demand  of  the  President  all  papers  relating 
to  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty  so  referred  to  it,  that  it  might 
intelligently  judge  whether  the  treaty  made  it  expedient  to 
appropriate  money,  or  to  pass  a  law  giving  the  treaty  force. 

It  will  be  seen  that  these  two  positions  involve  a  constitu- 
tional dilemma.  For,  if  a  treaty  made  by  the  President  and 
the  Senate,  as  the  Constitution  provides,  requires  the  action 
of  the  House  of  Representatives  to  complete  it,  so  as  to  make 
it  valid,  then  the  treaty-making  power  is  not  absolute  with 
the  President  and  the  Senate,  but  is  shared  in  by  the  House. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  treaty  dealing  with  the  revenues 
may  constrain  in  advance  the  consent  of  the  House,  then  bills 
of  revenue  may  originate  elsewhere  than  in  the  House  of 
Representatives. 

The  lack  of  specific  provision  in  our  Constitution  for  such 
conflict  of  powers  is  undoubtedly  a  defect,  yet  in  the  Consti- 
tution, as  in  any  instrument  of  the  kind,  where  there  is  a  con- 
flict in  its  terms,  the  interpretation  of  those  terms  must  be 


1 66         The  Treaty-Making  Pozver  of  the  House. 

such  as  to  be  consistent  with  the  evident  intent  and  meaning 
of  the  whole,  and  no  one  will  deny  that,  based  as  our  Consti- 
tution is  on  English  procedure,  it  was  the  intent  of  the 
framers  of  our  Government  that  the  control  of  the  revenues 
should  remain  absolute  in  the  hands  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. In  analogous  cases  in  England  a  treaty  involv- 
ing the  revenues  requires  a  law  of  Parliament  to  make  it 
effective,  and  the  treaty  is  inoperative  until  such  law  is 
passed.  As  Anson  says  in  his  Law  and  Custom  of  the  Con- 
stitution, part  2,  p.  97,  "No  one  but  the  Crown  can  bind  the 
Community  by  treaty,  but  can  the  Crown  invariably  do  so 
without  the  cooperation  of  Parliament  ?  This  much  appears 
to  be  certain,  that  where  a  treaty  involves  either  a  charge  on 
the  people,  or  a  change  in  the  law  of  the  land,  it  may  be 
made,  but  cannot  be  carried  into  effect  without  the  sanction 
of  Parliament.  Such  treaties  are  therefore  made  subject  to 
the  approval  of  Parliament  and  are  submitted  for  its  approval 
before  ratification,  or  ratified  under  condition." 

By  thus  submitting  the  treaty  to  Parliament  before  ratifi- 
cation, a  serious  difficulty  is  avoided,  and  the  British  govern- 
ment never  finds  itself  committed  to  a  treaty  which  Parlia- 
ment is  afterward  found  to  be  unwilling  to  sanction.  Our 
own  government,  in  default  of  such  arrangement,  has  some 
times  been  placed  in  the  embarrassing  predicament  of  having 
ratified  and  proclaimed  a  treaty  only  to  find  it  jeopardized 
by  subsequent  opposition  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 
Yet  as  the  treaty-making  power  is  not  vested  in  the  President 
alone,  and  as  it  is  shared  in  by  the  Senate,  all  the  check  on 
his  action  that  is  necessary  is  thus  provided  for,  and,  for 
reasons  of  secrecy  and  safety,  it  would  be  practically  impos- 
sible with  so  many  conflicting  interests  ever  to  negotiate 
satisfactory  treaties,  which  involved  the  revenues,  if  they 
should  be  first  submitted  to  Congress.  More  than  this,  it  is 
the  President  and  the  Senate  which  represent  the  States  as  a 
nation  to  the  world  and  not  the  House  of  Representatives, 

As  to  the  power  of  the  House  of  Representatives  to  refuse 
to  vote  money  or  changes  in  the  revenue  laws,  there  can,  of 


The  Treaty-Making  Power  of  the  House.         167 

course,  be  no  doubt.  The  question  is  largely  one  of  moral 
obligation  in  preserving  the  honor  and  good  faith  of  the 
nation  when  it  has  been  pledged  by  the  properly  constituted 
treaty-making  power  of  the  government. 

In  France  conditions  are  somewhat  like  our  own.  "Trea- 
ties of  peace,  commercial  treaties,  as  well  as  all  treaties  which 
pledge  the  national  finance,  or  affect  the  persons  or  property 
of  French  citizens,  are  not  valid  until  after  they  have  received 
the  assent  of  both  chambers,  and  a  session,  an  exchange  or 
an  increase  in  the  national  territory  becomes  effective  only  in 
pursuance  of  a  law  to  that  effect."  (Lebon,  "Das  Staatsrecht 
der  fransosischen  Repiihlik,"  p.  46.)  "He  (the  President) 
concludes  and  ratifies  national  treaties  and  gives  the  cham- 
bers information  of  them  as  soon  as  the  interest  and  security 
of  the  State  permits"  (p.  71).  It  is  plain  that  in  France,  as 
in  our  country,  the  Executive  may  pledge  the  nation  to  a 
treaty  which  the  Senate  and  Chamber  of  Deputies  may  after- 
wards fail  to  endorse  by  proper  legislation,  and  the  nation 
offended  in  the  repudiation  of  a  treaty  already  ratified  by  the 
Executive  could  have  recourse  to  war  in  an  extreme  case  as 
a  remedy  for  what  it  might  consider  broken  faith. 

This  question,  however,  must  not  be  understood  to  deny 
the  power  of  Congress  to  annul  by  law  the  provisions  of  any 
prior  treaty.  There  are  so  many  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  that  Congress  has  this  power,  that  it  is  not  open  to 
question.  The  matter  under  discussion  here  is  not  con- 
cerned with  a  prerogative  of  Congress  as  a  whole,  but  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  alone,  when  in  opposition  to  the 
constituted  treaty-making  branch  of  government. 

There  have  been  many  occasions  on  which  this  question 
has  been  raised  as  to  the  treaty-making  power  of  the  House, 
but  treaties  of  the  most  importance  have  best  illustrated  the 
claims  of  each  side. 

Jay's  treaty  in  1796  was  so  unpopular  that  he  was  hanged 
in  effigy  in  his  own  State,  and  the  greatest  pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  upon  Congress  to  defeat  the  treaty  by  refus- 
ing the  necessary  legislation.     President  Washington  had 


1 68         The  Treaty-Making  Power  of  the  House. 

been  asked  by  the  House  to  submit  the  papers  concerning  the 
treaty  that  the  House  might  determine  its  merits.  He  refused 
to  do  this  on  the  ground  that  the  treaty-making  power  was 
vested  solely  in  the  President  and  the  Senate,  and  that  when 
a  treaty  was  made  it  became  the  law  of  the  land.  The  House 
of  Representatives  finally  passed  the  law,  but  stated  in  a 
resolution  that  in  all  such  cases  it  was  their  right  and  duty 
to  deliberate  on  the  expediency  or  inexpediency  of  carrying 
such  treaty  into  effect,  and  to  determine  and  to  act  thereon  as 
in  their  judgment  might  be  most  conducive  to  the  public 
good.  This  has  been  the  attitude  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives ever  since.  But  as  the  House  cannot  be  held 
responsible  by  a  foreign  power  for  failure  to  execute  a  treaty, 
it  looks  properly  to  the  President  and  the  Senate,  and  they, 
having  the  responsibility  upon  them,  have  uniformly  held 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  House  to  give  effect  to  every  treaty 
negotiated  by  the  President  and  ratified  by  the  Senate. 

The  treaty  of  1803  with  France,  involving  as  it  did  the 
appropriation  of  the  purchase  price  of  Louisiana,  required 
the  action  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  That  body 
before  considering  the  bill  to  give  the  treaty  effect  called  for 
all  the  papers  on  the  subject,  and  insisted  on  reviewing  the 
question  to  know  how  good  a  title  our  government  would 
get  to  the  land.  President  Jefferson  then  submitted  all  the 
papers  to  the  House  for  consideration  in  its  legislative 
capacity,  simply  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  certain  of 
the  conditions  could  not  be  carried  into  effect  without  the 
aid  of  legislation.  But  he  did  not  intimate  that  this  aid  was 
discretionary.  The  House  maintained  that  it  was,  but  passed 
the  necessary  law. 

The  treaty  of  1815  with  Great  Britain  involved  a  change 
of  the  revenue  laws,  and  the  appropriation  of  money.  The 
discussion  upon  this  treaty  brought  the  opposed  views  of  the 
constitutional  question  into  sharp  contrast.  The  Senate,  to 
forestall  the  action  of  the  House,  passed  a  bill  declaring  that 
all  laws  in  conflict  with  provisions  of  the  treaty  should  be 
held  null  and  void,  on  the  ground  that  a  treaty  as  a  supreme 


Tlie  Treaty-Making  Pozver  of  the  House.         169 

law  necessarily  repealed  any  existing  laws  in  conflict  with  it. 
The  House,  re-affirming  that  it  had  discretionary  powers  in 
all  matters  of  legislation,  ignored  the  Senate  bill,  and  passed 
one  of  its  own,  which  was  in  turn  rejected  by  the  Senate. 
The  matter  was  finally  arranged  by  the  passage  of  an  act 
which  provided  that  all  laws  in  conflict  with  the  provisions 
of  the  treaty  should  be  held  to  be  of  no  force  after  the  date 
of  ratification.  The  division  at  this  time  in  the  House  and 
in  the  Senate  was  along  party  lines,  the  Federalists  against, 
the  Democrats  in  favor  of,  admitting  the  claim  that  the  House 
of  Representatives  was  in  no  way  bound  to  enact  legislation 
to  carry  out  a  treaty.  President  Madison,  the  members  of 
his  Cabinet,  the  chief  diplomatic  representatives  of  the 
country,  and  the  leading  men  of  his  party  held  that  the 
treaty  became  at  once  a  supreme  law,  and  that  no  legislative 
act  was  necessary  to  give  it  effect.  This  was  the  position 
ably  defended  by  Mr.  Calhoun,  who  led  the  debate  in  the 
House. 

Incidents  in  our  diplomatic  history,  however,  show  that 
while  the  House  has  uniformly  insisted  that  a  treaty  which 
needed  legislative  sanction  could  not  be  binding  on  the 
nation,  they  have  not  always  taken  that  view  of  treaties 
which  have  failed  of  supplementary  sanction  in  other  coun- 
tries. There  are  two  examples  usually  cited  in  point — the 
treaty  of  1819  with  Spain,  and  the  treaty  of  1831  with 
France. 

The  treaty  of  1819,  by  which  the  United  States  acquired 
Florida  from  Spain,  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  the  day  after 
its  execution.  Spain,  however,  demanded  new  conditions 
before  it  would  fulfill  its  promises  already  agreed  to.  Mr. 
Adams,  Secretary  of  State,  thus  defined  the  obligations 
of  Spain  in  respect  to  this  treaty,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Lowndes 
of  South  Carolina :  "The  United  States,"  he  says,  "cannot 
compel  the  King  of  Spain  to  sign  the  act  of  ratification,  and 
therefore  cannot  make  the  instrument  a  perfect  treaty ;  but 
they  can — and  they  are  justifiable  in  so  doing — take  that 
which  the  treaty   if  perfect  would   have  bound   Spain  to 


lyo         The   Treaty-Making  Pozver  of  the  House. 

deliver  to  them."  Sharing  in  this  view  that,  having  agreed 
through  her  agent  to  the  conditions  of  the  treaty,  Spain 
was  in  honor  bound  to  ratify  it,  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives proposed,  and  Congress  passed,  a  bill  authorizing  the 
President  to  take  possession  of  Florida,  although  the  King 
of  Spain  had  not  ratified  the  treaty,  and  did  not  do  so  until 
more  than  two  months  after  the  time  had  expired. 

The  treaty  with  France  in  1831  affords  a  still  more  inter- 
esting illustration  of  the  general  belief  that  the  national 
honor  was  bound  as  soon  as  a  treaty  had  been  properly 
ratified,  and  that  legislation  did  not  give  it  greater  validity. 
By  this  treaty  France  agreed  to  pay  to  the  United  States 
25,000,000  francs  damages  for  injuries  inflicted  on  Ameri- 
can commerce  during  the  Napoleonic  wars.  The  treaty  had 
been  ratified  by  both  governments,  but  when  the  time  came 
for  the  first  installment,  France  refused  to  pay  because  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  had  made  no  appropriation.  The 
treaty  had  provided  for  the  admission  of  French  wines  on 
favorable  terms,  and  Congress  immediately  after  its  ratifica- 
tion had  passed  a  law  to  carry  the  treaty  into  effect,  but  as 
the  French  Deputies  had  on  five  different  occasions  neglected 
or  refused  to  make  provision  for  the  indemnity.  President 
Jackson  in  his  annual  message,  December  i,  1834,  laid  the 
matter  before  Congress.  He  declared  in  this  message  that 
it  was  his  conviction  "that  the  United  States  ought  to 
insist  on  a  prompt  execution  of  the  treaty  and,  in  case  it  be 
refused,  or  longer  delayed,  to  take  redress  into  their  own 
hands." 

In  response  to  this  intimation,  the  House  passed  Mr.  J. 
Q.  Adams'  resolution  by  a  unanimous  vote,  and  with  tre- 
mendous enthusiasm,  that  the  treaty  be  maintained  and  its 
execution  insisted  upon.  War  looked  imminent.  The 
French  minister  was  recalled,  and  our  minister  received  his 
passports.  The  Senate,  however,  held  back,  and  the  matter 
was  finally  settled  when  the  French  Government  paid  the 
indemnity.     The  vote  of  the  House  here  is,  of  course,  a 


The   Treaty-Making  Poiver  of  the  House.         171 

plain  declaration  that  a  treaty  is  valid  and  binding  upon  a 
nation  without  legislation  to  carry  it  into  effect. 

In  1844  a  commercial  treaty  with  the  German  Zollverein 
was  negotiated  by  President  Tyler.  But  upon  its  being 
submitted  to  the  Senate,  Mr.  Choate  of  Massachusetts 
reported  for  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  against  its 
ratification.  He  stated  that  the  proposed  treaty  changed 
duties  laid  by  law,  either  directly,  and  by  its  own  vigor,  or 
it  engaged  the  faith  of  the  nation,  and  the  faith  of  the  Legis- 
lature, through  which  the  nation  acts,  to  make  the  change. 
In  either  aspect,  he  stated,  it  was  the  President  and  the 
Senate  who,  by  the  instrumentality  of  negotiation,  repeal 
or  materially  vary  regulations  of  commerce  and  laws  of 
revenue  which  Congress  has  ordained.  His  view  was  that 
the  treaty  should  not  be  ratified,  because,  being  ratified,  it 
thereby  pledged  the  faith  of  the  House  to  carry  out  its 
stipulations,  which  he  conceived  were  better  carried  out  by 
a  law  to  that  effect  than  by  treaty. 

In  this  connection  Mr.  Calhoun,  then  Secretary  of  State, 
said,  "If  this  be  a  true  view  of  the  treaty-making  power, 
it  may  be  said  that  its  exercise  has  been  one  continual  series 
of  habitual  and  uninterrupted  infringements  of  the  Consti- 
tution. From  the  beginning  and  throughout  the  whole 
existence  of  the  Federal  Government,  it  has  been  exercised 
constantly  on  commerce,  navigation,  and  other  delegated 
powers." 

The  Gadsden  purchase  treaty  with  Mexico  in  1853  pro- 
vided for  the  payment  of  $10,000,000  to  Mexico  for  certain 
land.  This  treaty  was  ratified  by  both  governments  and 
placed  before  Congress  by  President  Pierce  with  the  request 
that  the  sum  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Executive. 
Upon  this  occasion,  Mr.  Benton  of  Missouri  sought  to  intro- 
duce resolutions  into  the  House  that  it  should  not  consider 
the  question  of  appropriating  $10,000,000  to  carry  the  treaty 
into  effect  until  they  should  have  first  considered  whether 
there  was  a  breach  of  the  privilege  of  the  House  in  negotia- 
ting and  concluding  the  treaty ;    and  until  after  the  Hovtse 


172         The   Treaty-Making  Poiver  of  the  House. 

had  obtained  full  information  upon  its  negotiation  and  con- 
clusion. The  constitutional  question  was  again  debated 
here  on  -almost  the  same  lines  as  were  followed  in  connec- 
tion with  Jay's  treaty.  And  the  same  division  took  place 
on  the  question  as  to  whether  the  House  had  any  discre- 
tion in  considering  the  bill  to  make  the  treaty  effective.  An 
important  argument  made  in  this  connection  was,  that,  while 
the  House  had  no  discretionary  power  in  reviewing  the 
treaty,  and  could  not  properly  demand  that  the  President 
should  lay  before  the  House  all  papers  bearing  on  the  treaty, 
if  it  believed  he  had  exceeded  his  powers,  it  could  impeach 
the  President,  and  in  that  way  review  the  entire  subject. 
This,  of  course,  was  not  thought  of,  and  the  House  appro- 
priated the  required  amount. 

The  question  again  came  up  in  connection  with  the  bill 
to  give  effect  to  the  Canadian  reciprocity  treaty  of  1854. 
The  opponents  of  the  treaty  argued  that  such  treaty  could 
not  be  constitutional  inasmuch  as  it  provided  for  taking 
out  of  the  hands  of  Congress  the  power  to  raise  revenue 
on  certain  articles  for  the  period  of  time  covered  by  the 
treaty  stipulations.  The  objection  had  little  weight  in  these 
debates,  as  it  was  generally  felt  that  the  treaty  once  made 
and  ratified  had  binding  force  on  Congress. 

The  prerogative  of  the  House  to  refuse  assent  to  a  treaty 
again  came  into  question  when  an  appropriation  of  $7,200,- 
000  in  coin  was  asked  for  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the 
sixth  article  of  the  treaty  with  Russia,  concluded  March 
20,  1867,  for  the  purchase  of  Alaska.  The  treaty  was  rati- 
fied by  the  Senate  with  but  two  votes  against  it,  but  when 
it  was  placed  before  the  House  for  action,  there  was  a 
minority  report  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
recommending  a  rejection  of  the  purchase  provided  for  in 
the  treat}-.  There  was  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  a  majority 
of  the  House  to  favor  the  bill,  but  at  the  same  time  to  reserve 
the  right  of  the  House  to  approve,  or  to  disapprove,  in  all 
cases  where  a  treaty  was  referred  to  it  for  action.  On  July 
14,  1867,  after  a  prolonged  debate,  the  House  passed  a  bill 


The   Treaty-Making  Power  of  the  House.         173 

giving  effect  to  the  treaty,  but  in  connection  with  it,  the 
House  made  plain  the  principles  upon  which  it  acted,  declar- 
ing that  "the  subjects  thus  embraced  in  the  stipulations  of 
said  treaty  are  among  the  subjects  which  by  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  are  submitted  to  the  power  of 
Congress,  and  over  which  Congress  has  jurisdiction  ;  and  it 
being  for  such  reason  necessary  that  the  consent  of  Con- 
gress shall  be  given  to  the  said  treaty  before  the  same  shall 
have  full  force  and  effect,"  that  upon  these  conditions  they 
had  "taken  into  consideration  the  said  treaty,"  and  had 
approved  of  "the  stipulations  therein."  The  Senate  excised 
this  part  of  the  bill,  and  having  restored  it  to  its  original 
shape,  sent  to  the  conference  committee,  which  had  been 
appointed  from  both  branches,  a  bill  declaring  that  the  House 
was  absolutely  bound  to  carry  out  the  stipulations  of  a  treaty 
ratified  by  the  Senate.  The  bill  finally  passed  by  both 
Houses  was  somewhat  of  a  compromise.  It  read,  "and, 
whereas  said  stipulations  cannot  be  carried  into  full  force 
and  effect  except  by  legislation  to  which  the  consent  of  both 
Houses  is  necessary."  Yet  it  did  not  maintain  the  discre- 
tion of  the  House  in  approving  or  rejecting  a  treaty.  Thus, 
from  the  time  of  Jay's  treaty,  the  question  had  never  been 
forced  to  an  issue.  The  House  of  Representatives,  while 
asserting  its  right,  had  always  voted  to  carry  the  treaty  pro- 
visions into  effect,  and  the  question  of  its  privilege  was  still 
open.  "Yet  two  positions  may  be  regarded  as  accepted," 
as  Wharton  says,  "in  the  practical  workings  of  our  govern- 
ment. One  is,  that  without  a  congressional  vote  there  can 
be  no  appropriation  of  money  which  a  treaty  requires  to 
be  paid.  The  other  is  that  it  should  require  a  very  strong 
case  to  justify  Congress  in  refusing  to  pass  an  appropriation 
which  is  called  for  by  a  treaty  duly  ratified." 

It  was  thought  wise  to  3.void  such  issues  in  the  future  if 
possible,  and  a  treaty  was  negotiated  which  for  the  first 
time  made  legislative  consent  a  proviso  before  the  treaty 
should  be  effective.  This  was  the  reciprocity  treaty  of  1876 
with  the  Hawaiian  Islands.     It  was  here  stipulated  that  the 


174         The   Treaty-Making  Pozvc}\  of  the  House. 

treaty  should  not  take  effect  until  a  law  to  carry  it  into 
operation  should  have  been  passed  by  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States.  But  no  sooner  had  the  treaty  been  submitted 
to  the  House  of  Representatives  for  a  bill  to  put  it  into 
operation,  than  the  debate  broke  out  once  more,  as  to  the 
right  of  the  House  to  reject  the  treaty.  There  had  developed 
considerable  opposition  to  the  treaty,  and  those  opposed  to 
it  in  the  House,  because  of  the  specific  stipulation,  felt  little 
responsibility  for  legislation  to  give  it  effect.  It  would 
seem  that  nothing  could  be  plainer  in  this  case  than  that 
the  House  of  Representatives  was  absolutely  free  to  deal 
with  the  treaty  as  they  saw  fit ;  to  approve  it,  or  to  reject 
it  without  any  constraint  whatever.  Yet  those  who  wished 
the  treaty  enacted  took  the  ground  that  this  wording  was 
mere  surplusage,  and  that  it  did  not  remove  the  obligation 
from  the  House  to  pass  the  bill  any  more  than  if  it  had  not 
been  there.  No  one  would  deny  that  a  measure  affecting 
the  public  revenues,  as  this  treaty  did,  would  require  legis- 
lation by  Congress  to  make  it  effective,  and,  therefore,  to 
declare  in  the  treaty  that  which  was  a  requisite  wherever 
the  constitutional  powers  of  the  House  were  involved,  added 
nothing  which  was  not  there  without  such  stipulation.  Fol- 
lowing these  lines,  the  old  arguments  as  to  the  moral  obliga- 
tion resting  on  Congress  were  brought  forward,  and  the 
debate  took  on  the  form  which  it  had  assumed  in  connection 
with  other  treaties.  The  bill  finally  passed,  however,  and 
the  treaty  went  into  effect. 

When  the  time  of  this  treaty  had  expired,  it  was  renewed 
by  the  action  of  the  Senate  and  the  President,  who  prolonged 
its  duration  for  a  period  of  another  seven  years,  but  with- 
out submitting  the  matter  to  the  House  of  Representatives. 
This  action  on  the  part  of  the  Executive  called  forth  a  vigor- 
ous protest  from  the  House,  and  an  elaborate  report  was 
made  on  the  question  by  Mr.  Tucker  of  the  Judiciary  Com- 
mittee. 

This  committee  submitted  a  resolution  "that  the  Presi- 
dent, by  and  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate,  cannot  nego- 


The  Treaty-Making  Power  of  the  House.         175 

tiate  a  treaty  which  shall  be  binding  on  the  United  States, 
whereby  duties  on  imports  are  to  be  regulated,  and  that  the 
extension  of  the  term  for  the  operation  of  the  original  treaty 
with  the  government  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  will  not  be 
binding  on  the  United  States  without  like  sanction  which 
was  provided  for  in  the  original  treaty  and  convention,  and 
was  given  by  act  of  Congress."  The  treaty,  however,  was 
never  submitted  to  the  House  for  consideration,  and  it  was 
prolonged  without  their  consent. 

A  reciprocity  treaty  with  Mexico  had  been  negotiated  in 
1883,  and  had  been  ratified  by  the  Senate  and  signed  by 
President  Arthur.  The  time  for  its  final  ratification  had 
been  extended  from  time  to  time  until  February,  1887.  Con- 
gress, however,  refused  to  pass  a  law  to  put  it  into  operation, 
and  the  treaty  remained  incomplete,  and  never  went  into 
effect.  It,  like  the  original  Haw'aiian  reciprocity  treaty, 
contained  a  clause  making  its  effect  depend  on  legislative 
sanction,  and  in  defeating  it,  the  House,  for  the  first  time 
since  the  government  began,  stood  on  its  right  to  use  its  dis- 
cretion in  giving  force  to  a  treaty  already  ratified.  It  thus 
determined  that  treaties  dealing  with  the  revenues  are  alto- 
gether under  control  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  and 
that  there  is  no  obligation  recognized  in  like  treaties  to  fol- 
low the  action  of  the  Senate  by  favorable  legislation. 

The  Cuban  treaty  to  come  up  for  assent  at  the  next  ses- 
sion of  Congress  is  like  the  Hawaiian  and  Mexican  treaties 
in  its  provisions,  and  although  it  does  not  stipulate  for  con- 
gressional action,  it,  like  them,  depends  for  effectiveness  upon 
the  independent  will  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  The 
bill  giving  the  treaty  force  may  be  passed  without  the  con- 
stitutional question  arising,  but  it  is  quite  within  the  power 
of  the  House  to  require  the  papers  concerning  the  negotia- 
tion of  the  treaty,  and  to  determine  from  the  merits  of  the 
treaty  itself  whether  it  thinks  a  law  advisable  or  inadvisable 
that  will  make  the  Cuban  treaty  operative. 


Bibliography 


1.  The  Treaty-making  Power  of  the  United  States.  Charles  Henry 
Butler,  Banks  Law  Pub.  Co.,  1902,  vol.  i,  chap,  x,  pp.  417-458. 

2.  Wharton's  International  Law  Digest,  Washington,  1886,  vol.  ii, 
par.  131a,  pp.  15  et  seq. 

3.  House  Reports  No.  4177,  49  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  vol.  ii,  1886-1887. 
(Mr.  Tucker  on  the  constitutional  power  of  the  Senate  to  bind  the 
House  of  Representatives  by  commercial  treaties.) 

4.  Richardson's  Messages  and  Documents. 

Especially  vol.  i,  pp.  194-6  (Washington  on  Jay's  Treat}');  vol.  ii,  pp. 
54-58  (Monroe  on  the  Spanish  Treat}')  ;  and  vol.  iii,  pp.  100-107,  152- 
160  (Jackson  on  the  French  Treaty). 

5.  Gadsden  Purchase  1853;  Cong.  Globe,  33  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  vol. 
xxviii,  pt.  2.     (Index  for  pages.) 

Alaska  Purchase  1867  ;  Cong.  Globe  1867-8,  40  Cong.,  i  Sess. 
(Index  for  pages.) 

The  Hawaiian  Reciprocity  Treaty  ;  Cong.  Record,  44  Cong.,  i  Sess., 
1876,  vol.  iv,  pt.  6,  Appendix,  pp.  5S-63,  pp.  184-igo. 

6.  Senate  Journal,  28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1843-1844,  pp.  445-6.  (Mr. 
Choate  on  the  treaty  with  the  Zollverein.) 

7.  Annals  of  Congress,  14  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1815-1816,  p.  467,  pp.  533- 

546. 

8.  Niles  Weekly  Register,  vol.  x,  p.  11,  26  (Treaty  of  1816);  vol.  xvi, 
p.  3,  225,  346,  385.     (The  Spanish  Treaty.) 

Q.  American  Annual  Register  1832-33,  pp.  22-24.  (The  French 
Treaty.) 

10.  Cong.  Debates  (Gales  and  Seaton),  vol.  xi,  pt.  i,  1834-5. 
(A  voluminous  consideration  of  French  Relations.) 

11.  Decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  as  to  the  power  of  Congress  to 
set  aside  treaty  provisions  by  a  subsequent  law  : — 

1.  The  Head  Money  Cases,  112  U.  S.  280,  599. 

2.  Whitney  vs.  Robinson,  124  U.  S.  190,  195. 

3.  The  Cherokee  Tobacco. 

4.  Taylor  vs.  Morton,  2  Curtis  454. 

5.  The  Chinese  Exclusion  Case,  130  U.  S.  581. 


APPENDIX 


PART    IV 


EARLY  ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS  IN  HAWAII 


12 


APPENDIX 


A   CONSIDERATION    OF   SOME    OF  THE   ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS 

FOUND   IN   THE   SANDWICH   ISLANDS   AT   THE   TIME   OF 

THEIR   DISCOVERY   BY   CAPTAIN    COOK.' 

The  Hawaiian  Islands  are  completely  isolated  in  the  vast 
expanse  of  the  Pacific  Ocean.  They  lie  at  the  center  of  an 
immense  circle  whose  radius  measures  2100  miles,  the  dis- 
tance to  San  Francisco,  and  whose  great  circumference 
embraces  besides  this  group  only  one  or  two  unimportant 
islands. 

Their  geographical  situation  of  18°  50'  to  22°  21'  north 
latitude  and  154°  53'  to  160°  15'  west  longitude  makes  it 
probable  that  the  Spanish  treasure  ships  going  from  Aca- 
pulco  to  Manila  in  the  seventeenth  century  knew  of  their 
position,  and  that  their  existence  was  kept  secret  from  the 
world  for  very  obvious  reasons.  From  native  traditions  and 
from  other  sources  there  is  evidence  for  believing  that 
Spaniards,  or  at  least  Europeans,  landed  on  the  Islands 
several  times  from  1535  to  1650. 

Captain  Cook  was  at  least  not  their  first  discoverer.  The 
description  by  him  of  the  people  whom  he  found  there,  and 
by  whom  he  was  killed  in  1779,  is  the  earliest  account  we 
have.  This  story,  completed  by  Captain  Clerk,  is  exceedingly 
interesting,  but  his  stay  was  so  short,  and  his  acquaintance 
with  the  people  so  brief,  that  the  narrative  must  be  supple- 
mented by  later,  and  more  thorough  investigators.- 

'  It  seemed  to  the  writer  that  some  interesting  results  might  be 
obtained  by  applying  to  the  conditions  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  the 
treatment  which  Mr.  E.  J.  Payne  has  so  satisfactorily  given  to  the 
pre-historic  economic  conditions  among  the  South  American  Indians, 
in  his  History  of  the  New  World  called  America,  Vol.  I.  The  above  is 
the  result  of  following  out  the  plan  laid  down  by  Mr.  Payne. 

'  From  the  writers  Ellis,  Jarves  and  Bingham,  we  have  a  fairly  accu- 
rate picture  of  that  time  constructed  for  us. 


i8o  The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hazvaii. 

Beginning  with  the  time  of  their  discovery,  the  Hfe  and 
pursuits  of  the  islanders  for  a  period  of  about  forty  years 
was  practically  unchanged.  In  all  probability  it  was  much 
as  it  had  been  for  hundreds  of  years.  The  later  influence 
of  Cook's  visit  in  opening  the  Islands  to  civilising  agencies 
is  beyond  calculation,  but  it  may  properly  be  said  that  from 
his  visit  in  1778  until  the  coming  of  the  American  mission- 
aries in  1820,  there  had  been  no  vital  change  in  the  religion, 
language,  arts,  or  customs  of  this  barbarous  people. 

They  were  in  a  state  of  barbarism  in  accordance  with 
Payne's  classification  of  the  states  of  society.  He  makes  the 
status  of  a  people  depend  upon  the  degree  in  which  they  have 
been  able  to  substitute  an  artificial  for  a  natural  basis  of 
subsistence.  If  the  substitution  has  been  completely  made, 
and  owing  to  favorable  circumstances  has  wrought  out  the 
ultimate  effects  which  the  substitution  is  capable  of  produc- 
ing, the  resulting  state  of  society  is  called  civilisation.  If, 
due  to  unfavorable  conditions  the  final  results  are  arrested, 
or  if  only  a  partial  substitution  has  been  made,  the  state  of 
society  resulting  is  called  barbarism.  If  society  rests  on  a 
natural  basis  of  subsistence  the  social  state  is  called  savagery. 

The  Hawaiian  islanders  were  in  a  state  of  barbarism,  for 
the  process  of  complete  substitution  of  an  artificial  for  a 
natural  basis  of  subsistence  had  been  arrested.  It  is  quite 
probable  that  the  islanders  would  have  continued  in  their 
backward  state,  if  the  means  of  progress  had  not  been  sup- 
plied to  them  from  without,  for  the  means  of  development 
had  for  the  most  part  been  denied  them  by  nature. 

The  necessity  for  obtaining  food  has  been  the  lash  that 
has  ever  driven  man's  progress.  A  lash  that  has  been 
applied  the  more  unrelentingly  the  lower  we  descend  the 
scale  of  civilisation.  The  intensity  of  his  struggle  for  exist- 
ence is  due  to  nature's  harshness  or  kindness,  and  this  is 
because  the  distribution  upon  the  globe  of  plants  and  animals 
useful  to  man  has  been  very  unequal. 

Where,  as  is  usually  the  case,  nature  is  severe,  all  his 
energy  is  at  first  spent  in  getting  food,  and  his  hunger  drives 


The  Econouiic  Conditions  in  Haivaii.  18 1 

him  to  invent  weapons  and  implements  that  will  enable  him 
to  get  this  food  in  greater  abundance.  When  once  secured, 
certain  foods  contain  more  nutriment,  quantity  for  quantity, 
than  others,  and  usually  food  whose  nutritive  value  is  small 
calls  for  a  greater  supply  of  vitality  to  digest  enough  to 
sustain  life,  and  therefore  this  kind  must  be  abundant.  With 
a  few  notable  exceptions,  as  for  example,  the  bread-fruit, 
the  least  nutritious  food  is  the  easiest  to  obtain. 

It  is  thus  that  savage  man's  whole  energy  is  so  taken  up 
with  the  struggle  to  sustain  life  that  little  time  is  left  him 
to  improve  the  means,  and  it  is  only  very  gradually  that  he 
is  able  to  gain  any  advantage  over  nature.  An  advantage 
is  always  gained  by  substituting  a  better,  more  nutritive 
food,  for  a  poorer  one,  and  a  better  means  for  obtaining  it 
for  one  that  is  not  so  adequate.  Where  there  is  a  limited 
area,  and  a  growing  population,  the  competition  for  the  food 
supply  is  increased,  and  up  to  a  certain  limit  this  competition 
sharpens  man's  faculties  and  is  the  means  of  his  advance- 
ment. 

Somewhere  early  in  his  history  man  secured  the  aid  of 
the  dog  in  hunting.  The  dog,  the  oldest  domestic  animal 
known,  having  at  first  followed  man  as  a  hanger-on  for 
the  offal  of  the  chase,  became  a  hunting  companion  to  him. 

Dogs,  too,  like  fire  and  domestic  fowls,  had  the  power 
to  frighten  away  ghosts,  from  whose  presence  primitive 
man  was  never  free,  and  were  thus  of  great  service  to  him. 
They  were  able  to  see  the  evil  spirits  that  were  invisible 
to  man,  and  by  barking  drove  them  away.  The  cocks  crew 
at  midnight  to  tell  the  spirits  that  the  time  had  come  when 
thev  might  leave  their  abodes,  and  at  daybreak  to  warn  them 
to  return.  Besides  domesticated  fowls,  the  young  of  wild 
animals  captured  in  the  hunt  were  often  spared,  possibly  at 
first  as  pets.  From  their  increase  in  captivity  the  savage 
found  an  easier  method  of  supplying  his  wants  than  that  of 
taking  them  in  the  chase.  In  time  they  came  to  supply  him 
with  food,  clothing,  and  power,  and  he  thus  advanced  into 
the  pastoral  state  and  into  the  w^andering  life  of  the  herds- 
man. 


1 82  The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii. 

The  savage  in  the  gathering  state  hves  on  what  he  can 
pick  up  for  food  in  its  natural  condition.  Berries,  fruits, 
nuts,  roots,  fish  and  small  weak  animals,  snakes,  lizards,  rats 
and  mice,  he  levies  on  for  his  needs.  He  makes  a  long  step 
forward  when  repeated  famine  has  taught  him  to  gather  a 
supply  against  a  time  of  need ;  to  lengthen  his  arm  by  stone 
weapons  ;  by  the  bow  and  arrow,  and  by  the  use  of  fire  to 
harden  his  weapons,  to  burst  the  cells  and  to  soften  the 
fibers  of  his  food  by  cooking,  and  thus  to  save  vitality  to 
digestion  for  some  other  purpose.  The  gathering  state  is 
a  precarious  means  of  supplying  food,  but  only  after  hunger 
and  famine  many  times  repeated,  does  the  savage  learn  to 
store  up  a  supply  in  time  of  plenty  against  a  time  of  want. 
His  usual  condition  is  one  of  satiety  or  of  emaciation.  Roots 
and  bulbs  furnish  him  the  nourishment  stored  by  nature  in 
the  ground  and  these  when  dried  can  be  preserved.  It  is 
this  need  of  storing  up  food  that  led  him,  perhaps,  to  the 
discovery  that  the  process  of  digging  in  the  loose  earth  for 
roots  with  a  hooked  stick  and  by  dropping  a  piece  of  root 
back  into  the  hole  that  he  has  just  dug  to  let  nature  do  the 
rest,  is  the  natural  means  for  increasing  his  store.  This  is 
an  easy  method  of  getting  food  as  the  crop  requires  no  care 
until  it  is  ready  for  use.  Root  culture  has  invariably  pre- 
ceded the  cultivation  of  cereals.  For  cereals  are  usually  the 
result  of  laborious  cultivation,  and  the  number  and  distribu- 
tion of  roots  as  well  as  their  food  value  compared  with  wild 
cereal-bearing  grasses  shows  root  culture  as  a  basis  of  sub- 
sistence to  be  in  an  earlier  and  a  more  primitive  state  of 
society ;  and  while  people  living  in  a  state  of  root  culture 
always  show  a  great  degree  of  advancement  over  the  savage, 
it  is  certain  that  nothing  worthy  the  name  of  civilisation 
has  ever  been  founded  on  any  other  alimentary  basis  than 
the  cereals.^ 

These  various  steps  from  the  gathering  state  to  root  cul- 
ture had  doubtless  been  made  by  their  Malay  ancestors  long 
centuries    before    the    Hawaiians    peopled    the    Sandwich 

'  Paj-ne,  p.  336;  Vol.  I. 


The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii.  183 

Islands.  It  is  quite  probable  that  the  original  Hawaiians 
came  from  Tahiti  or  Samoa,  whose  people  they  very  much 
resemble  in  speech  and  customs.  Possibly  having  been 
driven  this  great  distance  by  storm,  men  and  women,  dogs, 
pigs  and  chickens,  were  landed  in  a  single  boat,  by  accident 
upon  the  shores  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  They  closely 
resemble,  too,  the  other  South  Sea  Islanders,  and  from  the 
fact  that  they  have  not  had  long  enough  time  to  develop  a 
distinct  culture,  Ratzel  concludes  that  the  settlement  could 
not  have  been  made  very  long  ago.  Whatever  their  origin, 
when  Captain  Cook  found  them,  they  were  half-naked 
cannibals  offering  human  sacrifices  to  their  gods  and  to  the 
manes  of  their  chiefs.  They  were  living  on  roots,  the  cul- 
tivation of  which  they  had  brought  to  a  high  degree  of  per- 
fection, and  on  fish  and  the  flesh  of  hogs  and  dogs. 

The  changes  in  mode  of  life  from  living  on  a  natural  basis 
of  food  to  living  on  an  artificial  basis  have  always  depended 
a  great  deal  on  the  natural  conditions  that  make  a  change 
necessary.  Where  the  population  is  stationary  and  food  is 
plentiful  and  easy  to  obtain  in  one  grade  of  culture  a  change 
to  another  is  not  made.  But  where  people  live  on  a  limited 
area,  as  for  example,  on  an  island,  and  the  population 
increases,  the  food  supply  becomes  more  scanty  and  other 
means  of  obtaining  more  or  other  kinds  of  food  must  be 
resorted  to. 

This  was  never  the  case  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  as  their 
population  had  been  decreasing  probably  before  Captain 
Cook's  time,  and  has  continued  to  decrease  until  the  present. 
This  decline  in  population  is  one  of  the  five  causes,  following 
Mr.  Payne,  that  may  be  indicated  why  the  Hawaiians 
remained  economically  backward. 

These  five  causes  are : 

I.  lack  of  any  cereal-bearing  grasses ; 
II.  lack  of  any  animal  larger  than  the  hog; 

III.  lack  of  iron  or  of  any  metals  whatever; 

IV.  the  system  of  society  under  which  they  lived ; 
V.  the  failure  of  the  population. 


184  The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii. 

First — The  lack  of  cereals. 

The  roots  of  the  taro  (arum  esculentum)  form  the  chief 
article  of  vegetable  food.  Besides  this  the  sweet  potato,  yam, 
breadfruit,  sugar-cane,  cocoa-nut,  arrow-root,  strawberry, 
raspberry  and  an  insipid  juicy  red  apple  are  also  native 
and  abundant.  To  these  must  be  added  the  useful  trees,  the 
paper  mulberry  (morus  papyrifera),  out  of  which  native 
cloth  is  made;  the  kukui  (aleurites  trilaba)  or  candle-nut 
tree,  the  fruit  of  which  contains  so  much  oil  that  it  was  used 
by  the  natives  in  place  of  lamps  or  candles ;  the  sandal  wood 
tree,  and  some  beautiful  cabinet  woods.  Sandal  wood  was 
of  no  value  to  the  Islands  until  it  was  made  an  article  of 
commerce  by  traders  from  the  United  States.  They  took 
large  quantities  of  it  to  Canton  where  it  was  sold  in  great 
quantities  to  the  Chinese,  who  manufactured  it  into  incense 
and  burned  it  in  their  temples.^ 

"  The  forests  are  usually  very  dense,  broken  by  deep  chasms,  hidden 
ravines  and  deep,  conical-shaped  pits,  which  appear  to  have  been  once 
active  craters  ;  while  the  trees  are  over-grown  with  masses  of  fern  and 
parasitical  vines,  thickly  interlaced,  and  spreading  their  shoots  in  all 
directions  which  renders  it  a  task  of  great  difficulty  to  penetrate  their 
recesses."*' 

For  this  reason  possibly  and  because  of  their  fishing  and 
sailor  life  the  population  kept  to  the  seashore. 

The  cultivation  of  the  taro  plant  and  of  the  sweet  potato 
comprised  the  agriculture  of  the  native  Hawaiians.  The  dry 
friable  nature  of  the  volcanic  soil  made  the  cultivation  of 
the  sweet  potato  comparatively  simple  and  easy.  Soil  and 
climate  were  so  well  suited  to  its  growth  that  Captain  Cook 
spoke  of  potatoes  weighing  twelve  to  fifteen  pounds,  seldom 
did  they  weigh  less  than  three.  The  growth  of  the  taro  is, 
however,  attended  with  great  labor,  as  it  requires  a  year  to 
produce  a  crop. 

'  In  one  year  the  trade  amounted  to  four  hundred  thousand  dollars. 
The  greed  of  the  kings  allowed  the  trees  to  be  destroyed  and  the  sup- 
ply practically  ceased. 

"^  Jarves,  pp.  11  and  12. 


The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii.  185 

Washing  down  into  the  valley  from  the  sides  of  the 
mountains  the  streams  carry  with  them  certain  mineral  salts 
that  serve  to  renew  the  soil  exhausted  by  the  growth  of  the 
taro  plant.  For  this  purpose,  and  because  the  taro  grows 
in  wet  ground,  artificial  irrigation  was  practiced,  and  the 
mountain  streams  were  conducted  tO'  the  plots  of  taro  in 
trenches  or  ditches. 

Captain  Cook  has  given  a  very  good  picture  of  their  agri- 
culture ;  he  says : 

"Our  way  lay  through  the  plantations.  The  greatest  part  of  the 
ground  was  quite  tiat,  with  ditches  full  of  water  intersecting  different 
parts,  and  roads  that  seemed  artificially  raised  to  some  height.  The 
interspaces  were  in  general  planted  with  taro,  which  grows  here  with 
great  strength,  as  the  fields  are  sunk  below  the  common  level,  so  as  to 
contain  the  water  necessary  to  nourish  the  roots." 

"  What  we  saw  of  their  agriculture  furnished  sufficient  proof  that  they 
are  not  novices  in  that  art.  The  vale  ground  .  .  .  was  one  continuous 
plantation  of  taro,  and  a  few  other  things,  which  have  all  the  appear- 
ance of  being  well  attended  to.  The  potato-fields  and  spots  of  sugar- 
cane or  plantains,  on  the  higher  grounds,  are  planted  with  the  same 
regularity  ;  and  always  in  some  other  minute  figure,  generall)'  as  a 
square  or  oblong  ;  but  neither  these  nor  the  others  are  enclosed  with 
any  kind  of  fence  unless  we  reckon  the  ditches  in  the  low  grounds 
such,  which,  it  is  more  probable,  are  intended  to  convey  water  to  the 
taro.  The  great  quantity  and  goodness  of  these  articles  may  also, 
perhaps,  be  as  much  attributed  to  skillful  culture  as  to  natural  fertility 
of  soil,  which  seems  better  adapted  to  them  than  to  bread  fruit  and 
cocoanut  trees."' 

His  account  shows  that  these  people  were  then  in  an 
advanced  state  of  agriculture,  expending  enough  labor  upon 
the  taro-root  to  have  raised  cereals,  and  displaying  intelli- 
gence enough  to  have  availed  themselves  of  the  change  had 
the  soil  been  suitable,  and  had  nature  supplied  them  with 
any  wild  cereal-bearing  grasses  such  as  wheat,  corn,  rice, 
oats,  rye  or  barley.  These  seem  to  have  been  entirely  absent, 
and  the  people  remained  in  a  state  of  root  culture,  not  because 
they  were  incapable  of  advancing,  but  because  the  means 
of  advance  was  lacking  to  them. 

'  Capt.  Cook,  p.  189. 


1 86  The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii. 

Second — Domestic  animals. 

The  absence  of  any  wild  animals  on  the  islands  that  could 
be  objects  of  the  chase  or  were  suitable  for  domestication 
removed  a  second  means  of  progress. 

There  were  no  wild  animals  at  all,  and  the  islanders  never 
became  hunters  for  this  reason,  and  could  not,  therefore, 
take  the  next  step  in  progress  to  herds,  and  to  becoming 
a  pastoral  people.  The  only  animals  found  on  the  island 
were  the  dog,  a  small  variety  of  hog,  domestic  fowls,  some 
wild  ducks  and  geese,  the  lizard  and  a  small  rat.  The  dog 
and  hog  were  eaten  as  food. 

Fish  were  caught  in  abundance,  and  as  their  island  situa- 
tion compelled  them  to  be  expert  fishermen  it  made  them 
marvelously  at  home  in  the  water.  It  has  been  conjectured 
that  their  dependence  upon  a  fish  diet,  and  the  fact  that  they 
usually  ate  fish  raw,  and  sometimes  in  a  semi-putrid  state, 
brought  a  terrible  consequence.  This  was  the  disease  of 
leprosy,  which  recent  investigations  seem  to  show  is  closely 
associated  with  a  continued  diet  of  this  kind. 

The  lack  of  any  large  animal  that  could  be  tamed  to  yield 
food — as  milk  and  meat, — and  power,  for  traction  and  for 
burdens,  had  a  very  important  domestic  bearing. 

One  of  the  most  shocking  practices  of  these  people  was 
infanticide.  The  accounts  all  agree  as  to  the  extent  and 
prevalence  of  this  practice.  Cook  especially  noticed  the 
evidences  of  affection  displayed  by  the  mothers  for  their 
little  ones,  but  sooner  or  later  they  were  strangled  or 
smothered  by  the  mothers,  and  were  often  buried  in  the  dirt 
floor  of  the  living  room.  One  out  of  a  family  of  three  or 
four  might  be  spared,  and  no  more  feeling  was  discovered 
than  might  be  expected  in  drowning  all  but  one  or  two  of 
a  litter  of  kittens.  The  reason  given  was  always  the  same. 
They  gave  too  much  trouble.  It  is  estimated  that  two- 
thirds  of  the  population  perished  in  this  way.  As  Mr.  Payne 
has  already  pointed  out,  where  there  is  no  substitute  in  the 
milk  of  animals,  mothers  must  nurse  their  children  three 
or  four  vears  and  longer  before  thev  can  be  weaned.     This 


The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii.  187 

necessarily  lowers  the  vitality  of  the  mother  besides  shutting 
her  out  from  many  of  the  pleasures  of  life,  and  so  the  cause, 
the  child,  was  indifferently  put  out  of  the  way.  The  burden 
of  raising  children  became  doubly  exhausting  when  the  posi- 
tion of  the  women  is  considered.  They  were  held  to  be  so 
far  inferior  to  the  men  that  not  only  could  the  women  not 
eat  with  the  men  and  might  not  even  touch  their  food,  but 
the  most  palatable  and  nutritious  animal  and  vegetable  foods 
were  reserved  for  the  men  alone.  Women  were  forbidden 
to  eat  pork,  turtle,  shark,  bananas,  and  cocoanuts  under 
penalty  of  death.  Thus,  obliged  as  they  were,  besides,  to 
perform  all  the  toil  that  they  were  physically  capable  of,  the 
greatest  tax  on  physical  powers  was  put  where  it  was  least 
able  to  be  borne.  Human  life  was  everywhere  held  cheap, 
and  the  old,  the  sick,  or  the  insane,  in  fact  any  that  would 
become  a  burden  on  the  rest,  were  treated  in  the  same  way 
as  the  undesirable  children  or  they  were  left  to  die  alone, 
and  for  the  same  reason — that  they  were  too  much  trouble.^ 
Savage  man  does  not  himself  look  on  death  with  revulsion 
or  even  with  fear.  Yet  had  there  been  a  substitute  for  the 
milk  of  the  mother  it  seems  to  me  altogether  probable  that 
the  loss  to  the  race  by  infanticide  would  have  been  very 
greatly  decreased ;  though  it  must  be  remembered  that 
superstition  played  a  great  part  in  abandoning  the  sick  and 
Vv^eak.  If  any  one  was  long  sick  he  was  thought  to  be 
under  the  displeasure  of  the  gods  and  was  therefore  aban- 
doned. 

'  "  The  sick  at  first  found  sympathy  and  kindness  and  there  were 
instances  of  tender  care  and  treatment  to  the  last  ;  but  those  long  sick 
became  a  burden,  and  were  frequently  borne  to  the  bushes,  or  were 
shut  up  in  some  old  unoccupied  house  to  languish  and  die  alone.  For 
days  and  nights  together,  the  miserable  invalid  has  been  known  to  call 
in  vain,  even  in  sight  and  hearing  of  his  own  relatives,  for  a  drink  of 
water  ;  approached  only  by  the  dogs  that  waited  for  the  carcass." 
"Occasionally  the  insane  were  treated  with  respect  and  care,  while 
usually  they  were  stoned  to  death.  Along  many  a  beach,  over  many  a 
plain,  into  the  thicket  of  many  a  mountain  stream,  boys  and  men  pur- 
sued and  destroyed  them  as  they  would  the  wild  beast  of  the  forest." 
Hunt,  p.  38. 


1 88  TJic  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii. 

Further,  the  labor  of  cultivating  the  taro  would  have  been 
greatly  lessened  by  the  use  of  some  animal  strong  enough 
to  draw  the  plow,  and  the  labor  of  the  people  would  have 
been  greatly  eased  and  economic  advancement  furthered 
could  some  beast  of  burden  have  been  found  to  drag  the 
timber  from  the  forest,  and  to  carry  the  heavy  burdens  that 
had  to  be  borne  from  place  to  place  on  the  naked  shoulders 
of  the  people. 

Third — The  use  of  metals. 

A  third  means  by  which  they  might  have  reached  a  more 
advanced  civilisation  was  in  the  use  of  iron.  There  are  no 
metals  to  be  found  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  this  means 
of  progress  was  therefore  denied  to  them.  Without  metals 
they  were  obliged  to  remain  in  the  Stone  Age  so  far  as  their 
tools  and  implements  were  concerned,  long  after  they  would 
have  been  fitted  under  more  favorable  natural  conditions  to 
leave  it. 

They  were  thus  compelled  to  fell  trees  and  to  shape  timber 
with  their  stone  adzes,  to  hollov/  out  their  canoes  by  fire  or 
by  stone  chisels,  to  saw  with  toothed  flints  or  with  saws  of 
sharks  teeth,  to  cut  with  shells  or  with  obsidian,  or  with 
glass-like  splinters  of  lava,  to  bore  holes  with  stone  awls — 
to  do  everything,  in  fact,  that  required  tools  or  implements, 
with  the  greatest  pains  and  patience  without  the  aid  of  the 
most  useful  of  all  metals. 

When  Captain  Cook  arrived  they  knew  the  value  of  iron, 
and  displayed  such  an  avidity  for  it  that  they  were  willing 
to  trade  almost  anything,  at  first,  for  a  nail,  and  later  knives, 
axes  and  bars  of  iron  were  the  most  acceptable  presents  that 
could  be  made  to  their  kings  and  chiefs. 

Beads  and  looking  glasses,  which  usually  appeal  to  the 
savage,  were  handed  back  by  them  as  of  no  use,  but  iron 
was  so  highly  prized  that  the  cutter  they  stole  from  its  moor- 
ings was  broken  up  for  the  nails  that  held  it  together.  It 
was  the  effort  to  recover  this  boat  which  led  to  Captain 
Cook's  death.  He  found  them  in  possession  of  a  piece  of 
iron  hoop  two  inches  long,  and  a  piece  of  what  he  thought 


TIic  Economic  Conditions  in  Hazvaii.  189 

must  have  been  the  point  of  a  broad  sword ;  he  conjectured 
that  the  iron  hoop  might  have  been  found  on  a  spar  of  some 
ship  that  had  drifted  ashore.  Wherever  they  got  the  iron 
or  the  knowledge  of  its  use,  they  were  satisfied  with  nothing 
else. 

Captain  Cook  was  impressed  with  their  skill  and  dexterity 
in  many  ways,  but  particularly  he  admired  the  perfection 
of  their  handicraft. 

"  In  everything  manufactured  by  these  people,"  he  says,  "  there 
appears  to  be  an  uncommon  degree  of  neatness  and  ingenuity.  Their 
cloth,  which  is  the  principal  article  of  manufacture,  is  made  from  the 
morns papyrif era;  and  doubtless  in  the  same  manner  as  at  Atahate  and 
Tongotaboo  ;  for  we  bought  some  of  the  grooved  sticks  with  which  it 
is  beaten.  Its  texture,  however,  though  thicker,  is  rather  inferior  to 
that  of  the  cloth  of  either  of  the  other  places  ;  but  in  coloring  or  stain- 
ing it,  the  people  of  Atooi  display  a  superiority  of  taste,  by  the  endless 
variation  of  figures  which  thej'  execute.  One  would  suppose,  on  see- 
ing a  number  of  their  pieces,  that  the}^  had  borrowed  their  patterns 
from  some  mercer's  shop,  in  which  the  most  elegant  productions  of 
China  and  Europe  are  collected,  besides  some  original  patterns  of  their 
own.  Their  colors  indeed  except  red  are  not  very  bright,  but  the 
regularity  of  the  figures  and  the  stripes  is  truly  surprising  ;  for  as  far 
as  we  know,  they  have  nothing  like  stamps  or  prints  to  make  their 
impressions."'  .  .  .  "  Amongst  the  articles  which  they  brought  to  barter 
this  day,  we  could  not  help  noticing  a  peculiar  sort  of  cloak  and  cap 
which  even  in  countries  where  dress  is  more  particularly  attended  to, 
might  be  reckoned  elegant.  The  first  were  nearly  of  the  size  and  shape 
of  the  short  cloaks  worn  by  the  women  in  England,  and  bj^  the  men  in 
Spain,  reaching  to  the  middle  of  the  back  and  tied  loosely  before.  The 
ground  of  them  is  a  net  work;  upon  which  the  most  beautiful  red  and 
yellow  feathers  are  so  closely  fixed  that  the  surface  might  be  compared 
to  the  thickest  and  richest  velvet  which  they  resemble  both  as  to  the 
feel  and  the  glossy  appearance.  The  manner  of  varying  the  mixture  is 
very  different,  some  having  triangular  spaces  of  red  and  yellow  alter- 
nately, others  a  kind  of  crescent;  and  some  that  were  entirely  red,  had 
a  broad  yellow  border,  which  made  them  appear  at  some  distance, 
exactly  like  a  scarlet  cloak  edged  with  gold  lace.  .  .  .  Some  were  after- 
ward purchased  for  a  few  large  nails. "^ 

'  Cook,  p.  184. 

'■*  Cook,  p.  160,  in  Vol.  XVI.     R.  Kerr,  "  Modern  Circumnavigations." 
Jarves  suggests  that  the  idea  of  these  short  cloaks  and  helmets  and  the 
color  and  variet)'  of  patterns  in  their  cloth  came  through  the  Spaniards, 
who  landed  on  the  islands  more  than  a  hundred  years  before  Cook. 


190  The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii. 

"  In  what  manner  the)'  produce  their  colors  we  had  not  opportuni 
ties  of  learning  ;  but,  besides  the  party  colored  sorts  they  have  some 
pieces  of  plain  white  cloth,  and  others  of  a  single  color,  particularly 
dark-brown  and  light  blue.  In  general,  the  pieces  which  they  brought 
to  us  were  about  two  feet  broad,  and  four  or  five  yards  long,  being  the 
form  and  quantity  that  they  use  for  their  common  dress  or  maro  ;  and 
even  these  we  sometimes  found  were  composed  of  pieces  sewed 
together  ;  an  art  which  we  did  not  find  to  the  southward,  but  is 
strongly,  though  not  ver}'  neatly,  performed  here." 

"  There  is  also  a  particular  sort  that  is  thin,  much  resembling  oil 
cloth,  and  which  is  actually  either  oiled  or  soaked  in  some  kind  of 
varnish  and  seems  to  resist  the  action  of  the  water  pretty  well."' 
"  They  stain  their  gourd  shells  prettily  with  undulated  lines,  triangles, 
and  other  figures  of  a  black  color;  instances  of  which  we  saw  practiced 
at  New  Zealand.  And  they  seem  to  possess  the  art  of  varnishing  ;  for 
some  of  these  stained  gourd  shells  are  covered  with  a  kind  of  lacquer  ; 
and  on  other  occasions  they  use  a  strong  size  or  gluey  substance  to 
fasten  things  together."  "  They  fabricate  a  great  many  white  mats, 
which  are  strong  with  many  red  stripes,  rhombuses  and  other  figures 
interwoven  on  one  side.  .  .  .  Their  wooden  dishes  and  bowls,  out  of 
which  they  drink  .  .  .  are  as  neat  as  if  made  in  our  turning  lathe  and 
perhaps  better  polished.  .  .  .  The  great  variety  of  fishing  hooks  are 
ingeniously  made,  some  of  bone,  others  of  wood  pointed  with  bone 
and  many  of  pearl  shell.  ...  Of  this  (bone)  sort  one  was  procured 
nine  inches  long  of  a  single  piece  of  bone.  .  .  .  The  elegant  form  and 
polish  of  this  could  certainly  not  be  outdone  by  any  European  artist, 
even  if  he  should  add  all  his  knowledge  in  design  to  the  number  and 
convenience  of  his  tools."' 

These  wooden  bowls  apparently  take  the  place  of  pottery 
here.  Either  because  the  volcanic  soil  furnished  no  clay 
immediately  suitable  for  pottery;  or  because  having  dis- 
covered that  by  heated  stones  they  could  bake  their  vege- 
tables, they  were  not  driven  to  find  any  vessel  that  would 
resist  the  action  of  fire. 

"Judging  from  what  we  saw  growing,  and  from  what  was  brought  to 
market,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  that  the  greatest  part  of  their  vegetable 
food  consist  of  sweet  potatoes,  taro,  and  plantains  ;  and  that  bread- 
fruit and  yams  are  rather  to  be  esteemed  rareties. 

Of  animal  food  they  can  be  in  no  want ;  as  they  have  abundance  of 
hogs,  which  run  without  restraint  about  the  houses  ;  and   if  they  eat 

'  Cook,  p.  184.  ^  Cook,  p.  185. 


The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hazvaii.  191 

dogs,  which  is  not  improbable,  their  stock  of  these  seemed  to  be  very- 
considerable.  The  great  number  of  fishing  hooks  found  amongst  them, 
showed  that  they  derive  no  inconsiderable  supply  of  animal  food  from 
the  sea.  But  it  should  seem,  from  their  practice  of  salting  fish,  that 
the  openness  of  their  coast  often  interrupts  the  business  of  catching 
them  ;  as  it  may  be  naturally  supposed  that  no  set  of  people  would  ever 
think  of  preserving  quantities  of  food  artificially,  if  they  could  depend 
upon  a  daily  regular  supply  of  it  in  its  fresh  state.  This  sort  of  reason- 
ing, however,  will  not  account  for  their  custom  of  salting  their  pork, 
as  well  as  their  fish."' 

A  possible  explanation  of  this  salting  of  both  fish  and 
hogs'  flesh  is  that  the  monotony  of  a  diet  of  taro,  fish  and 
hog  led  them  to  salt  their  food  to  give  it  a  different  taste, 
as  well  as  to  satisfy  a  natural  craving  for  salts  to  supply 
the  needs  of  the  body.  The  trade  in  spices  with  the  East 
Indies  was  due  in  the  Middle  Ages  to  a  similar  desire  of 
Europe  to  vary  the  monotonous  diet  of  fish.  In  other  parts 
of  the  world : 

"It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  pods  and  seeds  of  the  capsicum,  a  shrub 
indigenous  to  the  warmer  districts  where  maize  was  cultivated,  came 
first  to  be  employed  as  a  corrective,  and  thence  to  be  habitually  eaten 
to  relieve  the  insipidity  and  prevent  the  deleterious  consequences  of 
a  purely  farinaceous  diet ;  for  the  same  reason  ants  were  mixed  with 
cooked  maize  in  New  Granada,  powdered  limestone  with  the  com- 
pounds of  maize  in  Mexico,  and  clay  in  Callao.'"- 

This,  too,  may  account  for  the  use  among  the  islanders 
of  kava,  an  intoxicating  drink  made  from  a  species  of  the 
pepper  plant. 

The  finish  in  the  workmanship  on  their  bone  fish-hooks, 
which  in  itself  marked  a  certain  stage  of  culture,  the  excel- 
lence of  their  stone  adzes  and  axes,  polished,  ground  and 
ornamented  so  that  they  became  famous  in  the  South  Sea 
Islands,  the  exquisite  delicacy  of  the  feather  work  on  their 
feather  cloaks  and  helmets,  the  variety  and  execution  of  the 
designs  of  their  cloth,  the  texture  of  their  woven  mats,  the 
symmetry  and  turning  of  their  bowls,  and  the  beautiful  polish 
of  the  wood  of  their  weapons,  together  with  the  advanced 

'  Cook,  p.  182.  -  Payne,  pp.  406-7. 


192  The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii. 

state  of  their  agriculture,  shows  that  their  means  of  getting 
a  Hving  was  comparatively  easy  and  did  not  at  least  occupy 
more  than  a  part  of  their  time  and  energy.  It  further  shows 
that  though  morally  degraded  they  were  pressing  against 
the  economic  barriers  set  by  nature  and  that  their  advance 
would  be  rapid  if  the  means  were  offered. 

Fourth — Their  system  of  gozmiment. 

A  fourth  cause  that  tended  to  keep  them  in  a  backward 
sjtate  was  the  system  of  government  under  which  they 
existed.  This  was  a  despotism,  yet  in  some  particulars  it 
resembled  the  feudal  system  ;  certain  customs,  from  their 
general  usefulness  and  antiquity,  were  considered  in  the  light 
of  traditionary  code.  These  related  principally  to  the  tenure 
of  lands,  personal  security,  right  of  property,  and  barter. 
Such  indeed  was  the  force  of  public  sentiment  upon  these 
subjects  that  the  chiefs  hesitated  to  violate  the  spirit  of 
their  meaning.  By  them  the  amount  of  taxes  or  labor  due 
the  chiefs  from  their  dependants  and  his  duties  to  them  were 
to  some  extent  regulated.  This  species  of  common  law  was 
particularly  binding  in  regard  to  the  means  of  irrigation,  on 
which  the  whole  value  of  their  crops  depended.  It  regu- 
lated the  amount  of  water  for  each  plantation  according  to 
the  dryness  of  the  season.^ 

In  criminal  cases  the  lex  talionis  prevailed. 

"  Such  were  the  nature  of  some  of  their  regulations,  which  while  they 
tended  to  some  extent  to  create  a  security  of  property  and  person 
among  the  common  people  in  their  transactions  with  each  other  afforded 
but  little  safety  against  oppression  on  the  part  of  their  chiefs."^ 

"The  people  were  attached  to  the  soil  and  transferred  with  the  land 
like  serfs  of  modern  times."* 

"The  kingly  authority  extended  over  the  lives,  liberty,  and  property 
of  all  and  was  delegated  to  the  governors  of  the  islands  or  great  dis- 
tricts and  from  them  to  inferior  officers.  No  chief  could  interfere  with 
the  tenant  of  another  and  should  they  desire  revenge  or  justice  it  could 
only  be  obtained  through  the  legitimate  lord. 

'  Jarves,  p.  34.  '■'  Jarves,  p.  35.  *  Jarves,  p.  37. 


The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii.  193 

The  greatest  safeguard  of  the  people  consisted  in  the  self-interest  of 
their  masters,  whose  wealth  and  power  depended  chiefly  on  the  number 
of  their  bondmen."' 

So  far  as  their  productive  powers  were  concerned  they 
were  a  nation  of  slaves,  and  the  system  by  which  the  chief 
might  take  anything  that  his  subject  had  any  claim  upon, 
from  a  taro  crop  to  his  wife  and  children,  would  be  a  very 
effective  bar  to  economic  progress.  If  this  were  true  dur- 
ing the  period  before  their  discovery,  when  the  wants  of  the 
kings  and  chiefs  were  little  incentive  to  the  accumulation  of 
tribute  in  the  form  of  taro  roots,  fish,  plantains,  cocoanuts, 
mats,  bowls,  tapa  cloth  and  sandal  wood,  any  of  which  must 
have  had  small  exchange  value  among  the  different  islands, 
it  was  a  hundred  fold  more  oppressive  when  these  supplies 
could  be  exchanged  for  fire-arms,  rum,  silks,  and  the  lux- 
uries of  the  new  civilisation  that  the  white  traders  brought 
with  them  from  over  the  sea. 

A  command  was  sufficient  to  bring  these  coveted  treasures 
into  the  hand  of  the  king  and  chiefs — for  as  they  ordered 
so  the  people  did — and  the  little  finger  of  the  chiefs  of  this 
generation  was  thicker  than  the  loins  of  their  predecessors. 
Jarves  paints  a  terrible  picture  of  this  time  of  oppression. 

"The  little  natural  human  feelings  the  chiefs  possessed  was  extin- 
guished by  an  all-powerful  passion  for  gain  !  Interested  foreigners 
stimulated  this  desire.  Cargoes  of  rich  goods  were  brought,  luxuries 
displayed  and  no  means  left  untried  to  excite  their  cupidity.  The 
unfortunate  result  is  well  known.  The  whole  physical  resources  of 
the  kingdom  were  over-wrought,  and  men,  women  and  children  were 
taxed  beyond  their  powers.  Sandal-wood  was  to  be  collected  ;  moun- 
tains and  valleys  almost  inaccessible  were  to  be  penetrated  and  heavy 
loads  borne  on  bleeding  shoulders  to  the  sea  side.  Like  the  Children 
of  Israel  their  toil  was  doubled  and  their  sufferings  found  no  consid- 
eration in  the  eyes  of  their  task-masters.  Cultivation  was  neglected 
and  famine  ensued.  Multitudes  perished  under  their  burdens  ;  others 
left  their  homes  and  wandered,  like  wild  animals,  in  the  depths  of 
forests,  where  they  either  sunk  under  the  horrors  of  want  and  starvation 
or  sustained  a  miserable  existence  on  roots  and  wild  fruits." 

This    system    of    government    was,    however,    gradually 
changed,  and  in  time  a  constitutional  government  took  its 
'  Jarves,  p.  26. 
13 


194  The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hawaii. 

place,  but  before  it  disappeared  great  numbers  of  the  popu- 
lation had  perished.  Other  needs  were  suppHed  one  by  one 
by  the  white  people.  Captain  Cook  began  by  trying  to  intro- 
duce various  animals  and  certain  garden  vegetables.  Cereals 
were  soon  supplied  in  abundance  as  well  as  domestic  animals, 
the  ox,  the  horse,  the  cow,  the  sheep  and  goat,  and  much 
needed  implements  of  iron,  steel,  copper,  brass  and  bronze. 

Hawaii  seemed  now  ready  to  leap  forward  at  a  bound, 
but  there  was  lacking  a  vital  element  to  progress  that  the 
Hawaiians  could  alone  supply  for  their  own  advancement. 
This  was  the  population.  Instead  of  increasing  and  thus 
acting  as  a  further  spur  to  endeavor,  the  population  con- 
tinued to  decline.  The  death-rate  exceeded  the  birth-rate, 
and  from  Cook's  time  on,  the  increase  was  due  to  foreign 
immigrants.  A  variety  of  causes  may  have  been  at  work. 
For,  while  it  is  customary  to  hold  the  advent  of  civilisation 
responsible,  and  to  compare  it  with  the  earthen  pot  and  the 
brazen  pot  floating  down  the  stream,  the  earthen  pot  being 
safe  from  destruction  alone,  but  in  contact  with  the  brazen 
pot  the  weaker  vessel  goes  to  the  bottom,  still,  the  diseases 
introduced  by  the  white  men,  and  they  were  virulent,  measles 
and  small  pox  carrying  off  great  numbers,  the  exterminating 
ferocity  of  the  native  wars,  and  the  havoc  wrought  by  the 
intoxicating  drinks  of  the  Europeans  all  taken  together,  do 
not  give  a  satisfactory  account  for  the  great  decrease  in 
population. 

A  nation  no  more  than  an  individual  can  dissipate  its 
vital  energy  and  continue  sound  and  vigorous.  Savages  are 
notorious  for  their  lack  of  continence  and  for  their  intem- 
perance, and  that  pleasure  which  is  near  is  most  desirable, 
nor  may  the  satisfaction  of  any  desire  be  postponed  if  its 
gratification  is  at  hand.  The  propensity  to  thieving  among 
savages  illustrates  this  lack  of  restraint.  The  Hawaiians 
were  grossly  licentious.  We  have  many  accounts  of  their 
lascivious  orgies.  Marriage  was  merely  formal,  and  in  no 
way  binding.  Woman's  virtue  was  an  unknown  conception 
to  them. 


The  Economic  Conditions  in  Hazvaii.  195 

"  As  they  had  no  wants  but  those  of  the  body,  the}'  knew  no  pleas- 
ures but  wanton  indulgence.  In  these  they  reveled  day  and  night. 
Except  in  times  of  tabu  their  capacity  and  opportunities  alone  limited 
their  excesses.  In  their  feasts  the)'  left  no  remnant.  In  their  bacchana- 
lian revels  they  drank  the  last  drop.  In  their  licentious  indulgence 
there  were  no  bounds  they  did  not  pass." 

Here  seems  to  be  a  prime  cause  for  their  decay. 

Captain  Cook  estimated  the  population  of  the  islands  in 
1778  at  400,000 — probably  an  over-estimate.  The  Hawaiian 
Almanac  and  Annual  for  1878  gives  tables  of  population : 

1823  estimated.  143,050 

1832  census.  130,313 

1836       "  108,579 

1853        "  73.138 

i860       "  69,800 

1872        "  56,987 

Entire  population. 
1884         "  80,000 

Native. 
40,000 
1890  "  90.000 

34,000 

The  declining  native  population  made  it  possible  for  a 
foreign  population  to  take  its  place,  and  that  class  of  for- 
eigners would  be  attracted  as  permanent  settlers  who  found 
the  inducements  to  remain  most  profitable  and  pleasant.  The 
relative  nearness  of  the  shores  of  the  American  Republic 
together  with  the  preponderance  of  American  sentiment  due 
to  the  American  missionaries  and  to  the  American  whale 
ships  gave  the  United  States  an  advantage  from  the 
first.  It  would,  therefore,  be  the  natural  policy  of  the 
American  government  to  supply  the  demands  of  this  mixed 
people  and  to  itse  commercial  treaties  to  bind  closer  the 
political  ties  between  the  two.  As  time  went  on  and  the 
Americans  increased,  attracted  by  trade  advantages,  the  dis- 
parity in  the  numbers  of  the  native  and  foreign  population 
became  greater  and  in  time  so  great  that  the  islands  were 
American  in  everything  but  name,  and  it  needed  only  the 
incident  of  the  Spanish  War  to  bring  about  Annexation. 


196  Appendix. 


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Appendix.  197 


APPENDIX    B. 

The  text  of  the  articles  of  the  treaty  as  it  was  submitted 
and  finally  ratified. 

Article  I. 

For  and  in  consideration  of  the  rights  and  privileges 
granted  by  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
in  the  next  succeeding  article  of  this  convention,  and  as  an 
equivalent  therefor,  the  United  States  of  America  hereby 
agree  to  admit  all  the  articles  named  in  the  following 
schedule,  the  same  being  the  growth  and  manufacture  or 
product  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  into  all  the  ports  of  the 
United  States  free  of  duty. 


Articles  the  product  of  the  Hazvaiian  Islands. 
Free  Schedule. 

Arrowroot,  castor  oil,  bananas,  nuts ;  vegetables,  dried 
and  undried,  preserved  and  unpreserved ;  hides  and  skins 
undressed,  rice  ;  pulu,  seeds  ;  plants  ;  shrubs  or  trees  ;  musca- 
vado,  brown  and  all  other  unrefined  sugar,  meaning  thereby 
the  grades  of  sugar  heretofore  commonly  imported  from 
Hawaii  Islands  and  now  known  in  the  markets  of  San  Fran- 
cisco and  Portland  as  Sandwich  Islands,  sugar,  syrups  of 
sugarcane,  melado,  and  molasses  ;   tallow. 

Article  II. 

For  and  in  consideration  of  the  rights  and  privileges 
granted  by  the  United  States  of  America  in  the  preceding 
article  of  this  convention,  and  as  an  equivalent  therefor,  His 
Majesty  the  King  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  hereby  agrees 
to  admit  all  the  articles  named  in  the  following  schedule, 
the  same  being  the  growth,  manufacture,  or  produce  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  into  all  the  ports  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  free  of  duty. 


198  Appe'udix. 

Articles  the  produce  and  manufacture  of  the  United  States. 

Free  Schedule. 

Agricultural  implements  ;  animals,  beef,  bacon,  pork,  ham, 
and  all  fresh,  smoked,  or  preserved  meats  ;  boots  and  shoes  ; 
grain,  flour,  meal,  and  bran,  bread  and  breadstufifs,  of  all 
kinds,  bricks,  lime,  and  cement ;  butter,  cheese,  lard,  tallow  ; 
bullion ;  coal ;  cordage,  naval  stores,  including  tar,  pitch, 
resin,  turpentine,  raw  and  rectified ;  copper  and  composition 
sheating  ;  nails  and  bolts  ;  cotton  and  manufactures  of  cotton, 
bleached  and  unbleached,  and  whether  or  not  colored,  stained, 
painted,  or  printed ;  eggs  ;  fish,  and  oysters,  and  all  other 
creatures  living  in  the  water,  and  the  products  thereof  ;  fruits, 
nuts,  and  vegetables,  green,  dried  or  undried,  preserved  or 
unpreserved.  hardware ;  hides,  furs,  skins,  and  pelts  dressed 
or  undressed  ;  hoop  iron  and  rivets,  nails,  spikes  and  bolts, 
tacks,  brads  or  sprigs ;  ice ;  iron  or  steel,  and  manufactures 
thereof  ;  leather  ;  lumber  and  timber  all  kinds,  round,  hewed, 
sawed,  and  unmanufactured,  in  whole  or  in  part,  doors, 
sashes,  and  blinds  ;  machinery  of  all  kinds,  engines  and  parts 
thereof ;  oats  and  hay ;  paper,  stationery,  and  books,  and  all 
manufactures  of  paper  or  of  paper  and  wood ;  petroleum 
and  all  oils  for  lubricating  or  illuminating  purposes ;  plants, 
shrubs,  trees,  and  seeds ;  rice  :  sugar,  refined  or  unrefined ; 
salt,  soap ;  shocks,  staves,  and  headings  ;  wool  and  manufac- 
tures of  wool,  other  than  ready-made  clothing ;  wagons  and 
carts  for  the  purpose  of  agriculture,  or  of  defraying ;  wood 
and  manufactures  of  wood,  or  of  wood  and  metal,  except 
furniture,  either  upholstered  or  carved,  and  carriages  ;  textile 
manufactures,  made  of  a  combination  of  wool,  cotton,  silk, 
or  linen,  or  of  any  two  or  more  of  them,  other  than  when 
ready-made  clothing ;  harness  and  all  manufactures  of 
leather ;  starch ;  and  tobacco,  whether  in  leaf  or  manu- 
factured. 

Article  III. 

The  evidence  that  articles  proposed  to  be  admitted  into 
the  ports  of  the  United  States  of  America,  or  the  ports  of  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  free  of  duty,  under  the  first  and  second 
articles  of  this  convention,  are  the  growth,  manufacture,  or 
produce  of  the  United  States  or  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
respectively,  shall  be  established  under  such  rules  and  regu- 
lations and  conditions  for  the  protection  of  the  revenue  as 
the  two  governments  may  from  time  to  time  respectively 
prescribe. 


Appendix.  199 

Article  IV. 

No  export  duty  or  charges  shall  be  imposed  in  the 
Hawaiian  Islands,  or  in  the  United  States,  upon  any  of  the 
articles  proposed  to  be  admitted  into  the  ports  of  the  United 
States  or  the  ports  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  free  of  duty 
under  the  first  and  second  articles  of  this  convention.  It 
is  agreed  on  the  part  of  His  Hawaiian  Majesty,  that  so  long 
as  this  treaty  shall  remain  in  force  he  will  not  lease  or  other- 
wise dispose  of  or  create  any  lien  upon  any  port,  harbor,  or 
other  territory  in  his  dominions,  or  grant  any  special  priv- 
ilege or  rights  of  use  therein,  to  any  other  power,  state  or 
government  nor  make  any  treaty  by  which  any  other  nation 
shall  obtain  the  same  privileges  relative  to  the  admission  of 
any  article  free  of  duty,  hereby  secured  to  the  United  States. 

Article  V. 

The  present  convention  shall  take  effect  as  soon  as  it  shall 
have  been  approved  and  proclaimed  by  His  Majesty  the  King 
of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  shall  have  been  ratified  and 
duly  proclaimed  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  but  not  until  a  law  to  carry  it  into  operation  shall  have 
been  passed  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

Such  assent  having  been  given,  and  the  ratifications  of  the 
convention  having  been  exchanged  as  provided  in  Article 
VI,  the  convention  shall  remain  in  force  for  seven  years  from 
the  date  at  which  it  may  come  into  operation  and  further, 
until  the  expiration  of  twelve  months  after  either  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  shall  give  notice  to  the  other  of  its  wish 
to  terminate  the  same,  each  of  the  high  contracting  parties 
being  at  liberty  to  give  notice  to  the  other  at  the  end  of  said 
term  of  seven  years,  or  at  any  time  thereafter. 

Article  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  duly  ratified,  and  the  rati- 
fications exchanged  at  Washington  City,  within  eighteen 
months  from  the  date  hereof,  or  earlier  if  possible. 

In  faith  whereof  the  respective  plenipotentiaries  of  the 
high  contracting  parties  have  signed  this  present  convention 
and  have  affixed  thereto  their  respective  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate,  at  Washington,  the  thirtieth  day  of 
January,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight-hundred 
and  seventy-five. 

[seal]  Hamilton  Fish. 

[seal]  Elisha  H.  Allen. 

[seal]  Henry  A.  P.  Carter. 


200  Appendix. 

and  whereas  the  said  convention,  as  amended,  has  been  duly 
ratified  on  both  parts,  and  the  respective  ratifications  were 
exchanged  in  this  city  on  this  day  : 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  known  that  I,  Ulysses  S.  Grant, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  have  caused  the 
said  convention  to  be  made  public,  to  the  end  that  the  same, 
and  every  clause  and  article  thereof  may  be  observed  and 
fulfilled  with  good  faith  by  the  United  States  and  the  citizens 
thereof. 

In  witness  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand,  and 
caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  this  third  day  of  June, 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
seventy-five,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United  States 
the  ninety-ninth.^ 

U.  S.  Grant. 

By  the  President, 
Hamilton  Fish, 
Secretary  of  State. 

»  S.  E.  D.,  No.  77,  52  C,  2  S.,  Vol.  8,  pp.  160-162. 


Appendix. 


APPENDIX   C. 

"The  simple  recital  of  the  facts  as  to  our  trade  with 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  before  and  since  the  date  of  the  reci- 
procity treaty  Sept.  9,  1879,  will  show  its  great  inequality 
and  the  conspicuous  injustice  to  our  government  and  people 
of  its  longer  continuance. 

Prior  to  the  treaty  the  average  annual  importations  of 
Hawaiian  sugars  amounted  to  about  fifteen  million  pounds, 
all  of  a  very  low  grade,  upon  which  the  duties  collected  were 
only  about  $500,000 ;  and  that  was  represented  to  be  the 
full  extent  of  the  loss  of  revenue  to  which  the  United  States 
would  be  subjected  by  the  ratification  of  the  treaty. 

It  appears  that  the  soil  and  climate  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  are  peculiarly  adapted  to  the  growth  of  the  sugar 
cane,  as  well  as  to  that  of  rice ;  and  there  was  an  increase  of 
50  per  cent,  in  the  importation  of  Hawaiian  sugars  the  first 
year  after  the  treaty  went  into  operation. 

In  1882  the  amount  imported  rose  to  the  astonishing 
amount  of  106,181,858  pounds.  Beyond  this  grade  and 
value  of  these  sugars,  by  the  use  of  the  vacuum  pan  and 
centrifugal  machines  in  the  process  of  manufacture,  have 
been  very  largely  changed ;  and  now  instead  of  the  larger 
portion  coming  in  as  it  previously  came,  not  above  No.  10 
Dutch  standard,  nearly  the  whole  of  it  comes  in  above  No.  10 
Dutch  standard. 

Beyond  all  question  the  sugars  lately  received  from  the 
Plawaiian  Islands  have  not  been  such  as  are  commonly  and 
commercially  known  prior  to  the  date  of  the  treaty  in  the 
markets  of  San  Francisco  and  Portland  as  Sandwich  Island 
sugars,  and  their  admission  is  an  open  and  indisputable 
fraud  on  the  treaty.  Whether  the  government  can  protect 
itself  against  this  flagrant  fraud,  by  excluding  these  higher 
grades  of  sugars  from  the  benefit  of  the  treaty,  is  very 
doubtful,  as  these  same  sugars,  without  diminishing  their 
saccharine  strength,  may  easily  be  so  discolored  as  to  reduce 
them  below  No.  10  Dutch  standard,  or  to  the  class  formerly 
known  as  Sandwich  Islands  sugars,  and  thus  they  would 
have  at  least  a  colorable  title  to  pass  free  through  the  custom 
house. 


202  Appendix. 

"Whether  the  low  grades  of  sugar  from  China  and  India, 
costing  three  cents  or  less  a  pound,  may  not  be  brought  to 
the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  re-exported  to  the  United  States 
at  a  large  profit,  is  a  question  that  hardly  admits  of  doubt. 
The  fixed  belief  of  importers  and  producers  of  sugar  and 
rice  is  that  this  has  been  done  already.  The  temptation  is 
great,  and  the  difficulty  of  detecting  such  frauds  is  not  small. 

Without  taking  any  account  of  the  increasing  quantity  of 
Hawaiian  molasses  brought  here  free  of  duty,  the  article 
of  rice  appears  as  one  of  their  most  rapidly  increasing  com- 
modities, as  will  appear  from  the  following  table  of  the 
annual  importations. 

Rice  imported  from  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 

1877 3,034,405 

1878 6,063,514 

1879 5,553,676 

1880  5,062,646 

1881 6,984,406 

1882 10,135,678 

That  our  trade  with  the  Hawaiian  Islands  is  most  un- 
profitable, will  appear  when  we  add  up  our  entire  domestic 
exports  of  merchandise  and  find  that  the  whole  for  six  years 
amounts  to  less  than  our  actual  remission  of  duties  on  sugar 
and  rice,  or  to  $13,033,314  of  exports,  against  a  loss  of 
duties  remitted  of  $13,717,436.  .  .  .  We  have  no  colo- 
nial possessions,  and  do  not  and  shall  not  require  any  for 
a  surplus  population  so  long  as  one-third  of  our  acreage  of 
lands  remains  uncultivated,  and  so  long  as  the  country  is 
able  annually  to  absorb  and  Americanize  a  million  of  foreign 
immigrants.  Certainly  there  is  no  pressure  requiring  us  to 
send  to  foreign  lands  any  portion  of  our  people  with  a  heavy 
subsidy  to  be  paid  and  borne  by  those  who  remain  at  home. 
Signed, 

Justin  S.  Morrill, 
Dan'l  W.  Voorhees, 
Nelson  W.  Aldrich. 


Appendix.  203 


APPENDIX    D. 

"Article  I. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  the  time  fixed 
for  the  duration  of  the  said  convention  shall  be  definitely 
extended  for  a  term  of  seven  years  from  the  date  of  the 
exchange  of  ratification  hereof  and  further  until  the  expira- 
tion of  twelve  months  after  either  of  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties  shall  give  notice  to  the  other  of  its  wish  to 
terminate  the  same,  each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
being  at  liberty  to  give  such  notice  to  the  other  at  the  end 
of  the  said  term  of  seven  years  or  at  any  time  thereafter. 

Article  H. 

His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  grants 
to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  the  exclusive  right 
to  enter  the  harbor  of  Pearl  River,  in  the  Island  of  Oahu, 
and  to  establish  and  to  maintain  there  a  coaling  and  repair 
station  for  the  use  of  vessels  of  the  United  States,  and  to 
that  end  the  United  States  may  improve  the  entrance  to 
said  harbor  and  do  all  other  things  needful  to  the  purpose 
aforesaid. 

Article  HI. 

The  present  Convention  shall  be  ratified  and  the  ratifi- 
cation exchanged  at  Washington,  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  witness  whereof,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries  have 
signed  the  present  Convention  in  duplicate  and  have  here- 
unto affixed  their  respective  seals. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  the  6th  day  of  Decem- 
ber in  the  year  of  our  Lord  1884. 

Frederick  T.  Freylinghuysen,  [seal]. 
H.  A.  C.  Carter,  [seal]. 

And  whereas  the  said  Convention,  as  amended,  has  been 
duly  ratified  on  both  parts,  and  the  respective  ratifications  of 
the  same  have  been  exchanged. 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  known  that  I,  Grover  Cleveland, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America,  have  caused  the 


204  Appendix. 

said  Convention  to  be  made  public  to  the  end  that  the 
same  and  every  article  and  clause  thereof,  as  amended  may 
be  observed  and  fulfilled  with  good  faith  by  the  United 
States  and  citizens  thereof. 

In  testimony  whereof  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and 
caused  the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  affixed. 

Done  at  the  City  of  Washington  this  ninth  day  of  Novem- 
ber in  (Seal)  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  eighty-seven  and  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  the  one  hundred  and  twelfth. 

Grover  Cleveland. 
By  the  President, 
T.  F.  Bayard, 

Secretary  of  State." 


Appendix.  205 


APPENDIX   TABLE   I. 

statement'  showing  the  value  of  a  ton  of  wheat  and  one  of  corn, 
at  given  points  from  market,  as  affected  by  cost  of  trans- 
portation by  railroad,  and  over  the  ordinary  road. 


Transportation  by 
railroad. 

Transportation  by 
ordinary  highway. 

Wheat. 

Com. 

Wheat. 

Corn. 

Value  at  market 

$49.50 

$24.75 

$49-50 

$24.75 

10  miles  from      " 

49-55 

24.60 

48.00 

23 

.25 

20      "         " 

49.20 

24-45 

46.50 

21 

.75 

30 

49-05 

24.30 

45.00 

20 

.25 

40      " 

48.90 

24-15 

43.50 

18 

.75 

50      " 

48.75 

24.00 

40.00 

17 

-25 

60      " 

48.60 

23.85 

40.50 

15 

-75 

70      " 

48.45 

23.70 

39.00 

14 

.25 

80      " 

48.30 

23-55 

37.50 

12 

.75 

90      " 

48.15 

23.40 

36.00 

II 

.25 

100      "         "         " 

48.00 

23.25 

34.50 

9 

.75 

no 

47.85 

23.10 

33.00 

8 

.25 

120 

47.70 

22.95 

31.50 

6 

.75 

130 

47.55 

22.80 

30.50 

5 

.25 

140 

47.40 

22.65 

28.50 

3 

.75 

150      " 

47.25 

22.50 

27.00 

2 

•25 

160      " 

47.10 

22.35 

25.50 

.75 

170    " 

46.95 

22.20 

24.00 

.00 

200      "         "         " 

46.50 

21.75 

19.50 

220 

46.20 

21.45 

16.50 

240 

45-90 

21.15 

13.50 

260 

45.60 

2O.S5 

10.50 

280        " 

45-30 

20.55 

7.50 

300 

45-00 

20.25 

4.50 

320 

44.70 

19-95 

1.50 

330        " 

44-55 

19.80 

.00 

The  homogeneousness  in  the  pursuits  of  the  great  mass  of  our 
people,  and  the  wide  space  that  separates  the  producing  and  consum- 
ing classes,  as  they  are  popularly  termed,  necessarily  implies  the 
exportation  of  the  surplus  of  each.  The  western  farmer  has  no  home 
demand  for  the  wheat  he  raises,  as  the  surplus  of  the  district  in  which 
he  resides  has  to  be  exported  to  find  a  consumer  ;  and  the  producer 
for  a  similar  reason  is  obliged  to  import  all  the  various  articles  that 
enter  into  consumption  which  his  own  industry  does  not  immediately 

'  Sen.  Doc.  No.  112,  p.  380-1  ;  1851-2,  32  Cong.,  i  Sess. 


2o6  Appendix. 

supply  ;  and  farther,  as  the  markets  for  our  agricultural  products  lie 
either  upon  the  extreme  verge  of  the  countr}',  or  in  Europe,  the  greater 
part  of  our  domestic  commerce  involves  a  throtigh  movement  of  nearly 
all  the  articles  of  which  it  is  composed. 

It  is  well  known  that  upon  the  ordinar}'  highways,  the  economical 
limit  to  transportation  is  confined  within  a  comparatively  few  miles, 
depending  of  course  upon  the  kind  of  freight  and  character  of  the 
roads.  Upon  the  average  of  such  ways  the  cost  of  transportation  is 
not  far  from  15  cents  per  ton  per  mile,  which  may  be  considered  as  a 
sufficiently  correct  estimate  for  the  whole  country.  Estimating  at  the 
same  time  the  value  of  wheat  at  $1.50  per  bushel,  the  corn  at  75  cents, 
and  that  33  bushels  are  equal  to  a  ton,  the  value  of  the  former  would 
be  equal  to  its  cost  of  transportation  for  330  miles,  and  the  latter  165 
miles.  At  these  respective  distances  from  market,  neither  of  the  above 
articles  would  have  any  commercial  value  with  only  a  common  earth 
road  as  an  avenue  to  market. 

But  we  find  that  we  can  move  property  upon  railroads  at  the  rate  of 
15  cents  per  ton  per  mile,  or  for  one-tenth  the  cost  upon  the  ordinary 
road.  These  works,  therefore,  extend  the  economic  limit  of  the  cost  of 
transportation  of  the  above  articles  to  3,300  and  1,650  miles  respectively, 
At  the  limit  of  the  economical  movement  of  these  articles  upon  the 
common  highways,  by  use  of  the  railroads  wheat  would  be  worth  $44.50 
and  corn  $22.20  per  ton,  which  sums  respectively  would  represent  the 
actual  increase  of  value  by  the  interposition  of  such  a  work. 


Appendix. 


207 


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Appendix. 


APPENDIX    TABLE    III. 

Fish  Exported  from  U.  S.  to  Br.  N.  A.  Prov. 


1854 

Dried. 

Pickled. 

Total  Exports. 

1855 

$12,373 

$11,947 

$396,611  Dried. 

1856 

29,261 

18,310 

283,049  Pickled, 

1857 

13,276 

34.980 

1858 

30,657 

23,903 

1859 

47,763 

11.094 

i860 

36,210 

7,650 

I86I 

30,327 

20,664 

1862 

35,747 

12,615 

1863 

57,655 

18,386 

1864 

38,223 

20,776 

1865 

21,947 

64.110 

1866 

23,172 

38,614 

$396,611        $283,049    $679,660 


Fish  Imported  from  Br.  N.  A.  Prov.  to  U.  S. 


Dried. 

Pickled. 

Total  Imports. 

1855 

(6  mo 

.)  $      6,211 

(6 

mo.)$      5,582 

$  4,085,903  Dried. 

1856 

528,788 

1,336,268 

11,995,726  Pickled, 

1857 

470,416 

1,162,933 

1858 

341,855 

1,172,916 

1859 

422,505 

1,328,969 

i860 

313,491 

1,389,852 

I86I 

415,201 

945,603 

1862 

684,358 

137,337 

1863 

144,305 

493,631 

1864 

234,126 

837,611 

1865 

197,932 

1,600,826 

1866 

326,715 

1,584,198 

$4,085,903  $11,995,726        $16,081,629 

Compiled  from  Ex.  Doc.  53d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  No.  106,  p.  42. 


Appendix. 


209 


APPENDIX    TABLE    Ul.  —  ConHnued. 

Canadian  (Br.  JV.  A.  Prov.)  Exports. 

Meats,  Butter  and 

all  kinds.  Cheese.                      Wheat.  Flour. 

1855  $  8,000  $  28,000  $2,000,000  $2,000,000 

1856  53,000  215,000  6,000,000  4,000,000 

1857  80,000  344,000  5,000,000  4,000,000 

1858  36,000  279,000  2,000,000  2,000,000 

1859  227,000  375,000  1,000,000  2,000,000 
i860       392,000  511,000  1,500,000  3,000,000 

1861  400,000  398,000  4,500,000  3,000,000 

1862  128,000  444,000  3,000,000  2,000,000 

1863  137,000  328,000  1,000,000  2,000,000 

1864  397,000  495,000  2,000,000  2,000,000 

1865  850,000  699,000  1,000,000  2,000,000 

Total           $2,708,000  $4,116,000           $29,000,000  $28,000,000 

American  Exports. 
Pork  only. 

1855  $1,016,000  $  84,000  $     500,000  $2,000,000 

1856  1,421,000  180,000                   1,200,000  4,000,000 

1857  1,121,000  168,000  2,000,000  3,000,000 

1858  949,000  182,000  2,000,000  4,000,000 

1859  1,210,000  280,000  1,000,000  4,000,000 
i860             1,002,000  249,000  1,000,000  4,000,000 

1861  630,000  208,000  3,000,000  3,000,000 

1862  1,044,000  323,000  3,000,000  3,500,000 

1863  1,246,000  589,000  6,000.000  5,500,000 

1864  2,476,000  499,000  5,000,000  5,500,000 

1865  2,152,000  389,000  6,000,000  6,500,000 

1866               2,000,000  

Total          $14,267,000  $3,151,000            $33,000,000  $45,000,000 

Compiled  from  Sen.  Ex.  Docs.  53  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  No.  106,  Vol.  4. 

Exports  of  Canadian. 
(Br.  N.  Am.  Prov.)  Exports  of  American. 

Corn.  Barley.                              Corn.  Barley. 

1855  $    862,000  No  returns. 

1856  No  returns,                                                1,193,000  

1857  58                       772,000  

1858  little  290                       384,000  

1859  532,000  

i860             corn  11,000                       608,000  

1861  851,000  

1862  grown  in  1,095,000                    1,075,000  

1863  1,524,000                    1,854,000  

1864  Canada.  2,917,000                   1,030,000  

1865  4,093,000                   1,619,000  

$9,640,348  $10,680,000  

Compiled  from  Sen.  Ex.  Docs.,  53  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  No.  106,  Vol.  4. 
14 


2IO  Appendix. 

APPENDIX    TABLE    III.— Continued. 

TABLE    SHOWING    THE    VALUES    OF    CANADIAN    GOODS    EXPORTED    TO    THE 
UNITED    STATES    AND    AMERICAN    GOODS    EXPORTED    TO    CANADA. 


1855 
1856 

1857 
1858 

1859 
i860 
1861 
1862 
1863 
1864 
1865 


Coal. 
&  363,000 
396,000 
387,000 
372,000 
497,000 
702,000 
614,000 
757,000 
883,000 
1,210,000 
877,000 


American  Imports. 

Timber 
and  Lumber. 

$     571,000 

2,832,000 

2,585,000 

2,931,000 

2,937,000 

3,416,000 

3,288,000 

2,526,000 

3,018,000 

4,511,000 

5,003,000 


Wood. 

Tobacco. 

$   51,000 

$1,000 

374,000 

2,000 

309,000 

3,000 

248,000 

900 

524,000 

1,000 

340,000 

400 

260,000 

100 

569,000 

2,000 

781,000 

400 

1,378,000 

2,000 

1,527,000 

4,000 

1,206,000 

900 

$7,058,000         $33,618,000 


7,567,000 


&I7.700 


Canadian  (Br.  N.  A.  Prov.)  Imports. 


1855 
1856 

1857 
1858 

1859 
i860 
1861 
1862 
1863 
1864 
1865 


$352,000 

$39,000 

429,000 

49,000 

395,000 

67,000 

318,000 

28,000 

250,000 

9,000 

257,000 

18,000 

271,000 

2,000 

398,000 

3,000 

431,000 

100 

555,000 

18,000 

815,000 

18,000 

p     7,000 

20,000 

15,000 

61,000 

224,000 

369,000 

66,000 

139,000 

88,000 

33,000 

109,000 


$  492,000 
567,000 
513,000 
910,000 
1,613,000 
1,116,000 
882,000 
394,000 
575,000 

540,000 
267,000 


$4,471,000  $251,100  $1,131,000       $7,869,000 

Compiled  from  Sen.  Ex.  Docs.  53  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  No.  106,  Vol.  4. 


Appendix. 


APPENDIX 

TABLE    IV.i 

IVool. 

Tobacco. 

Fish 

VlHieat. 

Jan. 

Salt  Mackerel. 

1850    $0.83^  pel 

lb. 

$10.12  per 

bbl 

■    $0.95  per  bu. 

1S51         .85>^ 

10.00 

1.05 

1852         .81^ 

9.00 

1. 00 

1853       1.07 

$  7.00  per  cwt 

11.50 

1.32 

1854        -9^% 

7,00 

15.00 

i.87_J^  per  bu 

1855         .851:^ 

7.50 

19.00 

2.30 

1856      1.043// 

I5-I2>4     " 

13.00 

1.77 

1857       1.02 

14-75 

15.00 

1.70 

1858          .82>^ 

15.00 

15.50       ' 

1. 10 

1859      i.og^jT 

11.00 

14.50       ' 

1.20 

i860 

II. 00 

16.00 

1.30 

1865      1.66 

32.50 

22.00 

2.28 

Wholesale  prices  in  New  York. 

Jan. 

Barley. 

Corn. 

1850 

$  0.65  per  bu. 

$  0 

.62      per  bu. 

1851 

.85    ' 

M%      " 

1852 

■79       ' 

.66 

1853 

•  71 

•  73 

1854 

.80     ' 

•79 

1855 

1.30 

I 

.00           " 

1856 

1.20 

92 

1857 

1.23 

.68 

1858 

.72     ' 

.58 

1859 

.69    ' 

.78 

i860 

•  77       ' 

89 

1865 

2.05       ' 

I 

86 

Page  8,  Table 

X.     Aldrich. 

Jan. 

Tar. 

Tti  r pent  inc. 

1850 

$i.62>^  per  bbl. 

%  0 

36      per  gal. 

1851 

1.681/       ' 

42 

1852 

1.75 

34>^       " 

1853 

2.00 

62 

1854 

3.00 

62 

1855 

3.00 

43 

1S56 

2.50 

37>^       " 

1857 

1-75 

48 

1858 

i.37>^       ' 

38 

1859 

2.25 

49 

i860 

2.44 

44 

1865 

6.00 

(imported) 

2 

05 

'  Aldrich,   Prices,    Wages  and  Transportation,  Rept.  1394,  52  C,  2  S., 
Vol  4. 


Appendix. 


APPENDIX    TABLE    IV .—Continued. 


Pine  boards. 

Pine  logs. 

Hevilock  logs 

1850 

$31.25  per 

M. 

I85I 

3125 

1852 

31.25 

1853 

33-25 

1854 

35-25 

1855 

34-25 

1856 

37-25 

1857 

40.25 

1858 

41-25 

$  8.00 

%   6.00 

1859 

33.25 

8.00 

6.00 

i860 

33-25 

8.00 

6.00 

1865 

61.25 

16.00 

12.00 

Pork. 

Coal. 

Jan. 

Anthracite. 

Bituminous. 

1850 

$ii.87>^  per 

bbl.                     $3.65 

1851 

12.75 

3.65 

1852 

i5-37>^        ' 

3-25 

1853 

19-25 

3-85 

1854 

13-75 

4.00 

1855 

12.75 

4.85 

1856 

17.00 

5.30 

1857 

2o.37>^ 

4.60 

%  6.00 

1858 

14-75 

4.45 

6.00 

1859 

17-50 

3-90 

4.50 

i860 

16.50 

3-8o 

5.00 

1865 

35-00 

9.50 

12.81 

Appendix.  213 


APPENDIX    TABLE    IVa. 

TABLE    SHOWING    CLEARANCES   AND    ENTRANCES    AT    THE    LAKE    PORTS    FOR 
EUROPEAN    PORTS    VIA    THE    ST.    LAWRENCE    RIVER. 

No.  No. 

Vessels.  Clearances.  Tons.  Vessels.     Entrances.       Tons. 

1855-56 

1856-57         I       Chicago  to  England  379 

1857-58         I       Chicago  to  England  123       i       England  to 

Chicago  123 

1857-58         9       Cleveland  to  England       3244       i        England  to 

Cleveland        382 
1857-58         3       Detroit  to  England  987       i       England  to 

Detroit  382 

1858-59       16       Chicago,  Detroit,  and 

Cleveland  to  England    5761       7       England  to 

same  ports     2401 
1858-59         2       Same  ports  to  Hamburg     633 
1858-59         I  "      ports  to  Spain  343 

1859-60         5  "      to  England  and 

Scotland  1436     10       From 

England  3575 
1860-61  5  "  "      and  Ireland   1791       8  "  "         2836 

1860-61         5  "to  England  3  "  "         1168 

1862-63         I  "to  "  994       I  "  "  394 

Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  1864,  p.  100. 


2  14  Appendix. 


APPENDIX    TABLE    V. 

statement'  showing  the  number,  national  character,  and  tonnage 

OF    vessels    on    and    through    the    WELLAND,     ST.     LAWRENCE, 

CHAMBLY,    BURLINGTON    BAY,    ST.    ANN'S    LOCK,    OTTAWA, 

AND  RIDEAU  canals,   DURING  THE  YEARS  1854-1864. 


V^essels  and 
Steamers. 

iVo.                 Tons. 

Do7i'n. 
No.                 Tons. 

Amount  of 

Tolls  on 

Vessels. 
I.         s.    d. 

British 
1854  Foreign 
Total 

9.076 

3,098 

12,174 

805,838 

485,144 
1,290,982 

7,602 

3,443 

11,045 

963,385 

512,763 

1,476,148 

4,665      9     0 
5,288     6   10 
9,953   15   10 

British 
1855  Foreign 
Total 

9,401 

1,742 

11,143 

1,000,127 

299,820 

1,299,947 

8,046 
1,720 
9,766 

765,084 

293,019 

1,058,067 

4,902     9     8 
3,481   18     I 
8,384     7     9 

Canadian 
1856  Foreign 
Total 

8,990 

2,111 

11,101 

1,096,670 

440,671 

1,537,341 

8,262 

2,085 

10,347 

753,648 

382,097 

1,135,745 

4,967  17     6 
4,447  10     7 
9,415     8     I 

Canadian 
1857  American 
Total 

8,401 

2,129 

10,530 

822,737 

394,400 

1,217,137 

7,465 
2,288 

9,753 

690,233 

408,524 
1,098,757 

4,853  15     6 
4,243     6     4 
9,097     I   10 

Canadian 
1858  American 
Total 

8,384 
2,201 

10,585 

776,949 

442,062 

1,219,011 

7,930 

2,121 

10,051 

759,926 

423,203 

1,183,129 

$18,757.13 
19,481.78 
38,278.91 

Canadian 
1859  American 
Total 

11,637 
1,786 

13,473 

929,003 

298,095 

1,277,098 

11,123 

1,871 
12,993 

899,360 

328.543 
1,227,923 

$19,668.48 

13,071-75 
32,740.23 

Canadian 
i860  American 
Total 

12,483 

2,470 

14,953 

1,028,333 

472,474 
1,500,807 

11,929 

2,620 

14,549 

1,037,547 

492,376 

1,529,923 

$25,681.10 
24,147.20 
46,826.30 

Canadian 
1861   American 
Total 

12,196 

2,313 

14,509 

1,116,424 

486,573 
1,602,997 

13,394 

2,368 
15,762 

1,219,257 

485,657 
1,704,914 

$28,716.71 
20,986.73 
49,703.44 

1862  Total 

1,807,367 

1,775,029 

Canadian 
1863  American 
Total 

15,623 

2,405 

18,028 

1,354,007 

452,270 

1,806,277 

15,190 
2,393 

17,583 

1,316,170 

451,466 

1,767,636 

$27,365.21 
20,157.81 
47,523.02 

Canadian 
1864  American 
Total 

15,790 

2,071 

17,861 

1,394,354 

326,294 

1,720,648 

15,266 
2,059 

17,325 

1,373,327 

326,860 

1,700,187 

$27,730.87 
13,680.64 
41,411.51 

i854-64(exc.  1862) 

Tetal  Canadian 
and  British 

112,031 

10,324,442 

106,206 

9,777,901 

Total  American 
and  Foreign 

22,326 

4,097,803 

22,968 

4,104,528 

Grand  Total 

137,357 

14,422,245 

129,174 

13,882,429 

'  Compiled  from  Canadian  Sessional  Papers  for  years  given. 


Appendix. 


215 


APPENDIX    TABLE    VI. 

table'    showing    quantities    of    wheat    exported   to    CANADA    AND 
RETURNED    TO    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

I.       Exports  to   Canada. 


Wheat- 

Wheat- 

Wheat 

flour 

Wheat 

flour 

From 

bushels. 

barrels. 

bushels. 

barrels. 

Lake  ports  in  Ohio 

349.372 

992 

1,428,511 

895 

Detroit 

408,428 

19.671 

345,075 

39,059 

Chicago 

1,987,276 

26,525 

1,519,396 

78,749 

Milwaukee 

1,567,657 

30,359 

2,880,791 

40,069 

4.312,753 

77,547 

6,173,773 

158,772 

Value  of  wheat  and  flour. 

1862. 

1863. 

To  Canada 

$3' 

,914,203 

$7, 

138,564 

From  Canada 

6,808,684 

3, 

180, 

698 

2.     Imports  front   Canada. 


Wheat 

Wheat 

Wheat 

flour 

Wheat 

flour 

bushels. 

barrels. 

bushels. 

barrels. 

At  Vermont 

659,884 

152.895 

27,639 

112,557 

Champlain 

41,524 

14,222 

17,877 

11,585 

Cape  Vincent 

226,512 

21,778 

135.628 

15,993 

Ogdensburg 

83,100 

79,200 

75,521 

46,718 

Oswego 

1,257,364 

76,583 

360,405 

47.303 

Genesee 

42,425 

532 

54,104 

52 

Niagara 

39,617 

140,800 

20,652 

81,822 

Buffalo 

761,840 

82,500 

267,328 

93,323 

3,112,266  568,510         958,254  393,360 

Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  1864,  pp.  80  and  81. 


2i6  Appendix. 


APPENDIX    TABLE    VII. 

MOVEMENT    OF    AMERICAN    BREADSTUFFS. 


Down  the 
St.  Lawrence. 

Through  the 
Erie  Canal. 

Total  to 
tide-water. 

1856 

$1,209,612 

$15,342,833 

$16,553,445 

1857 

1,930,280 

10,601,532 

12,531,812 

1858 

1,876,933 

13,757,282 

15,634,216 

1859 

1,988,759 

10,371,766 

12,360,725 

i860 

1,846,462 

23,912,000 

25,758,462 

I86I 

3-103,153 

34,427,800 

37,530,953 

1862 

5,320,054 

39,240,131 

44,560,185 

'  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  1864,  p.  loi. 


APPENDIX    TABLE   VIII. 


c 

;ummary'  at  ports  : 

Domestic 

EASTWARD    OF 

AND    INCLUDING 
Total 

BUFFALO. 

Foreign 

Exports. 

Exports. 

Exports. 

Imports. 

1856 

$11,435,919 

$3,845,132 

$15,281,051 

$16,074,457 

1857 

8,451,227 

2,611,074 

11,062,301 

16,652,371 

1858 

5,873,912 

2,897,044 

8,770,956 

10,390,937 

1859 

7,560,629 

4,637,332 

12,197,961 

12,782,924 

i860 

5,687,095 

2,506,412 

8,193,507 

17,538,793 

I86I 

6,428,534 

2,295,606 

8,724,140 

17,785,093 

1862 

4,912,616 

1,733,336 

6,645,952 

14,505,374 

1863 

4,418,761 

1,289,945 

9,088,681 

17.649,697 

SUMMARY    AT    PORTS    WESTWARD    OF    BUFFALO. 

1856  $3,619,476                   $3,619,476  $1,653,619 

1857  4,577,628                      $15,691                    4,593,319  1,622,584 

1858  7,813,109                         20,676                    7,824,785  1,203,507 

1859  5,886,229                   5,886,229  1,460,508 

i860                        5,494,096                   5,494,096  1,306,880 

1861  5,359,141                   5,359,141  890,600 

1862  6,365,532                       125,803                    6,491,335  767,687 

1863  10,565,285                         80,298                  10,645,583  1,167,302 

^  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  1S64,  p.  113. 


X     =: 


Appendix. 


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2 1 8  Appendix. 


APPENDIX    TABLE    X. 

The  table  below  will  show  the  rate  of  increase  upon  some 
of  the  principal  articles  from  1855  to  1859. 

Articles.          1855.         1856.        1857.  1858.  1859. 
per  cent. 

Molasses.. i6                  ii                  ii  i8  30 

Sugar  (refined) 32                 28                 25  26^  40 

Sugar  (other) 27^             20                 17^^  21  30 

Boots  and  shoes i2}4             1^%             20  21  25 

Harness I2>^              17                 20  21  25 

Cotton  goods 12X             13/^             i5  I5  20 

Iron  goods. 12%             i8>^             15  16  20 

Silk  goods i2>^             12)%             15  17  20 

Wool  goods .-         12^             14                 15  18  20' 

^  Repts.  of  Comm.  2  Sess.  37  Cong.,  Vol.  3,  p.  19. 

Debates  on  Confederation,  3d  Sess.  8th  Prov.  Pari.  Canada,  p.  751. 


Appendix. 


219 


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CO   1-1   h-   c^  11   w   coo   O  «3  o  ao 
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cocococococoooco 


X 


Appendix. 


■:=W 


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oo  en"+ino  t^oo  OO  w  pi  en'i-ini^ 
Tt*minininininin  mo  ^  \0  ^  -^  \0  ^ 
cooocococococococococooooocococo 


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